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1 .1 . T h e  T o p ic
1 .1 :1  .E n v iro n m e n ta l P r o te c t io n  th ro u g h  C iv il L ia b ili t y  
A lth o u g h  c iv il lia b ility  as  a  m e a n s  o f com pensating  env iro n m e n ta l dam age and  
p re ve n tin g  fu tu re  p o llu tio n  w as la rg e ly  neg lected  in  th e  p a s t, its  p o ss ib ilitie s  h a ve  
re ce n tly  be e n  re d isco ve re d . P re v io u s ly , p re ve n ta tive  le g is la tiv e  m easures w ere  
cons ide re d  p re fe ra b le  in th e  fie ld  o f en v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n , b u t v io la tio n , fa u lty  o r 
a cc id e n ta l, o f e n v iro n m e n ta l ru le s  w a s in e v ita b le  1 . A s K ra m e r recen tly  s ta te d , " it 
looks as if a ll com bined ru le s  o f C o m m u n ity  and na tio n a l en v iro n m e n ta l law , adopted  
ove r tw e n ty  ye a rs , have n o t m anaged  s ig n ifica n tly  o r g e n e ra lly  to  reverse th e  tre n d  o f 
th e  s lo w  b u t con tin u e d  d e g ra d a tio n  o f th e  e n v ironm en t w ith in  th e  EEC"2. T h e re fo re , 
th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t th ro u g h  c iv il lia b ility  in s tru m e n ts  is o ne  o f to d a y ’s  
m ost d iscu sse d  su b je c t a m ong  th e  e x p e rts  o f env ironm en ta l law .
1 S ee A line  d e  B ièvre , "Civil Liability and Compensation for Damages caused by 
certain Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HN$) during their Carnage by S ea", w ho 
co n firm s th e  in te re s tin g  assu m p tio n  s ta te d  by M urphy's law , accord ing  to  w h ich  if  
som eth ing  ca n  go  w rong it w ill go w ro n g ;
2 See Ludw ig K räm er, "The implementation of Environmental Laws by the European 
Economic Communitiesft 34 G erm an  Y earboo k o f In te rn a tio n a l Law , B e rlin , 1992, pp. 
9;
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INTRODUCTION
T h e  g row ing  risk o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age th a t is  in he ren t in m odem  in d u s tria l 
a c tiv ity  h a s stressed th e  need fo r th e  com pensation  o f su ch  dam age to  be re g u la te d , 
n a m e ly  th ro u g h  c iv il lia b ility  ru le s . In fa c t, th e  grow th  o f the  econom y and o f the  
le ve ls  o f p roductio n  have  led  to  an  increase o f e n v iro n m e n ta l acciden ts, n a m e ly  o il 
s p ills , a c id  ra in , w a te r p o llu tio n  a n d  the  greenhouse e ffe c t . N o tw ithstand ing  these  
m a jo r a cc id e n ts , to d a y 's  e n v iro n m e n ta l concerns re la te  m ore to  b a re ly  d e te c ta b le  
tra ce s  o f substances in th e  a ir, s o ils  and w a te r w h ich  ca u se  non-signature  d ise a se s. In 
fa c t, a s  th e  G reen P a p e r c o rre c tly  stressed, dam age  caused by n o n -a cc id e n ta l 
a c tiv itie s  is  less sp e cta cu la r b u t m ore  e x te n s ive  and th e re fo re  as m uch  in nee d  o f
4
re m e d ia l a c tio n  . H ow ever, aven  th ough  these  typ e s  o f in ju rie s  should p re fe ra b ly  be 
d e a lt w ith  th ro u g h  p re ve n ta tive  re g u la tio n , an a p p ro p ria te  c iv il lia b ility  system  m ay 
p ro v id e  an  im portan t su p p le m e n ta ry  system  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l regu la tio n  a n d  an
c
e ffic ie n t m echan ism  in co m p e n sa tin g  v ic tim s o f p ro p e rty  a n d  hea lth  in ju rie s  .
In th e o ry , by id e n tify in g  th e  ca u se  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l harm , and q u a n tify in g  the  
harm  ca u se d  to  th e  p la in tiff, th e  in d iv id u a l a ss ig n m e n t o f lia b ility  th ro u g h  th e  c o u rt 
p ro v id e s  com pensa tion  to  v ic tim s  w h ile  in te rn a lis in g  th e  soc ia l c o s ts  o f h a rm
g
p ro d u c in g  a c tiv itie s  . A c c o rd in g ly , a n y  c iv il lia b ility  sys te m  is  use fu l in  th e  p ro te c tio n  
o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t as lo n g  as it  p ro v id e s  a  fa ir  co m p e n sa tio n  fo r dam age ca u se d  to
f ’ 1
3 S ee  P e te r W e tte rs te in , "Recent Trends in the Development of International Civil 
Liability' in  N o rd ic  Jo u rn a l o f In te rn a tio n a l Law , 1991, v o l. 60 , n® 1-2, pp . 4 9 , w ho  
c o n firm s  th a t th e  risks  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l ca ta s tro p h e s  in c re a se s  a ll the  tim e  d ue  to  the  
ra p id  te c h n o lo g ic a l and in d u s tria l d e ve lo p m e n t in  th e  w o rld  and to  th e  in cre a s in g  
in te rco u rse  be tw e e n  co u n trie s  a n d  p e o p le ;
4 S ee a ls o  H ans U lrich  Je ssu ru n  d 'O liv e ira ,"The Sandoz Blaze: the damage and the 
public and private liabilities?, in In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r E nvironm en ta l H a rm , 
C h a p te r 18, w ho co n firm s  th a t a c c id e n ts  a re  ju s t as "s tru c tu ra l as th e  re g u la te d  
re le a se s  c o ve re d  by p e rm its  a n d  as the  re leases fro m  d iffu s e  sources, th e  to ta l 
g u a n tity  o f w h ich  fa r exceeds th o se  fro m  a cc id e n ts";
S ee P e te r S. M enel, "The limitations of legal institutions for addressing 
environmental risks” in Jo u rn a l o f E co n o m ic  P e rsp e ctive s , 1991, vo l. 5 , issue 3 , p p . 
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in d iv id u a ls  and  fu lfils  its  p re v e n tiv e  and econom ic fu n c tio n . In o th e r w ords, su ch  a  
lia b ility  sy s te m  shou ld  d e te r th e  o rig in a to r o f th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age fro m  a llo w in g  
such  d a m a g e  to  o ccu r a t a ll -  p re v e n ta tiv e  fu n c tio n  - a n d  th e  costs o f com pensa ting  
th e  da m a g e  caused by a  ce rta in  p ro d u c tive  and e conom ic  a c tiv ity  shou ld  be im posed  
upon its  o rig in a to r, th e re b y  fa v o u rin g  those producers w ho  have a vo id e d  ca u s in g  
su ch  d a m a g e  -  econom ic fu n c tio n  - 7.
C o n c lu d in g , it is  n o t re a lis tic  to  d isregard  th e  "p a th o lo g ica l" re g u la tio n  o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t ju s t because its  d a m a g e  is n o t de s ira b le  and  th is  is stressed  by B e tle m , 
acco rd in g  to  w hom  "it is  b e co m in g  increasing ly  c le a r th a t env ironm en ta l law  o f th e  
com m and  a nd  con tro l ty p e  is  a lo n e  in s u ffic ie n t fo r a n  e ffe c tive  p ro te c tio n  and  
en h a n ce m e n t o f na ture  a n d  th e  e n v iro n m e n t"8.
1 .2 . T h e  A im  o f  t h e  T h e s is
1 .2 .1 . T h e  M a in  Q u e r ie s
T h is  th e s is  not on ly co n s id e rs  th e  d iffe re n t possib le  system s o f c iv il lia b ility  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age b u t a lso , b y  considers th e  e x is tin g  lega l in s tru m e n ts  o r 
p roposa ls  in  E urope and tr ie s  to  a n a ly s e  the  m ain p ro b le m s ra ised by th e  aca d e m ic  
and in s titu tio n a l debate  a ro u n d  e a ch  o f them . S in ce  a  g e n e ra l com parison  o f a ll 
n a tio n a l le g a l system s w ou ld  be  a  ta s k  to o  va s t fo r th e  e x te n t o f th is  w o rk  th e  th e s is  
w ill lim it its e lf to  th e  h a rm o n isa tio n  e ffo rt th a t is  be ing  m ade in  E urope.
T h e re fo re , it w ill m a in ly  a n a lyse  a n d  com pare th e  p o te n tia l fu tu re  system s o f c iv il 
lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  in  E u rope , nam ely th e  E E C  D ra ft D ire c tive  o n  C iv il
7 S ee R ud iger Lum m ert, "Trends in Environmental Policy and Law: Changes in 
concepts of civil liability1,
8 See G e rrit B e tle m , "Civil liability for transfrontier pollutionr ,  in In te rn a tio n a l 
E nvironm en ta l Law  and P o licy  S e rie s , G raham  & T ro tm a n , L o n d o n , 1993, p p . 7 ;
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L ia b ility  fo r  W aste and its  su bsequ en t G reen P aper w ith  th e  C o u n c il o f E urope 
C o n v e n tio n  on C iv il L ia b ility  fo r D am age caused by D angerous A ctiv itie s .
1.2.2. Main questions which will not be referred to
A lth o u g h  th e  approach o f th is  th e s is  co u ld  a lso  in c lu d e  a  d iscussion  w h e th e r 
E u ro p e a n  E nvironm en ta l Law  sh o u ld  be  harm onised o r not, it w ill be  im p lic itly  
c o n s id e re d  th a t the  re g u la to ry  d iffe re n c e s  in  th is  fie ld  be tw een each M e m b e r S ta te  
c o n trib u te  to  th e  increasing  d e g ra d a tio n  o f the  E uropean, if  no t g lo b a l, e n v iro n m e n t, 
an d , fu rth e rm o re , h inders th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  C om m on M a rk e t9.
S in c e  th e  in te rest o f th e  th e s is  lie s  m ore in  p riv a te  law  rem edies as e ffic ie n t 
in s tru m e n ts  to  com pensa te  p o llu tio n  v ic tim s , th e  resea rch  w ill not in c lu d e  S ta te  
a n d /o r in te rn a tio n a l lia b ility , b e ca u se  these  d e a l m a in ly  w ith  issues o f p u b lic  and  
p riv a te  in te rn a tio n a l law  10. N e ve rth e le ss , th e  im p o rta n ce  o f th e  B russe ls C o n ve n tio n  
a n d  o th e r re le v a n t issues o f p riv a te  in te rn a tio n a l la w  w ill b e  b rie fly  re fe rre d  to .
1 .3 . C o n f ig u r a t io n  o f  t h e  T h e s is
1.3.1. Organisation
T h is  in tro d u c tio n  is d iv id e d  in to  th re e  ch a p te rs , in c lu d in g  th is  firs t o n e  w h ich  
b ro a d ly  p re s e n ts  th e  o b je c tiv e  o f th e  w ork , fo llo w e d  b y  th e  2nd C h a p te r, w h ic h  
a n a lyse s  th e  d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n t and e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age g iv e n  b y  th e
9 C o n firm in g  th e  need fo r u n ifo rm  lia b ility  system s se e  a g a in  P e te r W e tte rs te in
10 O n  s ta te  lia b ility  fo r tra n sb o u n d a ry  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  see T hom as G e h rin g  
a n d  M a rku s  Ja ch te n fu ch s , "Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage? in  
E u ropea n  J o u rn a l o f In te rn a tio n a l Law , v o l. 4 , n2 1, 1993, p p . 92-106; se e  a lso  Ida  
K o p p e n ,HEnvironmental Liability in a European perspective? in  EUI W o rk in g  P apers 
E P U  n2 9 1 /1 2  w ho g e n e ra lly  e la b o ra te s  on  the  m a in  in te rn a tio n a l lia b ility  re g im e s ; 
v e ry  im p o rta n t the  papers o f the  H a g u e  C o n fe rence  on  P riv a te  In te rn a tio n a l Law , 
”Note on the law applicable to civil liability for environmental damage”, P re lim in a ry  




a b o ve -m e n tio n e d  lega l in s tru m e n ts  and proposals, and fin a lly  th e  3rd  C hap te r, w h ich  
a im s to  show  the  use fu ln e ss o f c iv il lia b ility  in s tru m e n ts  in  the  co m p e n sa tio n  o f 
p o llu tio n  v ic tim s .
T he second  p a rt o f th e  th e s is  is  a lso d iv id e d  in to  th re e  chap te rs. C h a p te r 4  w ill 
m ake a b rie f com parison  be tw e e n  th e  d iffe re n t p o ss ib le  system s o f c iv il lia b ility  - 
fa u lt, s tr ic t a n d /o r risk lia b ility  -  a n d  sum m arise  th e ir m a in  ch a ra c te ris tics . C h a p te r 5 
w ill then  s p e c ify  the  m a in  le g a l o p tio n s  taken by th e  E uropean C om m un ity  in  th e  
fo rm u la tio n  o f a  ha rm on ised  sy s te m  o f c iv il lia b ility  fo r  e n v ironm en ta l dam age  in 
g e n e ra l, n a m e ly  by p resen tin g  its  re fle c tio n s  and re su lts  re g a rd in g  the  D ra ft D ire c tive  
on  C iv il L ia b ility  and th e  c o n c lu s io n s  m ade in th e  G reen P aper. L ikew ise , C h a p te r 6 
w ill try  to  show  the  a ffin itie s  a n d  d iffe re n ce s be tw een  th e  C ouncil o f E urope 
C o n ve n tio n  and  th e  E C 's p re se n t p o s itio n  on  th e  su b je c t b y  ana lysing  and e va lu a tin g  
th e  C o n ve n tio n 's  m ain c h a ra c te ris tic s  and legal cho ices.
F in a lly , in  th e  co n c lu s io n  I w ill try  to  e labo ra te  on  th e  s p e c ific  aspects o f e ach  
le g a l in s tru m e n t th a t sh o u ld  be  u se d  in  th e  concep tion  o f a  harm onised system  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  in  E u ro p e .
1 .3 .2 . O u tlo o k
A s an e a rly  e n v iro n m e n ta l la w y e r sa id , "th e  p ro b le m  o f th e  re s to ra tio n  and  
m a in tenance  o f a  liveab le  e n v iro n m e n t is , to  a  la rg e  e x te n t, th e  p rob lem  o f th e  co n tro l 
o f a d m in is tra tiv e  agencies b y  th e  c o u r ts " 11. Th is s ta te m e n t d eno te s th a t a long w ith  
the  in s tru m e n ts  o f c iv il lia b ility  th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t a lso  depends on  th e  
ju d ic ia l co n tro l o f pub lic  a u th o ritie s . T h e  a d m in is tra tive  b ra n ch  o f th e  S ta te  is  m o stly  
co n tro lle d  th ro u g h  its  a d m in is tra tiv e  cou rts , and th e re fo re  a d m in is tra tive  lia b ility
11 S ee S ive , "S o m e  thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of 
Administrative Lav/, 70 C o lum b ia  L aw  R evue  6 1 2 -6 1 5 ,1 9 7 0 ;
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s h o u ld  a lso  have be e n  c o n s id e re d  in  th is  w o rk  b u t its  lim ite d  extent does n o t a llo w  an 
a d e q u a te  study o f su ch  issu e . I w ill try  to  d e m o n s tra te  th e  e ffic ie n cy  o f c iv il lia b ility  
in s tru m e n ts  to  adequ a te ly  co m p e n sa te  and p re ve n t e nv ironm en ta l dam age, e ve n  th a t 
c a u s e d  by pub lic  a u th o ritie s .
CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS USED IN THE THESIS
2 .1 . D e f in it io n  o f  t h e  E n v ir o n m e n t
A s th e  G reen  P aper 1 23 stre sse d , the  co n ce p t o f e n v iro n m e n t needs to  be  
d e te rm ined  in  o rd e r to  d e fin e  d a m a g e  to  the  environm en t, th e  la tte r d e fin itio n  be ing  o f 
g re a t im p o rta n ce  in the  d e c is io n  w h e th e r o r not such  d a m a g e  can be com pensa te d  
fo r v ia  a c iv il lia b ility  action .
In itia lly , w hen  e n v iro n m e n t n o rm a tiv e  re fe rences w e re  sca rce , the  d o c trin e  d id  
no t co n ce ive  th e  e n v iro n m e n t as a  w h o le  b u t ra th e r d iv id e d  it in to  se ve ra l d iffe re n t 
n o tions . F o r e xam p le , G ia n n in i u nde rs too d  it in  th re e  d iffe re n t senses: n a tu ra lis tic , 
m ean ing  th e  n a tu ra l e lem ents (la n d sca p e s, c u ltu ra l asse ts  and h is to rica l ce n tre s , 
na tu ra l resou rces) w hose m a in te n a n ce  is  le g a lly  co n s id e re d ; sp a tia l, m ean ing  th e  
geograp h ica l sp a ce s su b je c t to  le g a l p ro te c tio n  a g a in s t p o llu tio n ; and, fin a lly , in an 
u rban is tic  sense .
1 "C o m m u n ica tio n  fro m  th e  C o m m iss io n  to  the C o u n c il a n d  P arliam ent and th e  
E conom ic S o c ia l C om m ittee : G reen  P a p e r on R em edying E n v iro n m e n ta l D am age", 
C O M (93) 47 fin a l, B russe ls 14 /5 /93 , p p . 10;
2 See F rancesca  P este llin i, in fra  no te  , re fe rrin g  to  a le g a l d e b a te  betw een th e  u n ita ry  
theory w h ich  co n s id e re d  the  e n v iro n m e n t as an un ique  good  a n d  th e  a to m is tic  th e o ry  
accord ing  to  w h ich  the  environm en t w a s  m ade o f a p lu ra lity  o f g o o d s ;
3 G iann in i M .S ., nAmbiente: saggio sui diversi suoi aspetti giuridici', in  R iv is ta  
T rim esta le  D iritto  P ubb lico ", 1973, pp . 15 e S s.;
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M o re  recen tly , th e  o p in io n s  have d iverged abou t th e  exten t o f th e  d e fin itio n  o f 
e n v iro n m e n t and th re e  p o ss ib le  concepts have been asce rta ine d : a  b ro a d  o n e , w h ich  
w o u ld  in c lu d e  no t o n ly  th e  b io lo g ica l aspects b u t a lso  th e  so c ia l, c u ltu ra l and 
e c o n o m ic a l aspects th a t in v o lv e  a  hum an be ing ; a  re s tric tiv e  one , lim ite d  to  the  
n a tu ra l e lem ents th a t su rround  a  hum an life , and, fin a lly , a  norm a tive  co n ce p t, w h ich  
a lso  in c lu d e s  the  lega l norm s re g u la tin g  the  na tu ra l e n v iro n m e n t4.
2.1.1, In Community Law
W o rk in g  through th e  enorm ous quan tity  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l instrum en ts  th a t th e  
C o m m u n ity  has enacted  o ve r th e  past tw en ty years, one com es to  th e  sam e 
co n c lu s io n  as fo r in te rn a tio n a l la w , i.e . th a t each  sp e c ific  instrum ent g iv e s , im p lic itly  
o r e x p lic itly , its  p a rtia l d e fin itio n  o f the  env ironm en t. A lth o u g h  o ne  o f th e  m a in  
o b je c tiv e s  o f the  1957 T re a ty  o f R om e w as "th e  c o n s ta n t im p ro ve m e n t o f th e  liv in g  
a n d  w o rk in g  cond itio ns", it d id  n o t in c lu d e  any e x p lic it re fe re n ce  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t o r 
to  its  p ro te c tio n  5.
N e ve rth e le ss , the  need to  re g u la te  th e  e n v iro n m e n t a nd  estab lish  g u id e lin e s  fo r 
its  p ro te c tio n  w as soon fe lt, in itia lly  in  th e  fie ld  o f p ro d u c t and in d u s tria l s ta n d a rd s . 
F u rth e rm o re , th e  h a rm on isa tion  o f th e  M em ber S ta te  law s in th e  fie ld  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l law  w as in itia lly  b a se d  on  fo rm e r a rtic le  1 0 0 a o f th e  1957 T re a ty , in  
o rd e r to  e n su re  th e  fre e  c irc u la tio n  o f goods necessary fo r  th e  "e s ta b lish m e n t and  
fu n c tio n in g  o f the  com m on m a rke t". La te r on, th e  o b je c tiv e  o f "im p ro ve m e n t o f th e  
liv in g  c o n d itio n s " was used to  fu rth e r base en v iro n m e n ta l le g is la tio n  in a rtic le  2 3 5 e,
4 P ro fe sso r G om es C a n o tilh o ,"Procedimento Administrativo e defesa do ambienter, 
in  R e v is ta  de  Legislagäo e Ju risp ru d é n c ia  d e  nfi 3 7 9 9 , pp .289 -290  c itin g  
M e sse rsch m id t, n Umweltabgaben als Rechtproblerrf, B e rlin , 1986; M .K Io e p fe r, 
"Umweltrechf, M ünchen, 1989; H oppe /B eckm ann, nUmweftrechf, M ünchen, 1989;
5  S e e  L u d w ig  K räm er, ” Focus on European Environmental Lauf, C h a p te r 1 , P a rt 2 , 
c o n firm in g  th a t in the  E E C  T re a ty  o f 1957 th e re  w as n o  in d iv id u a l rig h t to  an 
e n v iro n m e n t, n o t even a  c a ta lo g u e  o f fu ndam en ta l in d iv id u a l rig h ts  and fre e d o m s ;
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w h ich  e n a b le d  the  C ouncil to  ta k e  action  to  a ch ie ve  th is  o b je c tive  o f th e  C o m m u n ity  
a lth o u g h  th e  T rea ty  had n o t e x p lic itly  provided fo r the  n e ce ssa ry  pow ers.
O n ly  re ce n tly , w hen th e  D ra ft D ire ctive  on  C iv il lia b ility  fo r D am age caused by 
W a ste  w as be ing  d iscussed  6, th e  P arliam ent p roposed  an  am endm ent in w h ich  it 
d e fin e d  th e  e n v iro n m e n t as "th e  sum  o f th e  e a rth 's  b io tic  and a b io tic  n a tu ra l 
re so u rce s, such  as a ir, w a te r, s o il, flo ra  and fa u n a  o r any p a rt th e re o f 7. H ow ever, th e  
C o m m iss io n , considering  th a t no  d e fin itio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t had been  g ive n  by 
C o m m u n ity  law  un til th e n , d id  n o t a d o p t the  P a rlia m e n ts  d e fin itio n  in its  am ended 
p ro p o s a l8.
2 .1 .2 . In  In te rn a tio n a l L a w
U sua lly  e n v iro n m e n t is  d e fin e d  in the  se ve ra l in te rn a tio n a l instrum en ts  w ith  
va rio u s  "n u a n ce s", tak ing  in to  a cco u n t th e  d iffe re n t typ e s  o f p o llu tio n  w h ich  a re  to  be  
regu la te d , and  usua lly  each  in te rn a tio n a l o rg an isa tion  a n d /o r p rogram  uses its  ow n 
d e fin itio n . F o r exam ple , th e  "C o n se il In te rna tio na le  de  L a n g u e  F rança ise" d e fin e d  th e  
e n v iro n m e n t a s  "th e  to ta lity , in a  c e rta in  m om ent, o f a ll th e  physica l, ch e m ica l, 
b io lo g ica l a g e n ts  and o f th e  s o c ia l fa c to rs  w h ich  m ay h a ve  a  d ire c t o r in d ire c t, 
m ed ia te  o r im m e d ia te  e ffe c t on  h u m a n  be ings o r hum an a c tiv ity "9.
P ro b a b ly , th e  1972 D e c la ra tio n  o f S tockho lm  w as th e  firs t to  g ive  a  som ew ha t 
d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n t b y  a ffirm in g  th a t th e  w o rld 's  n a tu ra l resources -  a ir, w a te r, 
ea rth , land , flo ra  and fa u n a  and e sp e c ia lly  th e  areas co n s id e re d  to  b e  na tu ra l 
ecosystem s -  shou ld  be  p re se rve d  in  th e  in te re s t o f th e  present a nd  fu tu re
6 S ee ch a p te r 5  on  C om m unity Law  fo r  fu rth e r deve lop m en ts
7 A m endm en t no  8  o f P a rliam en ts  2 n d  R eport, infra no te
0 S ee a rtic le  2 /1  o f th e  A m ended P roposa l and th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t o f th e  
P arliam ents 2 n d  R eport, in fra  no tes a n d
9 S a lva to ri P a tti, "Ambiente (tutela dvilisticajr in D iz io n a ri d e l D iritto  P riva to , v o l. 1 , 
D iritto  C iv ile , p p . 3 1 ;
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g e n e ra tio n s  through ca re fu l p lann ing  and m anagem ent. The m ost re c e n t d e fin itio n  
co m e s  fro m  the  re ce n tly  app roved  C ouncil o f E urope C onvention  10 w h ich  b ro a d ly  
d e fin e s  env ironm en t as in c lu d in g  "natura l resources bo th  ab io tic  and  b io tic , such  as 
a ir, w a te r, so il, fa u n a  a nd  flo ra  a nd  th e  in te raction  be tw een  th e  sam e fa c to rs ; p ro p e rty  
w h ich  fo rm s  part o f the  c u ltu ra l heritage; and th e  ch a ra c te ris tic  a sp e c ts  o f th e  
la n d s c a p e "11. S trange ly  enough th is  d e fin itio n  does n o t seem  to  in c lu d e  th e  so c ia l 
a n d  e co n o m ica l e ffe c ts  o f hu m a n  a c tiv ity . i: />‘
T h e  tre n d  o f in te rn a tio n a l law  has been to  ch o o se  a  broad c o n c e p t o f the  
e n v iro n m e n t in  w h ich  the  e le m e n ts  resu lting  fro m  h um an  a c tiv ity  a re  c o n s id e re d  as 
re le v a n t as th e  n a tu ra l e lem en ts . Thus, th e  in te rp re ta tio n  o f the  C o u n c il o i E u rope  
C o n ve n tio n  d e fin itio n  m ay ra ise  som e doubts as to  w h e th e r ce rta in  d a m a g e s  to  the  
in d iv id u a l's  rig h t to  a hea lthy  e n v iro n m e n t are to  be in c lu d e d  in  its  sco p e  o r n o t.
2.2. Definition of Environmental Damage
In  g e n e ra l te rm s, m ost c iv il law yers d e fine  dam age  as any m a te ria l o r  m o ra l 
in ju ry  su s ta in e d  by a  pe rso n  a s  re s u lt o f the  a c tiv itie s  o f a  th ird  pa rty  12. N e ve rth e le ss , 
th is  d e fin itio n  o f dam age m ay n o t be  broad enough to  co v e r the  p o llu tio n  o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t, espec ia lly  in  th o se  system s w here th e re  is  no  in d iv id u a l rig h t to  the  
e n v iro n m e n t. A s has a lre a d y b e e n  m entioned it is  necessary to  de fine  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
dam age  in  o rd e r to  de te rm in e  w h ich  in ju ry  can be  com pensa te d  fo r v ia  c iv il lia b ility  
law . T h is  because  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  does n o t a lw a ys  im p lica te  a n  e co n o m ic
10 C o u n c il o f E urope  C on ve n tio n  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r  D am age resu lting  fro m  a c tiv itie s  
d a n g e ro u s  to  th e  E nvironm en t, L u g a n o  21 /6 /1993 ;
11 See a rtic le  22/10 o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  ;
12 A nne S u rz u r, "Liability for environmental damage in Europe?, in  E urope In fo rm a tio n  
S e rv ice , 1993 ;
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lo ss  o r an  in d iv id u a l in ju re d  p a rty , ch a ra c te ris tics  w h ich  a re  essentia l to  th e  e ffe c tiv e  
o p e ra tio n  o f a  c iv il lia b ility  syste m .
F u rth e rm o re , en v iro n m e n ta l d a m age  m ay h ave  s e v e ra l d is tin c tive  fe a tu re s  fro m  
th e  dam ages th a t a re  le g a lly  re le v a n t to  the  tra d itio n a l system s o f c iv il lia b ility , 
n am e ly  p e rso n a l in ju ry , p ro p e rty  dam age and e co n o m ic  lo ss . In fac t, th e  u n u su a lly  
la rg e  e x te n t o f th e  dam age, th e  huge  num ber o f p o ss ib le  o rig in a to rs  o f th e  dam age , 
th e  s e ve ra l in ju re d  persons and th e  co m p le x ity  o f the  ca u s a l re la tionsh ips  a re  som e  
o f th e  u n iq u e  ch a ra c te ris tics  o f en v iro n m e n ta l dam age  th a t m ust be  taken  in to  
acco u n t w h e n  fo rm u la tin g  its  d e fin itio n .
T h e re fo re , th e  re ce n t in s tru m e n ts  re fe rring  to  e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  h a ve  
accepted  th a t p o llu tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t m ay b e  ca u se d  by an in d u s tria l a c tiv ity , 
m ay re su lt fro m  seve ra l a c tiv itie s  le d  b y  d iffe re n t o p e ra to rs  13 and/or it m ay re s u lt 
from  a c tiv itie s  ca rrie d  o u t in  th e  p a s t
2.2.1. In Community Law
T he  G reen  P aper s tresses th e  n e e d  n o t onyl fo r a  le g a l d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n t 
bu t a lso  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l da m a g e  d u e  to  th e  im p o rta n ce  in  de te rm in in g  th e  le ve l a t 
w h ich  a ce rta in  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  w ill co n s titu te  an  "im p a irm e n t to  the  e n v iro n m e n t". 
F urthe rm ore , b y  lim itin g  th e  re s to ra tio n  and com pensa tion  m easures d ue  fo r such 
im pa irm en t th is  d e fin itio n  w ill a lso  b e  lim itin g  the  co s ts  th a t a n  in ju red  p a rty  can  sue 
fo r v ia  a  c iv il lia b ility  action  14.
A s  in re la tio n  to  th e  d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n t th e  s e ve ra l C om m un ity  D ire c tive s  
and/or R e g u la tions a lso  d e fin e  d a m a g e  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t a cco rd in g  to  th e  ty p e  o f 
p o llu tio n  th e y  seek to  re g u la te . N eve rthe le ss, w hen a n a lys in g  these  se ve ra l
13 E xam ples o f th e se  types o f ch ro n ic  o r cum u la tive  p o llu tio n  c a n  b e  seem  in  th e  C O s 
em issions in to  th e  a tm osphere ; see A n n e  S urzur, pp. 6 ;
14 S ee p o in t 4 .1 .2 . A) o f the  G reen  P a p e r
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C o m m u n ity  law in s trum en ts  the  question s till re m a in s  as to  w hen  th e  co n c e p t o f 
d a m a g e  to  the  e n v iro n m e n t includes dam age to  pe rso n s  o r p ro p e rty  and w h e n  it on ly  
c o n s id e rs  the  im pa irm ent o f th e  environm en t as such .
T h is  is  a lso one o f th e  do u b ts  th e  C om m ission 's  p ro p o sa l fo r a  D ire c tiv e  o n  C iv il 
L ia b ility  caused by W aste  trie s  to  c la rify . A lthough  it  s ta rts  by d e fin in g  in ju ry  to  the 
e n v iro n m e n t "as a n y s ig n ifica n t a nd  p e rs is ten t in te rfe re n ce  in the  e n v iro n m e n t caused 
b y  a  m od ifica tio n  o f the  p h ys ica l, chem ica l o r b io lo g ic a l co nd itio ns o f w a te r, s o il and 
a ir"  15, it a lso  considers necessa ry  the  com pensa tion  o f d e a th  o r p h ys ica l in ju ry  and o f 
d a m a g e  to  p riva te  p ro p e rty 16. It seem s as if  it d is tin g u ish e s  tw o  d iffe re n t co n ce p ts : a  
s tric te r one  o f "in ju ry " to  th e  environm en t a s  such , an d  a  b ro a d e r one w h ic h  a lso 
in c lu d e s  personal dam ages. T hese personal d am ages a re  a lso  to  b e  co m pensa te d  
w hen  th e  p riva te  p ro p e rty  o f th e  in ju red  person has b e e n  su b je c t to  d e s tru c tio n  o r to  
d e te rio ra tio n .
T he  use o f the  te rm  "m o d ifica tio n " was c ritic is e d  b y  the  ESC 17 w h ich  stressed  
th a t m od ifica tions ca n  a lso be  o f a p os itive  n a tu re  and  e ve n  re su lt in an  im p ro ve m e n t 
o f th e  environm enta l co n d itio n s. Such p o s itive  m o d ific a tio n s  sh o u ld  be p rom oted  
ra th e r than  penalised, a c ritic ism  con firm ed  b y  th e  P a rlia m e n t, w ho su g g e s te d  instead  
th e  use  o f the  term  "d e te rio ra tio n "18. N ot on ly  w as th is  su g g e stio n  a d o p te d  in  th e  fin a l 
v e rs io n  o f the  P roposal, but a lso  the  te rm  "im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t" s u b s titu te d  
the  te rm  "in ju ry  to  th e  environm en t",
T h e  new  concept o f im pa irm en t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t is  no  lo n g e r d e fin e d  a s those 
in te rfe re n ce s  w ith th e  e n v iro n m e n t w hich a re  "s ig n ific a n t and  p e rs is te n t", b u t re fe rs 
o n ly  to  s ig n ifica n t d e te rio ra tio n  o f th e  en v iro n m e n t to  a v o id  le a v in g  o u t th e  te m p o ra ry
15 S e e  a rtic le  2/1  d) o f th e  O rig in a l C om m issions P ro p o sa l, in fra  no te
16 S e e  a lso  C hapter on C om m unity law
17 O p in io n  on the p roposa l fo r a  C ouncil D ire c tive  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r dam age 
ca u se d  b y  W aste in O J n2 C 2 5 1 ,4 /1 0 /1 9 8 9 , p p . 3 ;
18 S ee  am endm ent no 8  o f P arliam ents 2 nd R eport, in fra  n o te
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in te rfe re n ce s , as it d id  b e fo re  19 20. T h is  am endm ent is o f so m e  im portance , s in ce  th e  
na tio n a l le g is la to r and ju d g e  m a y  n o t ignore th o se  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam ages w hose  
e ffe c ts  a re  o n ly  te m p o ra ry , as it  co u ld  be fore . N e ve rth e le ss , th e  concept o f s ig n ific a n t 
d e te rio ra tio n  o f the  e n v iro n m e n t s till leaves a  dange ro us m arg in  o f d isc re tio n : w hen 
w ill a c e rta in  dam age to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t be cons ide re d  s ig n ific a n t o r w hen  w ill it be  
co n s id e re d  neg lig ib le  and  th e re b y  n o t w orthy o f co n s id e ra tio n  under th is  lia b ility  
system  ?
R e tu rn ing  to  the  G reen  P aper , it sta tes th a t "a  le g a l d e fin itio n  o f dam age to  th e  
e n v iro n m e n t is  o f fu n d a m e n ta l im portance , s in ce  such a  d e fin itio n  w ill d rive  th e  
p rocess o f d e te rm in in g  th e  typ e  and  scope o f the  necessa ry rem ed ia l a c tio n  and th u s  
th e  costs th a t a re  re co ve ra b le  v ia  c iv il lia b ility ". A n  im p o rta n t conc lus io n  to  be  
reached is  a t w ha t p o in t p o llu tio n  o f the  e n v iro n m e n t can  be considered  an 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, to  be  co m p e n sa te d  by c iv il lia b ility .
2.2.2. In International Law
W ith in  in te rn a tio n a l la w  th e re  a re  th ree  d iffe re n t le v e ls  o f ru les  re g a rd in g  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, n a m e ly  th o s e  re la ting to  in te rn a tio n a l re sp o n s ib ility  fo r 
w ro n g fu l co n d u c t 21, fo r in ju rio u s  consequences a ris in g  o u t o f a c ts  no t p ro h ib ite d  b y  
in te rn a tio n a l law , and a lso  th e  n a tio n a l o r harm onised ru le s  on  c iv il lia b ility  fo r s p e c ific  
hazardous a c tiv itie s  22.
19S ee a rtic le  2 /1  d ) o f the  A m e n d e d  P ro p o sa l;
20 S ee above  no te  2;
21 S ee a rtic le  21 o f th e  E n v iro n m e n t P ro te c tio n  and S u s ta in a b le  D eve lopm e n t o f th e  
E xpert G roup  o n  E n v ironm en ta l Law  o f th e  W orld  C o m m iss io n  on  E n v iro n m e n t and 
D eve lopm e nt w hose  paragraph  1 e s tab lish es th a t" a  S ta te  is  responsib le  under 
in te rna tio na l la w  fo r a  b reach  o f a n  in te rn a tio n a l o b lig a tio n  re la tin g  to  th e  use  o f a  
na tu ra l re so u rce  o r th e  p re ve n tio n  o r ab a te m e n t o f an  e n v iro n m e n ta l in te rfe re n ce ";
22 S ee P re fa ce  to  "International Responsibility for Environmental Harnf, e d ite d  b y  
F rancesco F ra n c io n i and T u lio  S c o va zz i, In te rna tio na l E n v iro n m e n ta l Law  a nd  P o licy  
series;
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Furtherm ore , th e  sco p e  o f lia b ility  o f th e  se v e ra l in te rn a tio n a l in s tru m e n ts  is  
usua lly  lim ited  to  th e  dam age  caused by sp e c ific  e co n o m ic  a c tiv itie s  a n d  th e re fo re  
th e  d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age is  c lo se ly  co n n e cte d  w ith  th e  m e a n in g  g iv e n  
to  th e  te rm  p o llu tio n , w h ich  in in te rn a tio n a l law  has been in te rp re te d  as th e  
"in tro d u ctio n  b y  m an, d ire c tly  o r in d ire c tly , o f substances o r e n e rg y  in to  th e  
e n v ironm en t re su ltin g  in  d e le te rio u s  e ffe c ts  o f a  n a tu re  to  e n d a n g e r th e  hum an 
h e a lth , liv in g  resources a n d  ecosystem s, d e te rio ra te  n a tu ra l p ro p e rtie s , a n d  im p a ir o r 
in te rfe re  w ith  a m e n itie s  a n d  o th e r le g itim a te  uses o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t"23 4 25. A c c o rd in g ly , 
environm en ta l d a m age  in  its  b roadest m ean ing  in c lu d e s  in ju ry  to  p e rso n a l h e a lth  and  
p ro p e rty  and im p a irm e n t to  th e  en v iro n m e n t p e rs e .
2JL 2J*___ tnJtie Council <?t Eurcpe.CanxeatjQD
S im ila r to  th e  C o m m u n ity  le g a l in s tru m e n ts , th e  C o n ve n tio n  d e fin e s  d a m a g e  as 
in c lu d in g  dam age to  in d iv id u a ls , the  im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t and  th e  costs  o f 
p re ve n tive  m easures ta ke n  to  m in im ise  th e  dam age  and fu rth e r loss o r dam age 
th e re o f re la ted  . In  o rd e r fo r  such  dam age to  be  com pensa te d  it  m ust re s u lt fro m  
th e  dangerous n a tu re  o f th e  a c tiv ity , nam e ly fro m  th e  hazardous p ro p e rtie s  o f the  
su b sta n ce s, from  g e n e tic a lly  m o d ifie d  o rgan ism s o r m ic ro -o rg a n ism s, o r fro m  w aste .
A s  in  th e  proposed  EE C  D ire c tiv e  dam age  to  in d iv id u a ls  in c lu d e s n o t o n ly  th e ir 
p e rsona l in ju ry  and d e a th  b u t a lso  loss o r dam age  to  th e ir p ro p e rty . A lth o u g h  the
23 F o r e xa m p le , se e  th e  p o in t o f th e  G reen P aper th a t re fe rs  to  th e  C o n ve n tio n  on 
T h ird  P a rty  L ia b ility  in  th e  F ie ld  o f N u c le a r E nergy (P a ris  1960) a n d  to  the  
In te rn a tio n a l C o n ve n tio n  on  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r O il P o llu tio n  D am age (B ru sse ls  1960) 
w h ich  d e fin e s  dam age  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t m eans th e  lo s s  o r dam age  ca u se d  o u ts id e  
th e  sh ip  ca rry in g  o il o r  th e  co n ta m in a tio n  re su ltin g  fro m  th e  escape o r d is c h a rg e  o f o il 
fro m  th e  sh ip , w h e re ve r su ch  e sca p e  and d isch a rg e  m a y o ccu r, and in c lu d e s  th e  cost 
o f p re ve n tive  m easures and  fu rth e r loss o r d a m age  c a u se d  by p re ve n tive  m e a su re s .
24 S ee a rtic le  12 o f th e  C o rp u s  o f P rin c ip le s  a n d  R u les R e la tive  to  th e  P ro te c tio n  o f 
th e  E n v iro n m e n t in "L a  Pollution Transfrontîére et le Droit International b y  the 
A cadém ie  d e  D ro it In te rn a tio n a l d e  la  H aye;
25 S ee a rtic le  2®/7 o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  a nd  p o in t 3 3  o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  R e p o rt;
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C o n ve n tio n  inc ludes in  th e  da m a g e  to  persona l p ro p e rty , its  de s tru c tio n  a n d /o r 
d e te rio ra tio n , it exc ludes fro m  com pensa tion  th e  dam age  to  th e  in s ta lla tio n  its e lf o r  to  
p ro p e rty  u n d e r th e  co n tro l o f th e  o p e ra to r o f the  s ite  26, th e re b y  being m ore  re s tric tiv e  
th a n  th e  E E C  p roposed  D ire c tive .
U n like  th e  D ra ft D ire c tive , th e  C onvention  does n o t d e fin e  im p a irm e n t o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t, b u t it lim its  th e  com pensa tion  fo r  such im p a irm e n t to  th e  co s ts  o f 
m easures o f re in sta te m e n t ta ke n  o r to  be taken 27. T h e se  m easures m ay be in  th e  
fo rm  o f ré in tro d u ctio n  o f e q u iv a le n t com ponents in to  th e  e n v ironm en t w hen th e  
re in s ta te m e n t o r th e  re s to ra tio n  o f th o se  dam aged o r d e s tro ye d  com ponents o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t is  im poss ib le  .
F u rth e rm o re , the  C o n ve n tio n  a lso  includes in its  d e fin itio n  o f dam age th e  costs o f 
p re ve n tive  m easures and any lo ss  o r dam age caused b y  th e se  m easures . B y 
fu rth e r d e fin in g  p re ve n tive  m easures as "any reasonab le  m easures ta ke n  by a n y 
person" to  p re v e n t a th re a t o f d am age  o r to  a vo id  its  w o rse n in g  th e  C o n ve n tio n  
acknow led ges the  advan ta ges o f th e s e  p reven ta tive  a c tio n  c la u se s  . A lth o u g h  th e se  
p re ve n tive  m easures are o n ly  com pensa te d  if th e y  are  re a so n a b le , a  no tion  w h ich  is 
le ft to  th e  c o u rts ' in te rp re ta tio n , su ch  clauses encourage  a c tio n  to  be  ta ke n  a fte r th e  
re le a se  o f th e  ha rm fu l su b s ta n ce  b u t b e fo re  the  o ccu rre n ce  o f th e  dam age. 2678930
26 S ee a rtic le  2^ 7 b) o f the  C o n ve n tio n  and  po in t 35 o f the  E xp la n a to ry  R e p o rt
27 S ee a rtic le  2K? c) o f the  C o n ve n tio n ;
28 S ee a rtic le  2 ^ 8  o f the  C onven tio n  a n d  p o in t 40 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  R eport;
29 S ee a rtic le  2 ^ /7  d) o f the  C o n ve n tio n ;
30 S ee a rtic le  9s o f the  C onven tion  a n d  p o in t 41 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  R eport;
CHAPTER 3
ROLE OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE PREVENTION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
3.1. Introduction
A cco rd in g  to  s e ve ra l a u th o rs , e sp e c ia lly  co m m u n ity  law  a u th o rs , p riv a te ly  
in itia te d  litig a tio n  p la ys  o n ly  a  m in o r ro le  in th e  p ro te c tio n  o f the  e n v iro n m e n t, m a in ly  
due to  th e  p rocedura l d iffic u ltie s  th a t it usua lly  encoun te rs . In fact, th e  p ro ce d u ra l 
d iffic u ltie s  p riva te  pe rsons fa c e  in  d iffe re n t co u n trie s  w ith  regard to  a cce ss  to  
e n v iro n m e n ta l ju s tic e  v a ry  fro m  th e  re fusa l to  g iv e  s ta n d in g  to  p riva te  o rg a n isa tio n s , 
w h ich  a re  u su a lly  b e tte r p re p a re d  to  support th e  fin a n c ia l burden o f g o in g  to  c o u rt, to  
the  le g a l co n fig u ra tio n  o f its  c iv il lia b ility  reg im e , w h ich  in  m any co u n trie s  has s till n o t 
d e ve lo p e d  fro m  the  tra d itio n a l fa u lt lia b ility  re g im e  \  H ow ever, if p o llu te rs  a re  o n ly  
c o n tro lle d  by p u b lic  a u th o ritie s , th e  p re ca u tio n a ry  p rin c ip le  and th e  p o llu te r pays 
p rin c ip le  m ay be  som ew hat d is to rte d .
A cco rd in g  to  a  c e rta in  d o c trin e  th e  m ain  o b je c tive  o f any c iv il lia b ility  sys te m  is  to  
e q u a lly  d is trib u te  w ea lth  s in ce  th e  e x te m a lisa tio n  o f re p a ra tio n  costs w o u ld  m e a n  a
1 See D ehousse, supra n o te , re fe rin g  th e  ro le  o f th e  E C J in  re s tructu ring  th e  n a tio n a l 
p ro ce d u ra l system s, fo r e xa m p le  in  th e  C ase Frankovich w here  it w as re co g n ise d  
th a t th e  d iffe re n t in th e  re m e d ie s  a v a ila b le  a t n a tio n a l le v e l, a ffe c ts  th e  e x te n t to  
w h ich  in d iv id u a ls  can  re ly  o n  th e  rig h ts  d e rive d  fro m  C o m m u n ity  law ;
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d e p riv a tio n  o f rig h ts  o f th e  p o llu tio n  v ic tim  in fa v o u r o f th e  b e n e fit o f th e  risk  c re a to r2. 
T h e re fo re , w hen  d e c id in g  fo r a  s p e c ific  lia b ility  re g im e , th e  le g is la to r -  e ith e r th e  
co m m u n ity , in te rn a tio n a l o r n a tio n a l leg is la to r -  shou ld  b e  aw are o f th e  co n tra s tin g  
g o a ls  to  b e  ach ieved  th ro u g h  su ch  regula tion. If, w hen  regu la ting  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
lia b ility , p re fe re n ce  is g ive n  to  aw ard ing  com pensation to  v ic tim s , then  such  a system  
m ay not be  a  ve ry  e ffe c tiv e  p o llu tio n  de terren t. O n th e  o th e r hand, a  system  th a t 
im poses s u ffic ie n t lia b ility  co s ts  to  deter a  p o te n tia l p o llu te r fro m  causing  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age m ay lead  to  s itu a tio n s  o f o ve rco m p e n sa tio n  3.
F u rth e rm o re , it is  ve ry  im p o rta n t to  discuss w h e th e r c iv il lia b ility  ins trum en ts  a re  
adequate  to  com pensate  th e  im p a irm e n t o f ce rta in  e le m e n ts  o f the e n v iro n m e n t 
w h ich  can n o t be approp ria ted , such  as the  sea o r th e  a tm o sp h e re  4. In o th e r w ords, if  
ce rta in  e n v iro n m e n ta l aspects  a re  considered  goods o f th e  p u b lic  d o m a in , can its  
im p a irm e n t b e  co ns ide re d  da m a g e  s o  a s to  be co m p e n sa te d  fo r v ia  c iv il lia b ility  law  ?
3.2. Position of the European Community
2 S ee G ü n th e r D oeker and T hom as G ehring, "Private or International liability for 
transnational environmental damage - The precedent of conventional liability regimes? 
in Jo u rn a l o f E nv ironm en ta l Law , v o l. 2 , n2 1 ,1 9 9 0 , p p . 2;
3 See in re la tio n  to  the  g o a ls  o f th e  EEC  D raft D ire c tiv e , L in d a  M .S heehan, * The 
E E C 's proposed Directive on Civil Liability for damage caused by waste: taking over 
when prevention fails?, in E co logy Law  Q uarte rly , v o l. 18, 1 991 , n2 2, pp. 4 3 9 , note  
251;
4 F or e xa m p le , in  re la tion  to  Ita lia n  Law  see F rancesca P e s te llin i in "Environmental 
Liability in a European Perspective?, E U I W orking P apers EPU  n2 91 /12  re fe rin g  to  th e  
in itia l case  law  o f th e  C ourt A cco u n ts  w ho  considered the  e n v iro n m e n t as an n ique 
good destin e d  fo r c o lle c tive  e n jo ym e n t nd co n se q u e n tly  o n ly  th e  S ta te , as 
re p re se n ta tive  o f such  c o lle c tiv ity , had  th e  rig h t to  co m p e n sa tio n ;
27
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A ccord ing  to  T h ie ffry , c iv il law  Instrum ents sh o u ld  on ly  in te rv e n e  w h e n  th e  
C o m m un ity  m arket m echan ism s 5 and th e  in ce n tive s  to  su b scribe  to  v o lu n ta ry  
engagem ents are in e ffic ie n t. C onsequently, he co n s id e rs  th a t the  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f 
th e  "p o llu te r pays" p rin c ip le  th ro u g h  c iv il lia b ility  sh o u ld  be the  m ost ra d ic a l in s tru m e n t 
o f C om m un ity environm en ta l p o licy  6 7. Th is k in d  o f p o s itio n  show s th a t th e  E uropea n  
C o m m u n ity  has been m a in ly  concerned a b o u t the  need fo r an e ffe c tiv e  
im p lem en ta tion  and en fo rce m e n t o f environm en ta l D ire c tive s  and R e g u la tio n s  1. In 
fa c t, th e  C om m unity a tte n tio n  focuses on th e  e n fo rce m e n t ro le  o f M em ber S ta te s  and 
o f th e ir  lo ca l a u tho ritie s  as g u a ra n te e s  th a t th e  e n v iro n m e n t is  e ffe c tive ly  p ro te c te d  8.
F urtherm ore , n o t on ly  p re ve n tio n  is considered  a  fundam enta l p rin c ip le  in the  
p ro te c tio n  o f the en v iro n m e n t 9 b u t the  p a rtic ip a tio n  p rin c ip le  and th e  p o llu te r pays 
p rin c ip le  a re  also be ing  in c re a s in g ly  adopted. S uch a  "p o llu te r pays" p rin c ip le  w as 
in itia lly  re fe rre d  to  b y  th e  C o m m u n ity  in its  3 rd  E n v ironm en ta l P ro g ra m m e  in  th e  
fo llo w in g  m anner: "th e  p rin c ip le ’s  p rov is ions fo r charg ing  po llu te rs  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l 
p ro te c tio n -re la te d  costs  im pe ls p o llu te rs  to  reduce  th e  le ve l o f p o llu tio n  ca u se d  by
5 S ee L o rd  C lin ton  D avis in "Environmental Liability, In tro d u ctio n  to  C h a p te r V  - The 
R eg iona l P erspective  on  th e  use  o f econom ic and p o litic a l w eapons and  th e  ro le  o f 
in te rn a tio n a l law , w ho includes am ong the  po ss ib le  m a rke t m echan ism s to  p ro m o te  
th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te ctio n  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l cha rges and ta xe s , 
s tric t a llo c a tio n  o f re sp o n s ib ility  a nd  lia b ility  a nd  th e  g iv in g  o f re lia b le  in fo rm a tio n  on 
e n v iro n m e n ta l risk  to  o rd in a ry  c itiz e n s ;
6 P a trick  T h ie ffry , "L e s  nouveaux instruments juridiques de la politique communitaire 
de I'environmmenf, in  R evue T rim e s trie lle  de  D ro it E uropeen, P aris, A nn . 2 8 , ns 4, 
O ct.-D ez. 1992, pp. 669-685 ;
7 See fo r  a  m ore d e ta ile d  d e sc rip tio n  o f th e  e n fo rce m e n t p rob lem s R ich a rd  M a cro ry , 
"The enforcement of Community Environmental Laws: Some Critical issuesf, in  C M L 
R ev., 1 9 9 2 , pp. 347; see  a lso  E cka rd  R ehb inder and  R ich a rd  S te w a rt,"Environmental 
Protection Policy, vo l. 2 , C h a p te r V III, P a rt A / 3 ;
8 S ee Ludw ig  K räm er, "Focus on European Environmental Law ", C h a p te r 9 , w ho 
b e lie ve s  th a t s ince  no g ro u p  has a  v e s te d  in te re s t in  se e in g  en v iro n m e n ta l s ta n d a rd s  
a c tu a lly  a p p lie d , en fo rcem en t by p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  se e m s a ll the  m ore n e ce ssa ry ;
9 S ee a rtic le  130R  o f th e  EEC  T re a ty , as am ended  b y S E A ;
28
C H A P T E R  3
R O L E  O F  C IV IL  L IA B IL IT Y  IN T H E  P R E V E N T IO N  O F
E N V IR O N M E N T A L  D A M A G E
2 9
th e ir a c tiv itie s  and to  se e k  p ro d u cts  o r techno log ies th a t p o llu te  less" 10 1. La te r on , 
C o m m u n ity  le g is la to rs  re a lise d  th a t th e se  o b je c tive s  and  a im s cou ld  n o t be a ch ie ve d  
by on ly  us ing  regu la to ry m easures t1 and th e y  co n s id e re d  th a t the  "p o llu te r pays 
p rin c ip le " and  even th e  C o m m u n ity  environm en ta l law  sh o u ld  no lo n g e r be o f an 
e xc lu s ive ly  re g u la to ry  n a tu re 12 13.
For e xa m p le , le t us look a t a  case w here a co m p a n y  d ischarges p o llu tin g  
substance s in to  a  rive r, w ith o u t a  lice n se  o r o v e r the  lim its  o f the  lice n se , w ith  th e  
co nsequ ence  th a t se ve ra l p riv a te  p a rtie s  are in ju red  o r in c u r expenses to  avo id  such  
in ju ry . T h e  re a c tio n  to  th e se  p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  w ill d iffe r accord ing  to  th e  d iffe re n t 
e n v iro n m e n ta l po lic ie s  o f each  M e m b e r S tate : th o se  co u n trie s  w ith  a ce n tra l fo cu s  on 
e n v iro n m e n ta l regu la tio n  and  its  en fo rce m e n t w ill p ro b a b ly  lim it them se lves to  issu ing  
an a d m in is tra tiv e  o rder to  s top  su ch  a c tiv ity  and  a p p ly in g  o f fines acco rd ing  to  
n a tio n a l, c o m m u n ity  a n d /o r in te rn a tio n a l la w 1d. T h is  w ill n o t suppress th e  "eco n o m ic  
im m u n ity " o f th e  p o llu tin g  co m p a n y  s in ce  not o n ly  w ill it le a ve  p riva te  in d iv id u a ls  
w ith o u t a d e q u a te  co m pensa tion  b u t it  w ill enable th e  co m pany to  ba lance th e  p o ss ib le
10 3 rd  A c tio n  p rogram m e o f th e  EC  C o u n c il o f M in is te rs ;
11 S e e  EC D ire c tiv e  8 2 /5 0 1 , O J C 7  o f 12/10/87, th e  "S e ve so  D irective "on  the  risks  
o fm a jo r a cc id e n ts  in c e rta in  in d u s tria l a c tiv itie s  w h ich  im p lic itly  recogn ises th e  
im portance  b o th  o f p re ve n tio n  and  o f com pensation ; se e  a lso  C ouncil D e c la ra tio n  
a fte r th e  S a n d o z fire , B ull. EC  11 -1986 , p o in t 2 /1 /146 ;
12 S ee G ille s  J . M a rtin ,"Compensation for Ecological Damage? in C om pensation  fo r 
P o llu tio n  D am age, C hapter 2 , w ho re cogn ise s th a t in the  lo n g  te rm  the  d e s ira b le  g o a l 
is to  p re ve n t dam age fro m  o ccu rin g , b u t th a t in  th e  s h o rt and m edium  te rm  an 
e ffe c tive  sys te m  o f redress is  ve ry  im p o rta n t;
13 N e ve rth e le ss , see G iandom e n ico  M ajone, nDeregulation and re-regulation: policy 
making in the EC since the Single Act, EUI W orking P apers in  S P S  n2 93 /2  a cco rd in g  
to  w h ich  th e  tra n s fe r o f re g u la to ry  po w e rs  to  th e  EC  C o m m iss io n  m ay im p ro ve  th e  
b e h a v io u r o f p o llu tin g  firm s ; th e se  firm s  are  lik e ly  to  b e lie v e  th a t th e  na tio n a l 
le g is la to rs  w ill b e  unw illing  to  to  p ro se cu te  them  as rig o ro u s ly  if  th e y  d e te rm in e  th e  
leve l o f e n fo rce m e n t u n ila te ra lly  ra th e r th a n  under s u p ra n a tio n a l su p e rv is io n ;
29
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c o s t o f a d m in is tra tive  fin e s  a g a in s t th e  expenses it w o u ld  incu r if it le g a lly  e lim in a te d  
its  w a s te s 14.
3.2.1. Leaat Harmonisation
T h e re fo re , the  E uropean  C o m m u n ity  re c e n tly  re co g n ise d  th e  u se fu ln e ss  o f c iv il 
lia b ility  a s  a  in d ire c t m eans o f co m p le tin g  th e  in te rn a l m arke t and  a  necessa ry  
in s tru m e n t to  en fo rce  e n v iro n m e n ta l re g u la tio n s  15. In  fa c t, w hen s ta tin g  th e  m ain  
o b je c tiv e s  of th e  D ra ft D ire c tiv e  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  ca u se d  b y  W aste , th e  C om m iss ion  
ju s tifie d  th e  ha rm o n isa tio n  o f c iv il lia b ility  ru le s  in  th is  fie ld  in  o rd e r to  avo id  
d is to rtio n s  in  th e  c o m p e titio n  a n d  d iffe re n ce s  in  th e  e n v iro n m e n t p ro te c tio n  c o n d itio n s  
am ong  M em ber S ta te s 16,
In  o th e r w ords, th e se  d iffe re n c e s  be tw een  M e m b e r S ta tes law  c o u ld  lead 
p ro d u ce rs  o f w aste to  in v e s t in  th o se  co u n trie s  w h e re  th e  lega l fra m e w o rk  is  less 
s trin g e n t fo r  th e m  and  co n se q u e n tly  m ore d isa d va n ta g e o u s  fo r th e  e n v iro n m e n t and 
fo r p o te n tia l p o llu tio n  v ic tim s  17. T he  co nsequ en t tra n s fe r o f th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  to
14 S e e  R a lph  P. K rone r, ” Environmental Liability insurance: Tour d' horizon in Europe? 
in  T ra n sn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  a nd  in su ra n ce , P a rt A , C h a p te r 1 w ho 
co n firm s  th a t from  a fin a n c ia l p o in t o f v ie w  it is  o fte n  cheaper fo r  co m p a n ie s  to  
d isch a rg e  noxious su b sta n ce s  ille g a lly  ins tead  o f n e u tra lis in g  them  o r d isp o s in g  o f 
th e m  in  a  law fu l w ay;
15 S ee  a g a in  Eckard R e h b in d e r and  R ichard  S te w a rt, su p ra  no te  , w ho  in  th e  end 
ag ree  th a t litig a tio n  m ong p riv a te  parties m ay h ave  a  supp lem e n ta ry  fu n c tio n  in 
c o n tro llin g  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  a n d  e n fo rce m e n t o f d irc tiv e 's  o b lig a tio n s ;
16 S ee  th e  3 rd  re c ita l o f th e  A m e n d e d  P roposa l's  P re a m b le , infra no te  ; a m o n g  the  
m any ca se s  th a t co n s id e r n e ce ssa ry  the  h a rm o n iza tio n  o f e nv ironm en ta l p ro te c tio n  
m easures, see  C ase C -3 0 6 /8 9  Council v. Commission o f 11/6/91 co n firm in g  th a t 
d iffe re n t m easures re s u lt in  d iffe re n t in cre a se s in th e  p roduction  costs fo r  the  
m a n u fa c tu re rs , th e re b y d is to rtin g  th e  co m p e titio n  b e tw e e n  M em ber S ta te s ;
17 S ee  p o in t 2 o f th e  D ra ft D ire c tiv e  E xp lana to ry  M em orandum ; se e  a lso  C liffo rd  
C hance , "European environmental law guide? co n firm in g  the  m ore  s trin g e n t the  
n a tio n a l co n tro l le ve ls  im p o se d , th e  m ore xp e n s ive  it w ill be to  co m p ly  w ith  those
30
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such  "p o llu tio n  p a ra d ise s" * 18 w ould  a ffe c t the  fre e  m ovem ent o f goods w ith in  the 
in te rn a l m a rke t and  e n ta il d iffe re n c e s  in th e  le ve l o f p ro te c tio n  o f h e a lth , p ro p e rty  and 
th e  e n v iro n m e n t.
L ike w ise , in its  5 th  E n v iro n m e n ta l P ro g ra m m e 19 th e  C ouncil o f M in is te rs  s tressed 
the  n ecess ity  o f e ffic ie n t im p lem en ta tion  and en fo rce m e n t o f e n v iro n m e n ta l 
m easures if C om m un ity  o b je c tiv e s  in th is  a rea  a re  to  be  ach ieved . It w as fu rth e r 
acknow ledged  th a t in the  p a s t th e  choice o f lega l in s tru m e n ts  had been ve ry  narrow , 
w ith  to o  m uch re lia n ce  b e ing  p laced on re g u la tio n s  o f the  "com m and and con tro l 
typ e " 20. In o rde r to  fu lly  re sp e c t the  "p o llu te r p a ys  p rin c ip le ", th e  im p o rta n ce  o f 
re g u la tin g  e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  w as s tressed  a nd  th e  C om m un ity  w as u rg e d  to  
e s ta b lish  a  "m echan ism  w h e re b y  dam age to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t is  re s to re d  b y the  
person o r body, w ho is  re sp o n s ib le  fo r th e  dam age  in cu rre d , o r b y  o th e r m eans o f 
lia b ility -sh a rin g  w hen such  p e rso n  canno t be id e n tifie d ".
O n  th e  o th e r hand, it w as considered  th a t the  p u b lic  cou ld  p ro v id e  "an im p o rta n t 
spu r to  good  perfo rm ance  by com pan ies" and  th e re fo re  p racticab le  access to  cou rts  
by in d iv id u a ls  and p u b lic  in te re s t groups shou ld  be  guaran teed  to  ensure  e ffe c tiv e  
e n fo rce m e n t o f e n v iro n m e n ta l m easures and to  p u t a  s to p  to  illega l p ra c tice s  21.
lim is t, w h a t w ill lead to  p o llu tin g  com panies to  m ove fro m  "c lean" co u n trie s  to  "d irty " 
co u n trie s ;
18 S ee "La pollution tranfrontiére et le Droit Intemationaf', by the  A ca d é m ie  d e  D ro it 
In te rn a tio n a l de  la  H a ye , pp. 6 3 ;
19 C o m m iss io n  o f th e  E u ropea n  C om m un ities, 5 th  E nv ironm en ta l P rog ram m e, 
"T o w a rd s  S u sta in a b ility ", C om (92) 2 3  fina l, vo l. II, B ru sse ls  27 /3 /9 ;
20 W ith  regard  to  th e  A m e rica n  evo lu tio n  se e  D avid  Ja coby and A b b ie  E re m ich , 
"Environmental liability in US', in  E nvironm en ta l L ia b ility , C h a p te r V , P a rt C , 
re m e m b e rin g  th a t th e  in itia l o rie n ta tio n  o f the  A m e rica n  le g is la tio n  w as a lso  co m m a n d  
and c o n tro l, to  se t s p e c ific  re q u ire m e n ts  and to  d ire c t th e ir  im p lem en ta tion ;
21 S ee 5 th  E nv ironm en ta l P rogram m e, supra n o te  , C h a p te r 9 on Implementation and 
Enforcement s ta ting  th a t the  p u b lic  have a d ire c t in te re s t in  th e  q u a lity  o f th e ir liv in g
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L a te r on , th e  G re e n  P aper 22 co n firm e d  th e  usefulness o f c iv il lia b ility  as a 
"m eans fo r a llo c a tin g  re sp o n s ib ility  fo r the  co s ts  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l resto ra tion . 
H ow ever it a lso  lim ite d  c iv il lia b ility  to  a m ere  secondary fu n c tio n  o f "en fo rc ing  
standards o f b e h a v io u r and  p reven ting  peop le  fro m  causing dam age in  th e  fu tu re ". 
T h is  idea w as in te rp re te d  d iffe re n tly  b y  B riig g e m e ie r 23, fo r  w hom  th e  "a d d itive  
fu n c tio n " o f lia b ility  law  re fe rs  to  its  lim ita tio n s  in  preventing  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age. 
A cco rd in g  to  th is  a u th o r su ch  dam age is  p re ve n te d  by an essen tia l co m p le m e n ta ry  o f 
th re e  d iffe re n t typ e s  o f s ta te  risk re g u la tio n : p reven tive  re g u la tio n  o f po llu tin g  
a c tiv itie s , re a c tiv e  a d m in is tra tiv e  co n tro l o f risky  a c tiv itie s  - d ire c t re g u la tio n  b y  pub lic  
la w  - and  lia b ility  law  -  in d ire c t co n tro l th ro u g h  p rív a te  law.
3.3. T he  Im po rtan ce  given to  E nvironmental L iability  by  th e  
International C ommunity
The In te rn a tio n a l C o m m u n ity , as m en tione d  a b o ve , soon re co g n ise d  th e  need to  
le g is la te  on lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  a n d  th e  firs t fo rm a l e xp re ss io n  o f th is
e n v iro n m e n t, th a t in d iv id u a ls  and p u b lic  in te re s t groups sh o u ld  h ave  p ra c tica b le  
access to  the  c o u rts  in o rd e r to  ensure th a t th e ir leg itim a te  in te re s ts  a re  p ro tected , 
and  th a t p re scrib e d  e n v iro n m e n ta l m easures a re  e ffe c tive ly  e n fo rce d  and  illega l 
p ra c tice s  stopped : see  a ls o  W . J. O u w e rke rk , "Environmental Liability from the 
perspective of an operator: Council of Europe Draft Convention on Civil Liability, in 
T ra n sn a tio n a l L ia b ility  an d  In su rance , P a rt C , C h a p te r 3 , who a lso  b e lie v e s  th a t c iv il 
lia b ility  is  an in s tru m e n t e n ta ilin g  g re a te r p a rtic ip a tio n  b y  th e  p u b lic  in the  
g u a rd ia n sh ip  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t;
22 C om m un ica tion  fro m  th e  C om m ission  to  th e  C o u n c il and P a rlia m e n t and the 
E conom ic  and S o c ia l C o m m itte e : G re e n  P aper o n  R em edying E n v iro n m e n ta l 
D am age, C O M (93), 4 7  fin a l, B russe ls  14 /5 /9 3 ;
23 G e rt B ruggem e ir, "Enterprise liability for Environmental Damage in German Law 
and EC LaW, in  E co lo g ica l R e sp o n s ib ility : S e lf-O rg a n isa tio n  in  E n v iro n m e n ta l Law  by 
G u n tn e rT e u b n e r (e d ), B re m e n , F irenze , p re lim in a ry  d ra ft, 1992;
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co n ce rn  w as in P rin c ip le  22  o f the  1972 S to ckh o lm  D eclara tion  24, c a llin g  fo r fu rth e r 
d e ve lo p m e n t o f in te rn a tio n a l law  regard ing  lia b ility  and com pensation  fo r th e  v ic tim s  
o f tra n s fro n tie r p o llu tio n  and  o th e r e nv ironm en ta l dam age. The U N E P  co n sequ en tly  
e s ta b lish e d  v a rio u s  w o rk in g  groups w hose s tu d ie s  re su lte d  in th e  a p p ro va l o f se ve ra l 
co n ve n tio n s  and o th e r in te rn a tio n a l instrum ents.
N e ve rth e le ss, m o st o f th e s e  in te rn a tio n a l in s tru m e n ts  m ere ly p ro m o te  g u id e lin e s  
fo r th e  p repa ra tio n  o f b ila te ra l o r m u ltila te ra l co n ve n tio n s  25. E ven  th e  resu lting  
tre a tie s  o r co n ve n tio n s  a re  o n ly  genera l co m m itm e n ts  w h ich  encourage co -o p e ra tio n  
and s p e c ify  due d ilig e n c e  o b lig a tio n s  to  p re ve n t, c o n tro l and reduce  p o llu tio n  b u t 
ra re ly  a c tu a lly  s tric tly  p ro h ib it o f po llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  26.
S e ve ra l re le v a n t in te rn a tio n a l co n ve n tio n s  w e re  la te r adopted, re g u la tin g  c iv il 
lia b ility  in respect to  som e s p e c ific  risk c re a tin g  a c tiv itie s . The m ost im p o rta n t o f 
th e se  co n ve n tio n s a re  the  C iv il L ia b ility  C o n ve n tio n  27 - C LC  - and th e  C o n ve n tio n  on 
T h ird  P arty  L ia b ility  in th e  F ie ld  o f N uc lea r E nergy 28. S ince th e  lia b ility  reg im es
24 U N  D oc.A /C O N F . 4 8 /1 4 , ILM , 1972, pp. 1416;
5 F or a  b rie f re v iew  on th e  U N E P s a c tiv itie s  see A h m e d  Fatha ll, "Work on Liability 
within UNEP', in  E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility , In te rn a tio n a l Bar A sso c ia tio n  S eries, 
London , 1991; w ith  a  less o p tim is tic  v iew  se e  A lan  E. B oyle , "International Law and 
Transboundary Acess to Environmental Justice'' in  th e  C on fe rence  on  "A ce ss  to  
E n v iro n e m n ta l J u s tice  in  E u ro p e " held on  th e  18 /4 /94  a t the  E uropean U n iv e rs ity  
In s titu te  in  F lo rence , w ho co n s id e rs  th a t a lth o u g h  p u b lic  in te rn a tio n a l la w  has 
re g u la te d  e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  th rough tre a tie s , cu stom ary law  and s o ft-la w , it 
ca n n o t re a lis tica lly  b e  v ie w e d  as o ffe re in g  e ffc ie n t rem edies fo r  tra n sb o u n d ry  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age;
26 R icca rd o  P is illo -M a zze sch i, "Forms of International Responsibility for environmental 
harrrf', in  In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r E n v iro n m e n ta l H arm , e d ited  by F rancesco  
F ra n c io n i and  T u llio  S co va zz i;
27 In te rn a tio n a l C o n ve n tio n  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r O il P o llu tio n  D am age, B russe ls  
2 9 /1 1 /6 9 , 9  I.L .M . 4 5 , 1970; as  am ended b y  th e  L ondo n  P rotocol o f 1 9 /11 /7 6 , T rb. 
1980, 1. S upp le m e nted  by th e  In te rna tio na l C o n ve n tio n  o n  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f an 
In te rn a tio n a l Fund fo r  C om pensa tion  fo r O il P o llu tio n  D am age, B russe ls  1 8 /1 2 /7 1 , 
T rb . 1 9 7 3 ,1 0 1  a s am ended  b y  th e  London P ro toco l o f 19 /11 /1976, T rb . 1 9 8 0 ,2 .
28 C o n ve n tio n  on T h ird  P arty L ia b ility  in the  F ie ld  o f N u c le a r Energy, P a ris  2 9 /7 /1 9 6 0 , 
T rb . 1964 , 175; C onven tio n  S upp lem enta ry to  the  P a ris  C onven tion  and A n n e x ,
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pro v id e d  by th e se  co n ve n tio n s  a llow  m uch o f th e  loss lie  w here  it fa lls  o r a llo ca te  it 
e q u ita b ly  across the  in d u s try  o r am ong p a rtic ip a tin g  S tates as a w h o le , th e y  do n o t 
fu lly  im p le m e n t the  "p o llu te r pays" p rin c ip le  29. N everthe less th e y  ca n  b e  cons ide re d  
an  im p o rta n t in itia l e ffo rt tow ards p a rtia l harm on isa tion  o f c iv il lia b ility  ru les 
concern ing  tra n sb o u n d a ry  env ironm en ta l dam age , an e ffo rt w h ich  has cu lm in a te d  in 
th e  adop tion  o f th e  C o u n c il o f E urope C o n ve n tio n .
In conc lus io n , it is  c le a r th a t th e  in te rn a tio n a l com m un ity  h a s  in c re a s in g ly  
re g u la te d  lia b ility  issu e s, im proving  th e  ch a n ce s  fo r p o llu tio n  v ic tim s  to  b ring  
su cce ss fu l c la im s  30. S u ch  tre n d  cu lm in a te d  b y  th e  adoption a t th e  U n ite d  N ations 
C on fe rence  on  E n v iro n m e n t and D e ve lo p m e n t in  R io  de  Jane iro  o f tw o  in te rn a tio n a l 
docum en ts  w h ich  c o n firm  th e  im portance  o f th e  p riv a te  in d iv id u a l in th e  p ro te c tio n  o f 
th e  e n v iro n m e n t, nam e ly  A g e n d a  21 31 a n d  th e  R io  D ecla ra tion  32.
B ru sse ls  3 1 /1 /1 9 6 3 , T rb . 1963 , 176; as am en d e d  b y  th e  A d d itio n a l P ro to c o l, Paris 
2 9 /1 /6 4 , T rb. 1964, 178;
29 A la n  E. B oyle , "Making the polluter pay ? Alternatives to State responsibility in the 
allocation of transboundary environmental co s ts ", in  "In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r 
E nvironm en ta l H a rm " e d ite d  b y  F rancesco  F ra n c io n i an d  T u llio  S co va zz i;
30 S ee  Thom as G e h rin g  an d  M arkus Ja ch te n fu ch s , "Liability for Transboundary 
Environmental Damage: Towards a General Liability Regime* in  E u ropea n  Jo u rn a l o f 
In te rn a tio n a l Law , v o l. 4 , 0s 1 ,1 9 9 3 , p p .9 2  ;
31 S ee P o in t 2 7 .13  o f A g e n d a  23  th a t reads "G o ve rn m e n ts  w ill need  to  p ro m u lg a te  o r 
s tre n g th e n , su b je c t to  c o u n try  s p e c ific  co n d itio n s , a n y  le g is la tive  m e asures necessary 
to  ena b le  the  e s ta b lis h m e n t by n o n -g o ve rn m e n ta l o rg a n isa tio n s  o f co n su lta tive  
g ro u p s, and to  en su re  th e  rig h t o f n o n -g o ve rn m e n ta l o rg a n isa tio n s to  p ro te c t the  
p u b lic  in te re s t th ro u g h  le g a l a c tio n ;
32 S e e  R io  D e c la ra tio n  o n  E n v iro n m e n t a n d  D e ve lo p m e n t, R io d e  J a n e iro , 14 /6 /92 , 
31 In te rn a tio n a l L e g a l M a te ria ls  874 (1 9 9 2 ); P rin c ip le  10 p ro v id e s  th a t a ll 
e n v iro n m e n ta l issu e s are  b e s t hand led  w ith  th e  p a rtic ip a tio n  o f a ll co n ce rn e d  c itize n s , 
a t th e  re le va n t le v e l;
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3.4. A re  C ivil L iability Rules an appropriate instrum ent 
WITH WHICH TO INDEMNIFY DAMAGE CAUSED TO PUBLIC GOODS
W ith  re fe rence  to  th e  v a rio u s  d e fin itio n s  o f e n v iro n m e n t, a doub t a ris e s  as to 
w h e th e r c iv il law  in s tru m e n ts  can e ffic ie n tly  p ro te c t "the  e n v iro n m e n t", if  th is  
p ro te c tio n  is  considered  to  b e  o f pub lic in te re s t n o t b e long ing , d ire c tly  o r e x c lu s iv e ly , 
to  a  p riv a te  in d iv id u a l33. T h is  d oub t is  re la te d  to  th e  lengh ty  debate  d iscu ss io n  o n  the  
n a tu re  o f the  e n v iro n m e n t, as to  w he the r th e  rig h t to  an hea lthy and  clean 
e n v iro n m e n t w as d e fin e d  by p riva te  law  o r p u b lic  law  th e o rie s .
U n d e r th e  p riv a te  law  th e o rie s  the  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v ironm en t has b e e n  d e a lt 
w ith  a s  a  type  o f n e ig h b o u r re la tio n sh ip  p rob lem , co n s id e re d  a com m on and  d iffu se  
in te re s t and, m ore re ce n tly , in c lu d e d  am ong th e  fu n d a m e n ta l righ ts  o f a hum an be ing . 
U nder th e  pub lic  law  th e o rie s , on the  o th e r hand , th e  e n v ironm en t has been 
co n s id e re d  a  p u b lic  good b e lo n g in g  to  th e  c o lle c tiv ity  and recently as a  c o lle c tiv e  
in te re s t, d e fend ab le  b y  c iv il m e a n s  3 4 .
F o r exam ple , w h e re  th e  da m a g e  is  su ffe re d  b y p u b lic  goods o r goods be lo n g in g  
to  th e  p u b lic  dom a in , i.e . ro a d s, w aterw ays, a ir, e tc . U n like  th e  o w ner o f a  p riv a te  
good , th e  ow ner o f a  p u b lic  g o o d  has no e x c lu s iv e  rig h ts , since a ll pe rsons h a ve  a 
rig h t to  use  the  pub lic  d o m a in  g o ods 35. T he reby m any c iv il authors a rg u e  th a t it is  up
33 S a lv a to re  P atti, "Diritto Civile - Ambiente, Tutela Civilistica?, in D iz io n a ri d e l D iritto  
P riva to
34 F o r a  co m p le te  d e sc rip tio n  o f th e  e vo lu tio n  see G o m e s C ano tilho , "Procedimento 
Administrative e Defesa do Ambiente9 in R e v is ta  d e  L e g is la çâo  e  Ju ris p ru d ê n c ia  r f1 
3794, p p . 134 to  n* 3 8 0 2 , pp . 7 ;
35 B e tlem , 1993, pp. 3 8 5 ;
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to  th e  S ta tes to  in te rve n e  in the  fie ld  o f en v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  w ith  pub lic  
in s tru m e n ts  and  th a t c iv il la w  instrum en ts  can o n ly  have  a  m arg ina l ro le  36.
F u rthe rm ore , som e d o c trin e  cla im s th a t m ost c iv il lia b ility  ru le s  o n ly  e n v isa g e  the 
co m pensa tion  o f th e  d a m a g e  and do n o t a tte m p t to  p u t an end  to  th e  po llu ting  
a c tiv ity . T he  e xc lu s ive  u s e  o f c iv il lia b ility  schem es co u ld  lead th e  p o llu tin g  in d u stry  to  
in c lu d e  th e  in d e m n ifica tio n  co s ts  in the  fin a l p ric e  o f its  p roducts o r se rv ic e s , thus 
re n d e rin g  the  d e s ire d  d e te rre n ce  e ffe c t in e ffic ie n t O n ly  if  such so c ia l c o s ts  a re  taken 
in to  acco u n t in th e  e q u a tio n  o f the  in d e m n ifica tio n  w ill c iv il lia b ility  h a ve  a  p os itive  
ro le  in  th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  environm en t.
T hese  th e o rie s  w ere  fo u g h t aga inst by th e  tre n d  to  in c lu d e  th e  e n v iro n m e n t 
am ong  p e rso n a lity  rig h ts  o r even  am ong fu n d a m e n ta l righ ts, in  w h ich  case  th e ir 
p ro te c tio n  by a c tio n s  b ro u g h t b y  each in d iv id u a l be co m e s abso lu te ly  ne ce ssa ry . Th is 
in d iv id u a lisa tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t d e rive d  fro m  th e  genera l idea  th a t e v e ry  person 
sh o u ld  be  p e rm itte d  to  use  c iv il instrum ents, in  o rd e r to  p ro te ct a  good  th a t concerns 
h im /h e r in  e ve ry  m o m e n t o f h is /he r e x is te n ce  a nd  w hich c o n trib u te s  to  the  
d e ve lo p m e n t o f h is /h e r p e rs o n a lity  37
3.5. Econom ic  justifications
3.5.1. Economic Immunity
"E conom ic  im m u n ity  * in  th e  g ive n  exam p le  m eans th a t it can  be  m ore 
advan ta geous fo r th e  co m p a n y  to  pay the  a d m in is tra tiv e  fin e s  fo r n o t possess ing  the
36 S ee  V o lkm a r J. H a rtje , "0 /7  Pollution by tanker accidents: liability versus regulation^, 
w ho con s id e rs  th a t da m a g e s to  ecosystem s th a t d o  n o t belong to  in d iv id u a ls  since 
th e y  a re  p u b lic  g o o d s  do  n o t w a rra n t com pensa tion ;
37 P a tti, pp . ,
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re q u ire d  licences o r fo r exceed in g  its  lim its , th a n  to  in ve s t in  im p ro ve d  c lean ing  
te c h n o lo g y  a n d /o r to  d e liv e r th e  substances to  a u th o rise d  dea le rs . In  B ruggem eier*s 
a n a ly s is  the  tw o fo rm s  o f d ire c t con tro l th rough  p u b lic  law  are  depen den t o n  seve ra l 
e co n o m ic  in e ffic ie n c ie s , fo r  exam ple , th e  in flu e n ce  th a t ce rta in  p o w e rfu l in d ustries  
ca n  h ave  on law -m aking  and a d m in is tra tive  d e c is io n s  the reby im p ro v in g  th e ir 
p a rtic u la r cond itions th ro u g h  le ss  strin g e n t ru les o r lo w e r fines 3a.
W ith o u t denying  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f th e  p re ca u tio n a ry  p rin c ip le , K iss s ta te d  th a t it 
can  b e  "m et e ith e r b y  p re v io u s  regu la tion  o r by th e  e x is te n ce  o f a gen e ra l fe e lin g  th a t 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  m u s t b e  com pensa ted  a t su ch  a  h igh  level th a t it is  ch e a p e r to  
a v o id  it”  38 9. T h e re fo re , p riv a te  ju d ic ia l in itia tiv e  is  neede d  to  increase  th e  fin a n c ia l 
p re ssu re  on  p o llu tin g  co m p a n ie s , s ince  th e se  shou ld  p a y  n o t m erely th ro u g h  fin e s  b u t 
a lso  th ro u g h  com pensa tion  co s ts . In o th e r w ords, if th e se  com panies a re  n o t o n ly  
fin e d  b y  the  com pe ten t p u b lic  a u th o ritie s , b u t a lso m ade  liab le  fo r dam ages in flic te d  
on p riv a te  legal pe rsons, th is  w ill lead to  h ig h e r in ve s tm e n ts  in b e tte r p re ca u tio n a ry  
schem es fo r the sa ke  o f e co n o m ic  e ffic ie n cy 40 41.
In  fa c t, as P o lin sky  a n d  S h a ve ll concluded  in  th e ir w ork 4\  if com pan ie s 
p ro d u c in g  env iro n m e n ta l d isch a rg e s  are "m ade  re sp o n s ib le  fo r c le a n u p  a nd  s tric tly  
lia b le  fo r  any rem a in ing  h a rm , th e y  w ill ta ke  so c ia lly  o p tim a l p recau tio ns to  p re v e n t
38 Id e m , pp . 5 ;
39 A lessand re  K iss, ''Present limits to the enforcement of State responsibility for 
environmental damage" in In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r E nvironm en ta l H arm , 
F ra n ce sco  F rancion i and  T u lio  S co va zz i (eds.), 1991;
40 S ee  P eter W e tte rs te in ,"Recent Trends in the Development of International Civil 
Liability\ in  N ordic Jo u rn a l o f In te rna tio na l Law , 1991, v o l. 60, n2 1-2, p p .5 2 , w ho 
acce p t th a t ru les o f co m p e n sa tio n  m ay persuade co m p a n ie s  to  op t fo r  less ris k y  and 
e n v iro n m e n ta lly  fa o u ra b le  m e th o d s  o f p roductio n  as long as it is  e co n o m ica lly  
adva n ta g e o u s to  avo id  caus ing  dam age o r in ju ry ;
41 S ee M itche ll P o linsky and S te ve n  S h a ve ll, "OptimaI cleanup and liability after 
environmental harmful discharges", N ational B ureau o f E conom ic R esearch, W o rk in g  
P aper N o . 4176, S eptem ber 1992 ;
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d ischa rge s a n d  u n d e rta ke  so c ia lly  o p tim a l a m o u n t o f c leanup if  a  d isch a rg e  occu rs". 
A cco rd in g  to  th e  sam e a u th o rs , s tric t lia b ility  w o u ld  se rve  th e  p re ca u tio n a ry  p rin c ip le  
b e tte r because un d e r th e  neg ligence ru le  cu s to m e rs  w ould p u rchase  m ore  goods 
w h o se  p ro ductio n  ca u se s  d ischarges s in ce  th e ir p rice s  w ould  n o t re fle c t lia b ility  costs.
The d iffe re n t c iv il lia b ility  system s w ill be a n a lyse d  fu rth e r o n , b u t to  c la rify  the  
above  co n c lu s io n , so m e  com m ents have  to  be  m ade now. W h ile  it is  tru e  th a t 
d iffe re n t lia b ility  ru le s  a ffe c t th e  fina l c o s t o f g o o d s  d iffe re n tly , o th e r e le m e n ts  m ust be 
co n s id e re d  n e cessa ry  b e fo re  p rem atu re ly  co n c lu d in g  th a t un d e r th e  p re ca u tio n a ry  
p rin c ip le  the  ru le  o f s tr ic t lia b ility  is  p re fe ra b le . A n  exam ple  m igh t be  w h e re  th e  in ju re d  
p e rso n 's  co n d u ct m ay h a ve  co n tribu te d  to  th e  e n v ironm en ta l da m a g e  42 In such 
ca se s , fo r reasons o f e ffic ie n c y , p recau tio n  d e m a n d s  a re  m ade on  b o th  th e  in ju re r 
and  th e  v ic tim . T hese  "b ila te ra l p re ca u tio n " d e m a n d s are o n ly  s a tis fie d  by ideal 
n e g lig e n ce  ru le s , s in ce  w ith  s tric t lia b ility  ru les th e  p o llu te r m ust a lw a ys  com pensa te  
th e  in ju re d  pe rso n , e ven  if  ac ting  w ith o u t fa u lt, and  th e re fo re  such a p e rso n  has no 
in c e n tiv e  to  ta ke  th e  n e ce ssa ry  m easures th a t c o u ld  help to  p re v e n t d a m a g e  to  the 
e n v iro n m e n t
O n  th e  o th e r hand, if p re fe re n ce  is  g iv e n  to  th e  reduction  o f th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity , 
th e  p rice s  o f th e  "p o llu tin g  goods" w ill be  h ig h e r unde r the  s tr ic t lia b ility  ru le  than 
u n d e r th e  neg lig e n ce  ru le , and  th e re fo re  th e  a c tiv ity  o f p o llu tin g  in d u s trie s  w ill be 
g re a te r under th e  n e g lig e n ce  ru les. In o th e r w o rd s , under a  s tric t lia b ility  system  
p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  a re  fo rc e d  to  rem edy th e  d a m a g e  caused b y  th e ir a c tiv itie s  by 
in ve s tin g  in m ore  e n v iro n m e n ta lly  frie n d ly  te ch n o lo g ie s  and risk -m a n a g e m e n t 
sys te m s; th is  can  b e  ve ry  exp e n sive .
42 S ee  R obert D . C o o te r,"Economic Theories of Legal Liability*-,
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3.5.2. "Environmental Shopping”
T h is  concep t o f e n v iro n m e n ta l shopp ing  can b e  analysed in  v a rio u s  w a ys  and be 
g iv e n  d iffe re n t m ean ing s. F rom  an econom ic p o in t o f v iew , d iscussed in  th e  G reen 
P a p e r, th e  p o llu tin g  in d u s trie s  w hich a re  ab le  to  a vo id  th e  lia b ility  co s ts  fo r the  
da m a g e  they cause , b e ca u se  resto ra tion  is  n o t re q u ire d  o r because th e  com pensa tion  
co s ts  a re  passed o n  to  th e  taxpayers, have  a  co m p e titive  adva n ta g e . T h e re fo re , 
m u ltin a tio n a l com pan ie s w ill p re fe r to  m ove  th e ir p o llu tin g  un its to  n a tions w ith  less 
s trin g e n t re g u la to ry  re q u ire m e n ts  an d /o r le ss  e ffe c tive  lia b ility  ru les  43.
A  s im ila r idea  ca n  be  fo u n d  in  th e  th e o rie s  o f in te rn a tio n a l re g u la to ry  co m p e titio n , 
acco rd in g  to  w h ich  a  sys te m  w ith  a  low  le v e l o f e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  ca n  p ro v id e  
an ille g a l subsidy to  n a tio n a l po llu tin g  in d u s trie s  44. These system s, in s te a d  o f 
p rom oting  th e  in te rn a lisa tio n  o f e n v ironm en ta l p ro te c tio n  costs, lead  to  a  s itu a tio n  in 
w h ich  th e se  costs a re  bo rne  e ith e r by the  so c ie ty  in  gene ra l o r b y  s p e c ific  a ffe c te d  
groups.
If th e  regu la tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  is  a lso  de te rm ined  by th is  tre n d  tow ards 
w eak en v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  such  s itu a tio n s  w ill co n trib u te  to  the  ab o ve -m e n tio n e d  
"e n v iro n m e n ta l shopp in g ". In  o th e r w ords, th is  typ e  o f regu la to ry co m p e titio n  m ay 
cause  p o llu tin g  in d u strie s  to  b a se  them selves in  the  co u n trie s  w ith  such  syste m s, thus 
co n trib u tin g  to  the in cre a se  o f reg iona l fo cu s  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l d e g ra d a tio n . T here  
are, th e re fo re  doub ts as to  w h ich  su b sta n tive  q u e stio n s  should be  re g u la te d  by 
su p ra n a tio n a l bod ies ra th e r th a n  by sta tes.
43 S ee  fo r  fu rth e r d e ve lo p m e n ts  on th e  re la tio n  betw een lia b ility  ru le s  and 
co m p e titive n e ss , R ichard  B. S te w a rt, " Environmental Regulation and International 
Competitiveness!' in
44 "In te rn a tio n a l R egu la to ry C o m p e titio n ", H arvard  Law  R eview  n2 ,1 9 9 3 ;
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A n o th e r c o m p le te ly  d iffe re n t m ean ing  th a t can be g ive n  to  th e  concep t o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l s h o p p in g  is  th a t one lin k in g  it  w ith  the  co ncep t o f "fo ru m  shopp ing” . 
U n der th is  ru le  o f p riv a te  in te rn a tio n a l law , th e  in ju red  person can fre e ly  choose th e  
ju ris d ic tio n  in w h ich  to  b rin g  h is  le g a l a c tio n : e ith e r the  co u rt o f the  c o u n try  in w h ich  
th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  is  b a se d  o r th e  c o u rt w h ere  th e  p o llu tio n  caused d a m age  to  th e  
v ic tim  45. T h e  re a so n s  fo r  th e  p re fe re n ce  to  su e  in one ju ris d ic tio n  ra th e r than  in  
a n o th e r can  ra n g e  fro m  th e  d iffe re n ce  in lim ita tio n  periods 46 to  a  p re fe ra b le  
p ro ce d u ra l law .
T h is  p rin c ip le  o f forum shopping has b e e n  accepted in  s e v e ra l cases o f 
tra n s fro n tie r p o llu tio n , fo llo w in g  th e  ju risp ru d e n ce  estab lish ed  b y  th e  case  
Handelskwekerij GJ.Bier v. Mines de Potasse de Alsace SA 47. It h a s a lso  been 
adop te d  by th e  B ru sse ls  C on ve n tio n  48 and  js th e re fo re  app lied  to  th e  M e m b e r S ta te s  
w h ich  have  ra tifie d  i t
45 A le xa n d re  K iss , "Present limits to the enforcement of a state responsibility for 
environmental damagef in  In te rn a tio n a l re sp o n s ib ility  fo r E n v iro n m e n ta l H arm , 
F ra n ce sco  F ra n c io n i a n d  T u ilio  S covazzi (ed);
46 S ee C o u n cil o f E u ro p e  C onven tio n  th a t, in a rtic le  17, p roposes u n ifo rm  lim ita tio n  
p e rio d s  in  o rd e r to  a vo id  fo ru m  shopp in g ;
47 E C J C ase 2 1 /7 6  o f 3 0 /1 1 /7 6 , R JE, 1 9 7 7 ,3 2 3 ;
48 B russe ls  C o n ve n tio n  o n  J u risd ic tio n  a nd  th e  E n fo rcem en t o f Ju d g e m e n ts  in  C iv il 




COMPARISON OF CIVIL LIABILITY SYSTEMS
4.1. Introduction
T ra d itio n a lly , c iv il lia b ility  law  w as on ly  d iv id e d  am ong tw o m a jo r sys te m s: fa u lt- 
b a sed  lia b ility  and n o -fa u lt lia b ility . N e ve rth e le ss, am ong th e  C o n tin e n ta l legal 
sys te m s th e  v ie w  p re v a ile d  th a t fa u lt w as th e  c o n s titu tive  e le m e n t o f lia b ility , 
a lth o u g h  m ore re ce n tly  fa u lt lia b ility  is  be ing  w ith d ra w n  fro m  a  la rg e  num ber o f areas 
w here  it app lied .
S in ce  e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  w as based in th e  genera l th e o ry  o f to rts  a n d /o r 
lia b ility  fo r dam ages, th is  b ra n ch  o f lia b ility  law  in itia lly  adopted th e  sam e d iv is io n  
be tw een  fa u lt and s tr ic t lia b ility  \  H ow ever, in som e cases it was necessa ry  to  adap t 
to rt ru le s  to  em brace  th e  sp e c ia l s itua tion s o f dam age  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t, e x te n s io n  
w h ich  has led to  a  ce rta in  in te rd isc ip lin a ry  d e ve lo p m e n t. T h is  d e ve lo p m e n t is 
in te rd is c ip lin a ry  in  th e  sense th a t no t on ly d id  such adap ta tion  o f c iv il lia b ility  to  the  
s p e c ific  p rob lem s o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age c o n trib u te  to  a  be tte r use o f lia b ility  ru les 
as an  in s tru m e n t o f e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te ctio n  bu t a lso  th e  co n tra ry  w as tru e . The 
s o lu tio n s  fo u n d  w hen using c iv il lia b ility  ru les to  com pensate  fo r  such co m p le x
1 Ida J .K o p p e n , "Environmental Liability in a European Perspective?', EU I W o rk in g  
P apers E P U  ^ 9 1 /1 2 ;
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d a m a g e , as e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  he lp e d  to  su rp a ss  the  p resen t lim ita tio n s  o f c iv il 
lia b ility  law  in  d e a lin g  w ith  o th e r typ e s  o f co m p le x  h aza rds 2
W ith  th is  in cre a s in g  co m p le x ity  o f p o llu tin g  hazards and th e ir m u ltip le  causes, 
new  fo rm s o f lia b ility  w e re  deem ed n e ce ssa ry , nam ely risk  lia b ility , co lle c tive  
re sp o n s ib ility , e n te rp rise , m arke t-sha re  and  risk -sh a re  lia b ility  th a t a re , am ong  o thers, 
som e o f the  p o ss ib le  a lte rn a tiv e s  d e ve lo p e d  b y  the  d o c trin e  and ju risp ru d e n ce . 
F o llow ing , a b rie f d e s c rip tio n  o f each lia b ility  sys te m  is m ade in o rd e r to  b road ly 
a sce rta in  its  a d va n ta g e s  and  lim ita tio n s  in  e ffic ie n tly  p ro tecting  th e  e n v iro n m e n t. C iv il 
lia b ility  is  no t d e sc rib e d  in  its  gene ra l te rm s  o r co n ce p ts , bu t o n ly  in th o s e  aspects 
s p e c ific a lly  re le va n t to  re g a rd s  e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e .
4.2. Fa u lt- based  liability
U nder fa u lt-b a se d  lia b ility , in  o rd e r to  o b ta in  th e  w a n te d  co m p e n sa tio n , th e  in ju red  
p a rty  has to  p ro ve  th a t th e  p o llu te r c o m m itte d  an in te n tio n a l o r n e g lig e n t w ro n g fu l ac t 
w h ich  caused th e  d a m age  s u ffe re d  3. T h e  d is tin g u is h in g  requ irem en t o f th is  system  is 
th e  need fo r th e  p la in tiff to  p ro ve  th a t th e  d e fe n d a n t’s  conduct w as fa u lty . In o the r 
w ords, the  in ju re d  pe rso n  w ill have  to  p ro v id e  evidence  th a t the  p o llu te r has 
in te n tio n a lly  o r re ck le ss ly  b re a ch e d  a  d u ty  to  c o m p ly  w ith  a legal s ta n d a rd  o f ca re  o r a 
ru le  o f law  4 .
2  S e e  R üd ige r L u m m e rt," Trends in environmental policy and law: changes in concepts 
of civil liability', w h o  says th a t to  d e a l w ith  th e  lia b ility  fo r e n v ironm en ta l d a m a g e , the  
law  o f to rts  has been p a rtia lly  m o d ifie d  b y  p a rtic u la r ru le s  co n ce rn in g  the  
ne ighbourhhod  re la tio n s h ip s , b y  p ro v is io n s  re g u la tin g  th e  o p e ra tio n  o f in d u stria l 
in s ta lla tio n s  and b y  s p e c ific  s itu a tio n s  o f S ta te  lia b ility .
3 S ee th e  G reen P aper, w h ic h  g ive s  a  b rie f b u t v e ry  co m p le te  su m m a ry  o f the 
c h a ra c te ris tics  and  p ro b le m s  o f th e  tw o sys te m s: fa u lt and  s tric t lia b ility ;
4 In re la tio n  to  p ro d u c t s a fe ty  law  see G e rt B ü g g e m e ie r and H ans W . M ick litz , 
"European Product Safety, Internal Market Policy and the New Approach to Technical 
Harmonization and Standards: Product safety legislation in France and the UKh in EUI 
W o rk in g  P apers in  Law  9 1 /1 1 , F ebruary 1991, a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  th e  co m m o n  to rt
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S o m e  C om m unity law yers , in con firm a tion  o f th e ir regu la to ry ap p ro a ch  to  
e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  co n s id e r th a t th e  p ro o f o f breach o f e n v iro n m e n ta l 
re g u la tio n s  m ay be  s u ffic ie n t to  p rove  th a t th e  p o llu te r's  action  was fa u lty . F o r them , 
th e  e x is te n ce  o f n o rm s p ro te c tin g  the  in ju red  in te re s t ligh ten s the  p la in tiff’s bu rd e n  to  
p ro o f th e  causal co n n e c tio n ; s in ce  it w ill be s u ffic ie n t to  p rove  th a t th o se  n o rm s w ere 
b re a ch e d  in o rder to  e s ta b lish  th e  fa u lt requ ired . A lth o u g h  under th is  p e rsp e c tive  the 
e n v iro n m e n ta l re gu la tio ns a re  b e tte r en fo rced , s in ce  a n y breach o f them  p ro v id e s  
e v id e n ce  o f fa u lt, th e re  is  a lw a ys  th e  risk o f new  typ e s  o f po llu tion  n o t ye t c o ve re d  by 
sp e c ific  law s.
N eve rthe le ss, w ith  th e  lib e ra l in te rp re ta tio n s c o u rts  have been using, th e  fa u lt 
lia b ility  system  has com e c lo s e r to  s tric t lia b ility  than  o n e  expects. For e xa m p le , in  the  
N e th e rla n d s  the  re q u ire m e n t th a t the  p la in tiff has to  p rove  the  fa u lty  o r n e g lig e n t 
co n d u c t o f the  d e fe n d a n t has g ra d u a lly  been tra n s fo rm e d  and in se ve ra l ca se s , the  
co u rts  have  acknow ledged in s te a d  th a t a  d u ty  o f ca re  to  ta ke  a ll possib le  p re ca u tio n s  
and to  b e  aw are  o f a ll p o te n tia l d am ages sh o u ld  be im p o se d  on the  d e fe n d a n t5.
F u rth e r requ irem en ts  o f s u c h  a  system  are u s u a lly  unlaw fu lness, im p u ta tio n , 
c a u s a lity  and dam age 6. A lth o u g h  th e  g rounds o f th e s e  requ irem ents va ry  a cco rd in g  
to  th e  d iffe re n t lega l o rd e rs , fa u lt o r s tric t lia b ility , th e ir ch a ra c te ris tics  w ill he re  b e  o n ly  
b rie fly  a n d  genera lly  a n a lyse d  b e ca u se  they a re  u su a lly  com m on to  bo th  sys te m s.
4.2.1. Fault
law  a llo w e d  th re e  d iffe re n t g ro u n d s  o f c la im : b reach  o f a  s ta tu to ry  d u ty , n e g lig e n ce  
and c o n tra c t In th e  o ffe n ce  o f b re a ch  o f s ta tu to ry  d u ty , th e  p la in tiff has to  p ro ve  th a t 
th e  d e fe n d a n t has b reached th e  re le va n t s a fe ty  re g u la tio n , by b rin g in g  an u n sa fe  
p ro d u c t o n to  th e  m arke t;
5 C h ris to p h e r Van d e r H auw aert,"Clean Take-overs in the European Single Marker, 
in  E uropean B usiness Law  R eview , N ovem ber 1991, pp . 2 6 9 ;
6  F o r D u tch  Law  see B e tlem , pp . 2 9 2 ; For P ortuguese L aw  see A lm eida C osta ;
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F irs t, the in ju re d  p e rso n  w ill have to  p ro ve  th a t th e  p o llu te r's  a c t o r om ission  
w h ich  caused th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l d am age  w as e ith e r in te n tio n a lly  o r  n e g lig e n tly  
w ro n g fu l. In te n tio n  o ccu rs  w hen th e  d e fe n d a n t consciously  and w illin g ly  pursues a  
s p e c ific  w rong fu l re su lt (dolus directus) or, w h ile  recognising and n o t w an ting  th is  
re s u lt as a p robab le  co nsequ ence  o f h is  c o n d u c t, accep ts its po ss ib le  m a te ria lisa tio n  
(dolus eventualis).
O n th e  o th e r hand, ne g lig e n ce  is  re la te d  to  e ve ry  persons ' d u ty  to  behave 
a cco rd in g  to a  ce rta in  o b je c tiv e  sta n d a rd  o f ca re , w h ich  is, in  m any le g a l orders, 
re fe rre d  to  as th e  bonus pater familias. U n der n e g lig e n t lia b ility , th e  de fend an ts ' 
b e h a v io u r sha ll b e  v e rifie d  a g a in s t th e  h yp o th e tic a l be h a v io u r o f a  re a so n a b le  m an, 
an  ave ra g e  fa m ily  m an, co n s id e rin g  th e  la tte r in  th e  sam e e x te rn a l s itu a tio n  as the  
d e fe n d a n t. This re q u ire m e n t ca n  be  e xp la in e d  u n d e r a  d iffe re n t p e rs p e c tiv e , nam ely 
th e  im pu ta tion  o f th e  u n la w fu l a c t to  th e  d e fe n d a n t
4.2.1.1. imputation
T here  are tw o  d iffe re n t m e a n in g s th a t ca n  be g ive n  to  th e  co n ce p t o f im p u ta tio n : 
o n e  m eans th a t th e  p la in tiff h a s  th e  b u rden  o f p ro v in g , usually b y  a  p rep o n d e ra n ce  o f 
e v id e n ce , th a t th e  d e fe n d a n t caused  the  d a m age  s u ffe re d  7; and second  th e  un law fu l 
a c t has to  be im p u te d  to  th e  d e fe n d a n t as a re s u lt e ithe r o f h is  fa u lty  o r o f his 
n e g lig e n t conduct. . In o th e r w ords, it is  th e  p la in tiff w ho has to  p ro ve  th a t the 
d e fe n d a n t consc ious ly  a nd  w illin g ly  p u rsu e d  th e  dam age ca used  8 o r, w h ile  
recogn is in g  th is  dam age  a s  a  possib le  re s u lt o f h is  conduct, and  not w an ting  it,
7 S ee  Ja n  E ke ring , "Several theories on liability in the Dutch DES case" in 
T ra n sn a tio n a l lia b ility  litig a tio n  a n d  insu rance  b y  R a lph  K rôner, 1993;
8 Dolus directus
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a cce p te d  it as a  p ro b a b le  occu rre n ce  9 10. Im p u ta tio n  th u s  presupposes an e v a lu a tio n  o f 
th e  in d iv id u a l and co n c re te  c ircum stances o f th e  p o llu te r's  behaviour.
S om e system s d iv id e  th is  requ irem en t in to  tw o  d iffe re n t phases: firs t, to  exam ine  
w h e th e r th e  d e fe n d a n t a t th e  m om ent the  in ju ry  occu rre d  w as ca p a b le  o f p re d ic tin g  it 
1 0 ; a n d , second, to  d e c id e  o n  th e  ex is tence  o f ne g lig e n ce  o r fa u lt in  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  
c o n d u c t
4.2.2. Unlawfulness
A lth o u g h  ce rta in  lega l sys te m s tend to  co n fuse  th is  requ irem en t w ith  th e  co n ce p t 
o f fa u lt, g e ne ra lly  a  ce rta in  a c t o r om ission is  co n s id e re d  un law fu l w hen  it h a s  v io la te d  
a s p e c ific  lega l norm  w ith o u t a n y  lega lly  recogn ised  excuse . These le g a lly  recogn ise d  
d e fe n ce s  m ay in c lu d e  s e lf-h e lp , sta te  o f necessity , o t th a t th e  in ju re d  person 
exp ressed  consen t, am ong o th e rs .
T ra d itio n a lly , u n la w fu ln e ss  depended on  th e  h a rm fu l na ture  o f its  re su lt b u t the  
a c tu a l d o c trin e  on th e  su b je c t co ns ide rs  th a t it sh o u ld  instead  be d e te rm in e d  b y  the  
h a rm fu l n a tu re  o f th e  c o n d u c t i t s e lf11. C onclud ing , th e  p la in tiff w ill firs t have to  p ro ve  
th a t th e  d e fe n d a n t's  a c ts  a re  u n la w fu l e ith e r d u e  to  th e  b reach  o f a  s ta tu to ry  d u ty , the  
in frin g e m e n t o f a  rig h t o r th e  b re a ch  o f th e  d u ty  to  ta k e  d u e  ca re  not to  in flic t in ju ry  on 
o th e rs 12 T h is  la s t co n ce p t o f a  d u ty  o f due c a re 13 has be e n  deve lop ed  by th e  co u rts
9 Dolus eventualis
10 A rtic le  4 8 8  a o f th e  P o rtu g u e se  C iv il C ode;
11 T ra d itio n a lly  fo r G erm an  la w , u n like  French law , th e  co n ce p t o f fa u lt as an a ttitu d e  
o f a  p e rson  w ho in te n tio n a lly  o r n e g lig e n tly  causes dam age to  another is  d is tin c t fro m  
th e  n o tio n  o f un law fu lness as th e  v io la tio n  o f a  lega l no rm  w hose h a rm fu l re s u lt is  
o n ly  d is re g a rd e d  if a  le g a lly  re co g n ise d  d e fence  e x is ts . N everthe less a  new  a ca d e m ic  
a p p roach , supporting  a  w ro n g fu l co n d u c t th e o ry , inc lude s th e  v io la tio n  o f th e  g e n e ra l 
d u ty  o f c a re  in  th e  co n ce p t o f un law fu lness and red u ce s  fa u lt to  a  q u e s tio n  o f 
im p u ta b ility . See B .S .M a rke s in is , "The German Law of Torts, A comparative 
introductiorf, 2 nd e d .t O xfo rd  1990 , pp. 59;
12 F or a  com parison  o f the  d iffe re n t concepts o f d u ty  o f ca re , fa u lt and u n law fu lness 
see F .H .Law sin  and B .S .M a rke s in is , nTortious liability for unintentional harm in the
common law and the civilian, C am bridge  1982, vo l. 1 , p p . 99 ;
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in  o rd e r to  c o v e r th o s e  persons w ho  have fa ile d  to  com ply w ith  a  s p e c ific  d u e - 
d ilig e n c e  s ta n d a rd 14.
4,2,3. _ Causation
T h ird , a c a u s a l co n n e c tio n  betw een the  p o llu te r's  conduct and  th e  in ju ry  su ffe re d  
b y  th e  p la in tiff h a s to  b e  estab lished , a  lin k  th a t m ay be ve ry d iffic u lt to  p ro ve  due to  
th e  d is ta n ce  a n d  tim e  g a p  o r o th e r com b ina tio n  fa c to rs . T he re fo re , s e v e ra l connection  
ru le s  a re  used  b y  th e  d iffe re n t lega l system s, th e  m ost basic o f w h ich  is  the condition 
sine qua non ru le , re fe r* ed  to  in  the  C om m on law  system s as th e  "b u t-fo r" te s t 15. 
A cco rd in g  to  th is  te s t th e  dam age  is caused  by a ll those fa c ts  w ith o u t w h ich  it w ould 
n o t have  o c c u rre d , th a t is  if a  ce rta in  dam age m ight have o ccu rre d  w ith o u t the  
d e fe n d a n t's  w ro n g fu l c o n d u c t, th e  d e fe n d a n t sh o u ld  no t be he ld  g u ilty . T w o  m ethods 
have  been  a d v a n c e d  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r th e  defendan t's a cts  o r o m iss io n s  are 
co n s id e re d  o r n o t a  conditbn sine qua non o f th e  in ju ry  su ffe re d , re s p e c tiv e ly  the  
m e th o d  o f e lim in a tio n  a n d  th e  m ethod  o f su b s titu tio n .
T h e  "a d e q u a te  c a u s a tio n ” th e o ry  w as subsequ en tly  d e ve lo p e d , acco rd ing  to  
w h ich  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  c o n d u c t n o t o n ly  has to  b e  a  cond itio n  o f th e  in ju ry  s u ffe re d  bu t 
a lso  an  a d e q u a te  c a u s e  o f such  in ju ry , in  th a t it  increased th e  risk  o f in ju ry . To
,3  In G e rm a n  la w  th e  co n ce p t is  designa ted  by th e  te rm  
" Verkehrssicherungspfiichterf;
14 In re la tio n  to  d u e  d ilig e n c e  in  e n v iro n m e n ta l law  see T hom as M cM ahon, *The 
evolution of US due diligence in  In te rn a tio n a l C o rpo ra te  Law, O c to b e r 1994, n5 39, 
w here  due d ilig e n c e  is  g e n e ra lly  d e fin e d  as th e  le v e l o f inqu iry  w h ich  is  reasonab le 
and  a p p ro p ria te  u n d e r th e  c ircu m sta n ce s;
15 In re la tio n  to  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  caused b y  acid  ra in s  see L u is  C olago 
A n tu n e s, "PoluigSo Industrial e Dano Ambiental: as novas afinidades electivas da 
responsabilidade civX” in  B o le tim  ds F acutdade d e  D ire ito , v o l. LX V I I, 1991, who 
d is tin g u ish e s  b e tw e e n  th e  "b u t fo r te s t", a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  the  d e fe n d a n t's  co n d u c t is  
n o t a  cause  o f th e  d a m a g e , if th is  m ig h t h a ve  occurred  in  any c a s e  and the  
"su b s ta n tia l fa c to r te s t" u n d e r w h ich  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  co n d u ct co n s titu te s  th e  d e c is ive  
e le m e n t in  the  re s u ltin g  d a m a g e ;
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e v a lu a te  th is  s ig n ific a n t in cre a se  in th e  p ro b a b ility  o f harm  a ll th e  c ircu m sta n ce s  
p e rc e p tib le  to  an  "o p tim a l" obse rve r a t th e  tim e  o f th e  in c id e n t and th e  sp e c ific  
c o n d itio n s  know n b y  th e  d e fe n d a n t m ust b e  ta ke n  in to  accoun t16. M any o th e r th e o rie s  
h a ve  been  d e fend ed , fo r e xa m p le , the  "scope  o f th e  ru le " theory, b u t th e y  a re  o f less 
in te re s t w ith  regard  to  th e  com pensa tion  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, s ince  th e y  w ere 
fo u n d  to  b e  to o  re s tric tiv e  in  estab lish ing  th e  ca u sa l lin k  betw een th is  sp e c ia l ty p e  o f 
da m a g e  an d  a  c e rta in  p o llu te r's  a c tiv ity .
N eve rthe le ss, to  d e a l w ith  th e  p rob lem s o f e n v ironm en ta l dam age  ce rta in  
a d a p ta tio n s  w ere deem ed  necessary, s ince  in  som e env ironm en ta l cases e ith e r the  
da m a g e  is  im m easurab le  o r it  is  th e  re su lt o f cu m u la tiv e  acts, w h ich  m akes it ve ry  
d iffic u lt fo r th e  in ju re d  person  to  p rove  the  ca u sa l lin k  betw een th e  s p e c ific  dam a g in g  
a c t a n d  th e  in ju ry  su s ta in e d . F urthe rm ore , in  o th e r s itu a tio n s  w here th e  d a m a g e  w as 
caused  by severa l a c ts  o f p o llu tio n , as fo r exam ple  th e  perm anen t d e p o s it o f w a s te , it 
is im p o ss ib le  to  id e n tify  th e  in d iv id u a l p ro d u ce r o f each  po llu tin g  su b sta n ce  and 
th e re fo re  it is  necessary to  a d o p t sp e c ific  m echan ism s such as the  jo in t and se ve ra l 
lia b ility  c rite ria .
4.2.3.1. Joint and Several liability
In  s itu a tio n s  w here  s e ve ra l pe rsons m ay be  re sp o n s ib le  fo r the  sam e d a m age  o r 
fo r d iffe re n t parts o f it, it m ay be  ve ry  d iffic u lt fo r th e  p la in tiff to  p ro ve  the  re q u ire d  
ca u sa tio n  lin ks  be tw een th e  dam age su ffe re d  and  th e  a c tiv itie s  o f a ll those  
re sp o n s ib le  persons o r be tw een  a  sp e c ific  in d iv id u a l a c t and the  share  o f th e  da m a g e  
it caused .
F u rth e rm o re , in  se ve ra l o th e r cases it happens th a t c e rta in  responsib le  p a rtie s  a re  
n o t a t a ll id e n tifia b le  o r in  th e  m e a n tim e  have becom e in so lve n t. In a ll such  ca se s , a
16 S ee M a rke s in is , pp . 8 7 ;
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p ro p o rtio n a l a p p o rtio n m e n t o f lia b ility  am ong a ll th e  parties w ou ld  n o t be  e ffic ie n t 
s in ce  it w ould n o t c o v e r th e se  responsib le  p a rtie s , and th e re fo re  th e ir sh a re  in th e  
d a m a g e  w ould b e  p a id  b y  th e  in ju red  pe rson . If  su ch  apportio nm en t w e re  fo llow ed , 
n o t o n ly  w ould  th e  in te rn a lis a tio n  goa l n o t b e  a ch ie ve d  b u t th e  p re ca u tio n a ry  p rin c ip le  
w o u ld  be  p a rtia lly  d is to rte d .
In  o rde r to  s o lv e  th e se  d iffic u ltie s  in a llo ca tin g  lia b ility , som e sys te m s estab lish  
th a t such  lia b ility  w ill be  jo in t, seve ra l o r jo in t and se ve ra l, th e re b y c re a tin g  a  fic titio u s  
apportio nm en t o f re s p o n s ib ility  betw een th e  d iffe re n t p a rties .
O n  one hand, jo in t lia b ility  enables th e  p la in tiff to  sue on ly  one  o r m ore  o f the  
re sponsib le  persons w ho  w ill o n ly  be he ld  lia b le  fo r  the  share o f d a m age  a ctu a lly  
caused  by th e ir in d iv id u a l p o llu tin g  a c tio n s . O n  th e  o th e r hand, jo in t and  severa l 
lia b ility  im plies th a t a lth o u g h  a  sp e c ific  in d iv id u a l a c tio n  has o n ly  caused  p a rt o f the  
dam age , the p e rson  re sp o n s ib le  fo r su ch  a c tio n  is  a lso re sp o n s ib le  fo r the  
com pensa tion  co s ts  due b y  o th e r pe rsons w hose  a c tiv itie s  have c o n trib u te d  to  the  
d am age . The p la in tiff's  b u rd e n  o f p ro o f is  e ve n  fu rth e r ligh tened b y  th is  ru le , s ince  he 
w ill o n ly  have to  p ro ve  c a u sa tio n  in  re la tio n  to  o n e  o f th e  responsib le  p a rtie s . If th is  
p a rty  is  held lia b le , it w ill b e  responsib le  fo r th e  fu ll am ount o f d a m a g e s to  be 
co m p e n s a te d 17. U n d e r c e rta in  c ircu n s ta n ce s, th e  c o n ce p t o f jo in t and s e v e ra l lia b ility  
can  c re a te  an in c e n tiv e  fo r  a  w ho le  ra n g e  o f p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  to  ta k e  e ffic ie n t 
p re ca u tio n s .18.
S e ve ra l c ritic is m s  have  been  m ade o f th e  la tte r d o c trin e , nam ely th a t p a rtie s  on ly 
re sponsib le  fo r a  s m a ll sh a re  o f the  in ju ry  ca n  be h e ld  lia b le  fo r th e  e n tire  a m o u n t o f 
dam ages, w h ich  in  e n v iro n m e n ta l ca se s  can  reach  ve ry  h igh  su m s. This
17 S e e  p o in t 2 .1 .4 . o f th e  G re e n  P aper;
18 S ee  T ie tenberg  w ho d is tin g u ish e s  be tw een jo in t and se ve ra l lia b ility  under 
n e g lig e n ce  o r s tr ic t lia b ility  sys te m s and co n s id e rs  th a t on ly  under th e  la tte r reg im e 
w o u ld  a  responsib le  p a rty  ta k e  m ore  p re ca u tio n , pp . 3 1 0 ;
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d isa d va n ta g e  can  b e  so m e w h a t cu rta ile d  b y  in c lu d in g  in an e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  
sys te m  a  rig h t o f co n trib u tio n , w hich a llow s th e  party  he ld  lia b le  to  seek 
re in b u rse m e n t fro m  th e  o th e r responsib le  p a rtie s  w ho have n o t pa id  fo r th e ir 
c o n trib u tio n  to  th e  dam age  19 20.
A n o th e r c ritic is m  o fte n  m a d e  is  th a t un d e r jo in t a nd  severa l lia b ility  th e  in ju re d  
p e rso n s  w ill tend  to  sue th o s e  responsib le  p a rtie s  w h o se  fin a n c ia l s itu a tio n  is  b e tte r 
p re p a re d  to  pay fo r  any aw a rd e d  com pensa tion . T h is  "w ea lth  ta rg e tin g " m eans th a t 
the  d e fe n d a n ts  w ill be  ch o se n  fro m  am ong th e  re sp o n s ib le  persons w ho ca n  b e tte r 
a ffo rd  to  co ve r th e  co m p e n sa tio n  o r re s to ra tio n  co s ts  e ve n  if th e y  a re  n o t a b le  to
on
s ig n ific a n tly  p re ve n t o r re d u ce  th e  risk  o f such  da m a g e  .
F urtherm ore , so m e  a u th o rs  have  considere d  th a t such  w ealth ta rg e tin g  m ay in 
som e cases lead to  an "u n fa ir" p rim ary  a llo ca tio n  o f responsib ility  to  th e  so -ca lle d  
"d eep-pocke ts". A cco rd in g  to  th is  "deep-pocke t syn d ro m e ", th e  in ju re d  p a rtie s  w ou ld  
ta ke  le g a l actions a g a in s t th e  responsib le  p a rty  w ith  th e  m ost fin a n c ia l resouces 
ra th e r th a n  th e  one th a t has ca u se d  m ost o f th e  d a m a g e . F ina lly , th is  te n d e n cy  to  sue 
th e  "d e e p  pockets" has ra ised  conce rns regard ing  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f im posing  lia b ility  
on le n d e rs , a  s itu a tio n  th a t w ill be  re fe rred  to  n e x t
4.2.32. Lender Liability
A s  m entioned , th e  im p u ta tio n  o n  th e  o rig in a l p o llu te r m ay prove to  b e  a  d iffic u lt o r 
in e ffic ie n t m eans to  o b ta in  co m p e n sa tio n , fo r e xam p le  if  he  no longer e x is ts  o r in  th e  
m e a n tim e  has becom e in s o lv e n t. Thereby, th e re  is  a  tre n d  tow ards in cre a s in g  th e  
n um ber o f po ten tia l re sp o n s ib le  p a rtie s , and se ve ra l s o lu tio n s  have been a d o p te d ,
19 A g a in  T ie tenberg  co n s id e rs  th a t includ ing  th e  rig h t o f co n trib u tio n  in  a  jo in t and 
se ve ra l lia b ility  ru le  w o u ld  in c re a se  th e  am ount o f p re ca u tio n s  ta ke n  and e xp e c te d  
da m a g e s under the  s tric t lia b ility  system  bu t n o t un d e r a  neg ligence  system ;
20 S ee T ie te n b e rg , pp. 313 ;
49
C H A P T E R 4
C O M P A R IS O N  O F  C IV IL  L IA B IL IT Y  S Y S T E M S
5 0
v a ry in g  from  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f com pensation  fu n d s  and com p u lso ry  insu rance  to  
th e  crea tion  o f "d e e p -p o cke ts".
O ne kind  o f "deep po cke ts" are th e  banks o r o th e r types o f lend ing  in s titu tio n s , 
w h ich , having le n t m oney to  the  p o llu te r, m ay a lso  be held lia b le  u n d e r ce rta in  
c o n d itio n s  21. T he  ra tio n a le  beh ind  such an ap p ro a ch  is th a t banks a re  in a  s tra te g ic  
p o s itio n  to  p re ve n t th e  d e ve lo p m e n t o f ce rta in  e n v iro n m e n ta lly -u n frie n d ly  p ro je c ts  22.
T h e  s p e c ific  co n d itio n s  un d e r w hich fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s , n am e ly  b a n ks , a re  held 
lia b le  fo r th e ir b o rro w e rs ' p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  v a ry  am ong th e  d iffe re n t lega l 
in s tru m e n ts  fro m  th e  c o n ce p ts  o f c o n tro l to  th e  understand ing  o f th e ir ro le  as 
env iro n m e n ta l p o lice m e n . A s  m entioned in  th e  c h a p te r on  C o m m u n ity  la w , ne ithe r 
th e  proposed D ire c tiv e  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r  da m a g e  caused by W aste  n o r th e  G reen 
P aper p rovide  fo r a  se cu re d  lende r e xe m p tio n . A lth o u g h  they a re  s till n o t b ind ing 
le g a l in s trum en ts  th e  m a in  d ire c tio n s  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  a t th e  E u ropea n  leve l 
a re  to  be found  in  th e  fu tu re  in te rp re ta tio n  o f th e ir p ro v is io n s . If th e  re fe re n ce s  m ade 
to  th e  person w ho  is  co n s id e re d  to  have th e  "a c tu a l" o r "o p e ra tio n a l" co n tro l o ve r the 
p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  a re  in te rp re te d  in an e x te n s ive  m a n n e r, banks m ay w e ll be  included 
am ong th o se  re sp o n s ib le  p a rtie s .
T he  consequences fo r  a  c iv il lia b ility  sys te m  m ay be d isp ro p o rtio n a te , w ith  an 
in c re a se  in the  p rice  o f th e  le n d in g  ca p ita ls , d u e  n o t o n ly  to  the  b a n ks b e ing  o b lig e d  to  
in cu r e x te n s ive  e n v iro n m e n ta l a u d its  bu t a lso  to  th e  increased risks  be ing in c lu d e d  in 
th e  fin a l p rice  o f m o n e y 23.
21 F o r a  b rie f re v ie w  o f le n d e rs  lia b ility  in  co m m u n ity  law  see P e te r L .T e s te r and
G .M a rc  W h itehead , "77 ie  EC Directive on Civil liability caused by waste: lessons from 
the Superfund laW, in  E u ro p e a n  E n vironm en ta l Law  R eview , June 1992, pp . 2 6 ;
22 S ee C hris tophe  N itsch e  a n d  C h ris  H o p e ,"Bank as policemen -  money laundering 
and the proposed European environmental liability legislation!*, in R esearch  P apers in 
M anagem e n t S tu d ie s , U n iv e rs ity  o f C am bridge , O c to b e r 1983;
23 S ee D erek W h e a tle y , "A  green caveat vendor*  in  T h e  F inancia l T im e s, 1 1 /8 /19 92 ;
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4.2.4. Damage
L a s t b u t no t le a s t, th e  req u ire m e n t w h ich  shou ld  fin a lly  be m entioned is  th e  one 
w ith o u t w h ich  no c iv il lia b ility  m ay arise. In  o th e r w o rd s , lia b ility  o n ly  a rise s  fro m  an 
u n la w fu l a c t if th e  p la in tiff p ro ve s  th a t a  c la im a b le  da m a g e  has been caused  to  h im . 
L ike w ise , under th e  d iffe re n t le g a l o rders, o n ly  c e rta in  typ e s  o f dam ages sh o u ld  be 
co m p e n sa te d  fo r, d e p e n d in g  o n  th e ir q u a n tita tive  o r q u a lita tiv e  legal s ig n ifica n ce .
F u rthe rm ore , a fte r p ro v in g  th a t the  dam age  s h o u ld  be com pensated fo r the 
p la in tiff and  fin a ly  th e  c o u rt s till have to  fu lfill th e  d iffic u lt task o f e va lu a tin g  the 
dam age.
4.3. No n - fau lt  liability
T h e  above -m en tioned  bu rd e n  o f p roo f o n  the  p la in tiff, who m ust e s ta b lish  the 
re q u ire d  lin k  betw een the  in ju ry  su ffe red  and a  p a rtic u la r de fe n d a n t's  fa u lty  o r 
n e g lig e n t conduct, m ay so m e tim e s  be too  d iffic u lt to  fu lfil. Even co m p lia n ce  w ith  
e n v iro n m e n ta l regu la tio ns is  n o t s u ffic ie n t to  p rove  th a t th e  p o te n tia l p o llu te r has 
acted  in  a  p ro p e r m anner.
In itia lly , to  so lve  such  p ro b le m s  severa l p ro ce d u ra l m echan ism s w ere  used, fro m  
th e  re v e rs a l o f the  onus o f p ro o f to  th e  d o c trin e  o f res ipsa ioquitor, acco rd in g  to  
w h ich  th e  evidence  o f fa c ts  m a y  re lie ve  th e  v ic tim s  fro m  th e  burden o f p ro o f. T hese  
so lu tio n s  have  on ly led  to  an "o b je c tiv iza tio n " o f n e g lig e n ce , m erg ing fa u lt an d  s tric t 
lia b ility  24.
T h e se  s itu a tio n s  th e n  led to  th e  adoption o f s tric t lia b ility  ru les acco rd ing  to  w h ich  
th e  p o llu te r is held lia b le  e ve n  if th e  dam age  he ca u se s  is not a  re su lt o f h is 
in te n tio n a l o r neg lig en t co n d u ct. S uch a  sys te m  w ill e a se  som e aspects o f th e
24 In fra  n o te  5 , pp. 63 ;
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p la in tiff's  burden o f p ro o f a nd  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  o b lig a tio n  to p a y  co m p e n sa tio n  m ay 
e ve n  a rise  fro m  h is  la w fu l a c tiv itie s . F or e xa m p le , any person re sp o n s ib le  fo r ce rta in  
d a n g e ro u s  a c tiv itie s  w ill b e a r th e  com p e n sa tio n  c o s ts  from  u n a vo id a b le  dam age  and 
th e re fo re  the  p la in tiff w ill o n ly  have to  e s ta b lish  a  causa! lin k  be tw e e n  th e  in ju ry  
su s ta in e d  and th e  p o llu te r's  a c tiv itie s  25.
4.3.1. Absolute Liability
A b so lu te  lia b ility  is a  ch a ra c te ris tic  o f a  s p e c ific  lia b ility  sys te m , e ith e r fa u lt o r 
n o n -fa u lt lia b ility , a cco rd ing  to  w hich th e re  is  no  p oss ib le  d e fe n ce  o r e xc lu s io n  26. 
T h e o re tica lly , th is  p re ve n ts  th e  c re a to r o f a  risk  fro m  passing th a t risk  o n to  th e  p u b lic  
a n d  th e re b y  e xp rop ria ting  th e  w e a lth  from  o th e r p e o p le , because he  w ill n o t b e  ab le  to  
e x e m p t h im se lf fro m  lia b ility . T h e  ch o ice  o f a d o p tin g  absolu te  lia b ility  depen ds on 
how  th e  costs a re  a p p o rtio n e d  be tw een th e  p a rty  responsib le  fo r  th e  p o llu tio n , the  
v ic tim  and  the  p u b lic  in g e n e ra l.
4.3.2. Collective liability
A s a lready m e n tio n e d , th e re  a re  se v e ra l ty p e s  o f po llu tion  cases w h e re  it  can be 
v e ry  d iffic u lt to  e s ta b lish  th e  ca u sa l link  be tw een  a  ce rta in  a c tiv ity  o r in c id e n t and the  
in ju ry  re su ltin g  s p e c ific a lly  th e re o f, fo r e xa m p le  in  cases o f "s y n e rg is tic  p o llu tio n " 
w h e re  th e  p o llu tio n  re su lts  fro m  a  c o m b in a tio n  o f severa l d iffe re n t in c id e n ts  o r
25 In  th e  fie ld  o f in te rn a tio n a l re sp o n s ib ility  se e  R icca rd o  P is illo -M a zze sch i,"Forms of 
international responsibility for environmental hamf, in  In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r 
E n v iro n m e n ta l H a rm , e d ite d  b y  F rancesco  F ra n c io n i a n d  T u llio  S co va zz i;
26 S e e  a g a in  R icca rdo  P is illo -M a zze sch i, w h o  co n s id e rs  th a t n o n -fa u lt lia b ility  can  be 
re la tiv e  ( o r s tric t lia b ility ) o r  abso lu te  d e p e n d in g  o n  w hether th e  d e fe n d a n t m ay 
in vo ke  o r n o t one  o f  c ircu m sta n ce s  p re c lu d in g  w ro n g fu ln e ss  a llow ed  b y in te rn a tio n a l 
law ;
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a c tiv itie s  27. If th e se  d iffe re n t in c id e n ts  o r a c tiv itie s  a re  th e  re sp o n s ib ility  o f d iffe re n t 
p a rtie s , how  shou ld  lia b ility  be  a llo ca te d  am ong them  ?
In  fa c t, in the  a llo c a tio n  o f c iv il lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, d iffic u ltie s  m ay 
a rise  e ith e r because it  is  im p o ss ib le  to  id e n tify  the  s p e c ific  responsib le  p a rty , e .g . in 
cases o f ch ro n ic  p o llu tio n , o r because  in som e types o f po llu tio n , e .g . w aste  dum ps, 
link ing  th e  dam age to  th e  p o llu tin g  substance can p ro ve  ve ry d iffic u lt 28. In  such 
cases, th e  courts  h ave  d e ve lo p e d  d iffe re n t le g a l th e o rie s , m ost o f th e m  b o rrow ed  
fro m  p ro d u c t lia b ility  ca se -la w , w h ich  p rovide  m ore c o lle c tiv e  w ays o f com pensa ting  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age 29. It o u g h t to  be rem em bered  th a t the  fin a l a im  o f lia b ility  
ru les  is  to  com pensa te  th e  in ju re d  person and th a t th is  o b je c tive  sh o u ld  so m e tim e s 
p re va il o ve r th e  "p o llu te r pa ys" p rin c ip le .
T h e re fo re , the  p ro b le m s in p ro v in g  the  requ ired  ca u sa l links  h a ve  led to  the  
d e ve lo p m e n t o f new fo rm s  o f ris k  lia b ility  30, w h ich  d e ve lo p m e n t has been  e xp la in e d  
by using th e  fic tio n  o f an  o v e ra rch in g  "cupo la" w h ich  w o u ld  rep lace  th e  in d iv id u a lis e d  
ca u sa l a ttrib u tio n  w ith  a  q u a s i-c o lle c tiv e  lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l d am ages 31. 
A cco rd ing  to  th is  th e o ry , th e se  new  form s o f risk  "p o o lin g " are  a ch ie ve d  n o t o n ly
27 In re la tio n  to  the  C ouncil o f E urope C onven tion , see  "Explanatory report on the 
Convention on Civii Liability for Damage resulting from activities dangerous to the 
Environmenf, com m enta ry to  a rtic le  11 ;
28  See A le xa n d re  K iss, "Present limits to the enforcement of state responsibility for 
environmental damage?, in In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n sib ility  fo r  E nv ironm en ta l D am age, 
C hap te r 1 , w ho cons ide rs  th a t o n e  o f the  m a jo r o b s ta c le s  to  com p e n sa tio n  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age is  the  re q u ire m e n t th a t th e  a u th o r o f dam age be  id e n tifie d  in 
le g a l te rm s , w hich ca n  p ro ve  v e ry  d iffic u lt in th o se  s itua tion s o f lo n g -ra n g e  
tra n sb o u n d a ry  po llu tion ;
29 In re la tio n  to  the  fo llo w in g  fo rm s  o f co lle c tiv e  lia b ility  see M ichae l J. H a rrig a n  
"S om e concepts of Collective responsibility in US products liability and environmental 
situations? in  "T ra n sn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  and insu rance " by R a lph  K ro n e r, 
1993;
30 See G le n  O ’R obinson, "Risk, causation and harrrf, in "L ia b ility  and re s p o n s ib ility : 
essays in law  and m ora ls", w ho co n s id e rs  th a t lia b ility  b a sed  on risk, th a t is, on  th e  
p ro b a b ility  o f harm , d oes not re q u ire  one to  acce p t p ro b a b ility  as a  s ta te m e n t o f 
ca usa tion ;
31 G un tne r Teubner, "The invisible cupola: from causal to collective attribution of 
ecological liability', B re m en /F irenze , to  be pub lish ed ;
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th ro u g h  an easing o f th e  p ro o f requ irem en ts b u t a ls o  b y  c o lle c tiv is in g  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  
re sponsib ility ; th u s  a  p o llu te r is  no t lia b le  s o le ly  fo r h is  personal p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  b u t 
a lso  fo r th e  acts o f o th e r m em bers  o f th e  ris k  g ro u p  to  w h ich  he b e lo n g s .
Follow ing, a  b rie f su m m a ry  o f th e  m a in  fo rm s  o f co lle c tiv e  re s p o n s ib ility , w hich 
e xe m p lify  the co u rts  d e ve lo p m e n t o f th e  va rio u s ! th e o rie s , w ill be  g iven .
4.3.2.1. Alternative liability
T h is  fo rm  o f c o lle c tiv e  re sp o n s ib ility  is  used m a in ly  in the  s itu a tio n s  w here  it is 
v e ry  d iffic u lt, a t le a s t no t in  an a rb itra ry  b a s is , to  a llo c a te  lia b ility  am ong th e  va rious 
re sponsib le  parties w h ich  co n trib u te d  to  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f a ce rta in  d am age  32.
In Summers v. Tice 33 th e  A m erican  C ourts  s h ifte d  the  bu rden  o f p ro o f to  the 
de fe n d a n ts  and fo unde d  th e m  jo in tly  and s e v e ra lly  lia b le . A lthough  th e  p la in tiff cou ld  
n o t id e n tify  the  sp e c ific  in ju re r, he sued  and id e n tifie d  the  s e t o f a ll possib le  
responsib le  p a rtie s , in  su ch  instances, th is  fo rm  o f co lle c tiv e  re s p o n s ib ility  can  be 
co n s id e re d  as an a p p lica tio n  o f th e  jo in t a n d  se v e ra l co n ce p t unde r a  sys te m  o f s tric t 
lia b ility .
In o th e r w ords, th e  jo in t and se ve ra l lia b ility  ru le  ca n  a t p re se n t b e  a p p lie d  in 
s itu a tio n s  w here th e  in d e p e n d e n t acts  o f tw o  o r m ore  pa rties  p ro d u ce d  th e  sam e 
in d iv is ib le  dam age. H ow ever, one  o f the  d iffic u ltie s  encoun te red  h e re  is th a t a ll the 
p o te n tia l responsib le  p a rtie s  m u st be id e n tifie d  and su e d , and th e re fo re  th is  concep t 
has e vo lve d  in to  m ore  fle x ib le  lia b ility  fo rm s.
32 S ee  T om  H. T ie te n b e rg , "Indivisible Toxic Torts: The Economics of Joint and 
Several Liability', in  Land  E co n o m ics , vo l. 6 5 , rP  4 , N o ve m b e r 1993;
33 T h e  A m erican  case -la w  in  th is  chap te r w ill be  m a in ly  quo te d  fro m  H a rrig a n , supra 
no te  ; 3 3  C al.2d 8 0 , 199 P. 2 d  1 ,1 9 4 8 ; se e  a lso  th e  new  D utch C iv il C ode , S ection  
6 :9 9  w h e re  th e  re q u ire m e n t o f ca u sa lity  be tw een th e  po llu ting  in c id e n t and  the 
da m a g e  is  re laxed;
54
C H A P T E R  4
C O M P A R I S O N  O F  C IV IL  L IA B IL IT Y  S Y S T E M S
5 5
4 3.2.2. Enterprise liability
T h is  concept ca n  be u se d  to  designate  n o t o n ly  th e  lia b ility  o f e n te rp rise s  as 
se p a ra te  en tities  b u t a lso  a  s p e c ific  type  of lia b ility  w ith o u t fa u lt34, in w h ich  th e  cou rts  
re la xe d  to  an g re a te r e x te n t th e  requ irem en ts fo r co n sc io u s , p lanned and p u rp o s ive  
co o p e ra tio n  o f en te rp rises 35 36. In  Hall v. Dupont36 th e  C o u rt also a d m itte d  a  p a rtia l 
s h ift o n  th e  burden o f p ro o f b y  ho ld ing  "tha t a  g roup  o f m anufacture rs is  jo in tly  and 
s e ve ra lly  lia b le  if th e  p la in tiff c o u ld  prove  th a t th e y  had  jo in t aw areness o f the  ris k  and 
jo in t c a p a c ity  to  re d u ce  th e  ris k
O n e  o f the  m ain d isa d va n ta g e s  is th a t th is  typ e  o f co lle c tive  lia b ility  does no t 
co ve r th o s e  s itu a tio n s  o f p a ra lle l conduct am ong c o m p e titiv e  in d iv id u a ls , th e re b y  
c re a tin g  d is in ce n tive s  to  risk c o n tro l and to  co o p e ra tio n  w ith in  the  industry . F u rth e r 
d iffic u ltie s  a re  th a t in  th e  ta rg e te d  g roup  "v irtu a lly '' a ll o f th e  industry m a n u fa c tu re rs  
sh o u ld  b e  included, w h ich  w o u ld  p ro ve  d iffic u lt if  th e  in d u s try  in question  is  d ispe rsed ; 
th e re fo re  th is  type o f lia b ility  h a s  a lso  deve lopped  in to  a  le s s  dem anding  type .
4.3.2.3. M arket sh a re  liability
In re a c tio n  to  th e  d iffic u ltie s  in  co lle c tiv is in g  lia b ility  o f a  w id e ly  d ispe rsed  
in d u s try , it w a s  accep ted  in s e ve ra l cases th a t " if  th e  p la in tiff sued a  s u ffic ie n t n u m b e r 
o f m a n u fa c tu re rs  th a t c o n s titu te  a  substan tia l sha re  o f th e  m arke t", th e n  each 
d e fe n d a n t co u ld  be he ld  s e v e ra lly  lia b le  to  th e  e x te n t o f h is  m arke t share  37. in  o th e r
34 S ee G e rt B ru g g e m e ie r,"Enterprise Liability for Environmental Damage in German 
Law and EC Law " in  E co lo g ica l R e sp o n s ib ility , G u n tn e r T e u b n e r (ed.);
35 S ee a g a in  G untner T eubner, P a rt A , C hapter 3 , w ho co n s id e rs  th a t in th e  case Hall 
vs. Dupont th e  cou rt id e n tifie d  a  jo in t en te rp rise  s ince  th e re  w as jo in t co n tro l o f th e  
risk  th ro u g h  com m on a d heren ce  to  industry  s a fe ty  s ta n d a rd s  and the  d e le g a tio n  o f 
fu n c tio n s  o f sa fe ty  in ve s tig a tio n  to  a  jo in tly  sponsored tra d e  associa tio n ;
36 Idem , 3 4 5  F. Supp. E .D .N .Y . 1 972 ;
37 S ee a ls o  Ja n  E kering , supra  n o te  , according to  w h ich  th e  producers h e ld  lia b le  " f ill 
th e  gap" o f th e  m arket sh a re  o f p ro d u ce rs  w ho h a ve  no t b e e n  included a s d e fe n d a n ts  
o r w ho  h a ve  m eanw hile ce a se d  to  e x is t;
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w ords, w h e n e v e r a  firm  e n te rs  a  c e rta in  m a rke t it b e co m e s responsib le  fo r the  
e n v iro n m e n ta l risks  th a t m arke t c re a te s  36.
F or e x a m p le , in Sindeli v. Abott 39 th e  p la in tiffs  su e d  on ly  fiv e  D ES 38 940 
m a n u fa c tu re rs , b u t s ince  th e s e  fiv e  w e re  re sp o n s ib le  fo r 9 0  %  o f DES p ro d u c tio n , th e  
C o u rt h e ld  th a t th e y  co u ld  b e  h e ld  re sp o n s ib le  in  p ro p o rtio n  to  th e ir substan tia l sh a re  
o f th e  p ro d u c t m arke t. N e ve rth e le ss , in  o th e r D E S  ca se s, th e  C ourt re fe rre d  to  th e  
need to  d e m o n s tra te  p a ra lle l a c tio n  b y  th e  d iffe re n t m a n u fa c tu rin g  co m p a n ie s , a 
re q u ire m e n t w h ich  can be  d iffic u lt to  p ro ve  in  c e rta in  c a se s  41.
L in d e r th is  m a rke t-sha re  ru le , th e  tra d itio n a l ca u sa l c o n n e c tio n  re q u ire m e n t w ill 
n o t se rve  its  d e te rre n t fu n c tio n  s in c e  th e  p la in tiff does n o t h a ve  to  prove a  causa l lin k  
betw een th e  d e fe n d a n t's  co n d u c t a n d  th e  in ju ry  s u ffe re d . N everthe le ss, in  p ro d u c t 
lia b ility  c a s e -la w  th e  fu lfillm e n t o f th e  fo llo w in g  p re -re q u is ite s  was co n s id e re d  
necessary: th a t th e  risk o f th e  p ro d u c ts  shou ld  b e  id e n tic a l, th a t p o te n tia l v ic tim s  
shou ld  h a ve  been  sub jected  e q u a lly  to  th is  risk , a n d  fin a lly  th a t a ll the  risks  ca n  be  
a ccu ra te ly  e s tim a te d  42. T h e  m a in  p ro b le m s  o f th is  ru le  a re  how  th e  dam age  sh o u ld  
be  a p p o rtio n e d  am ong th e  v a rio u s  d e fe n d a n ts  a nd  w h e th e r th e  background le v e l o f 
risk  sh o u ld  b e  ta k e n  into a cco u n t b y  th e  co u rt.
4.3.2A . R isk Share Liability
38 S ee  a g a in  G u n tn e r T e u b n e r;
39 Sindeli v. Abott Labs, 2 6  C a l. 3 rd  5 8 8 ,6 0 7  P 2d 9 2 4 ,1 9 8 0 ;
40 DES s ta n d s  fo r  D ie th y Is tillb e s tro l. th a t is  syn th e tic  h o rm o n e , oestrogen , used in 
co m p lica te d  p re g n a n c ie s ; d u e  to  th e  tim e  g ap  th e  D E S  d a u g h te rs  w ere no lo n g e r a b le  
to  id e n tify  th e  m a n u fa c tu re rs  th a t m a d e  th e  p a rtic u la r p ills  ta k e n  b y th e ir m o the rs ;
41 S ee L u is  C o la g o  A n tunes, C h a p te r 4 , re fe rin g  to  C ase Bichler vs. Eli Lilly & Co 
w here  th e  C o u rt d e c ided  fo r th e  s o lid a ry  lia b ility  o f a ll th o se  w h o  agreed to  c o m m it an  
ille g a l a c t w h ic h  agreem en t co u ld  b e  ded u ce d  fro m  th e  c o n sc io u s  p a ra lle lism  o f th e  
in frin g e rs ' c o n d u c t;
42 S ee S u sa n  R ose-A ckerm an, *Market-share allocations in tort law: strenghts and 
weaknesses" in  Jo u rn a l o f L e g a l S tu d ie s , vo l. X IX , Ju n e  1990;
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In a m o re  rad ica l fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  m arket sh a re  lia b ility  th e o ry  so m e  A m erican  
C ourts  have  even  adopted  th e  th e o ry  th a t the  p la in tiff needs to  sue  on ly o n e  p oss ib le  
re sp o n s ib le  p a rty , w hich is  then  h e ld  lia b le  if  it does n o t b rin g  in to  the  a c tio n  the  o th e r 
possib le  d e fe n d a n ts . F o r e xa m p le  in  Collins v. Squibb 43  th e  C ourt o f W isco n s in  
based  th is  th e o ry  on  th e  id e a  th a t e a ch  m a n u fa c tu re r w h o  co n trib u te d  to  th e  risk  o f 
in ju ry  co u ld  b e  he ld  to ta lly  re sp o n s ib le , unless he  id e n tifie d  and brought in to  th e  case  
the  o th e r p o ss ib le  de fend an ts.
A cco rd in g  to  som e d o c trin e , C E R C LA  44 w o u ld  be  a  re g u la to ry  e xa m p le  o f th is  
risk  sha re  th e o ry , since a ll "p o te n tia lly  responsib le  p a rtie s " {"P R P ’s") w ho d ispose  o f 
hazardous substance s to  th e  s ite  in  question  can b e  he ld  lia b le  fo r the  e n tire  dam age, 
because  th e y  co n trib u te d  to  th e  ris k  o f harm .
43 W is. 2 d  166, c e rt, denied , 4 6 9  U .S . 8 2 6 ,1 9 8 4 ;




5.1. - I n tr o d uc tio n
A s  a lre a d y  m entioned  w h e n  d iscussing  th e  C o m m u n ity  law  d e fin itio n s  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, it w a s  o n ly  a fte r th e  S in g le  E uropean A c t 1 th a t the  
C o m m u n ity  fo rm a lly  a d op te d  a  p lanned  e n v iro n m e n ta l p o licy . In fa c t, w hen  the  
E uropean  C om m un ity w as fo u n d e d  in  1957 w ith  T re a ty  o f R om e the  p ro te c tio n  o f the  
e n v iro n m e n t w as n o t re fe rre d  to  and  it w as o n ly  w ith  th e  S E A  th a t th e  C o m m u n ity 's  
e n v iro n m e n ta l o b je c tive s  w ere  e stab lish ed , m a in ly  in  a rtic le  130r; th e se  o b je c tive s  
co n s is te d  in : a) p re se rv in g , p ro te c tin g  and im p ro v in g  th e  q u a lity  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t; 
b) c o n trib u tin g  tow ards th e  p ro te c tio n  o f hum an h e a lth  a n d  c) ensuring a  p ru d e n t and 
ra tio n a l u tilisa tio n  o f n a tu ra l re s o u rc e s  2
T h e  C om m un ity  co m p e te n c ie s  in  th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l fie ld  w ill no t b e  a n a lyse d  in 
d e ta il he re , s ince  th is  s u b je c t h a s  a lready be e n  e x te n s iv e ly  d e a lt w ith  by se ve ra l 
o th e r w o rks  3, and a ls o  be ca u se  th e  cen tra l fo cu s  o f th is  th e s is  is on  the  p o te n tia l 
E uropean  e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  re g im e  and n o t on th e  ch a ra c te ris tics  o f C o m m u n ity  
E n v iro n m e n ta l Law. N e ve rth e le ss , a b rie f a n a lys is  o f th e  M a astrich t T re a ty  a n d  th e
1 S in g le  E uropean  A ct, 1987  O J L 1 6 9 ,1 , h e re in a fte r S E A ;
2 S ee fo r  a  m ore d e ta ile d  a n a lys is  o f the  im p a c t o f th e  am endm en ts p u t fo rw a rd  by 
th e  S E A , N ig e l H aigh a n d  D. B a o ld o ck , "Environmental Policy and 1992\  IE E P , 1989;
3 E ckh a rd  R ehbinder and  R ich a rd  S te w a rt,"Environmental Protection Policy', v o l. 2, 
1985; L u d w ig  K räm er, "Focus on European Environmental LaW' ;
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m ost im p o rta n t changes it h a s  in troduced in to  C o m m u n ity  e n v ironm en ta l w ill be 
g ive n , in o rd e r to  b ro a d ly  d e s c rib e  the  fram ew ork under w hich fu tu re  C o m m un ity  
e n v iro n m e n ta l le g is la tio n  w ill b e  adop te d  o r in te rp re ted .
5.2. T he Ma a s tr ic h t  T reaty and C ommunity Environm ental
law
5.2.1. Introduction
F o llow ing  th e  s ta rtin g  p o in t g ive n  by th e  S in g le  E uropean  A ct, th e  T re a ty  on 
E uropean U n ion  stresses th e  fo rm e r e xp lic it re fe re n ce s to  th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t by am ending  som e o f its  m ain p rin c ip le s . N e ve rth e le ss, it is  co n s id e re d  
b y  som e o b se rve rs  th a t th e  M a a s tric h t T rea ty rep resen ts a  "tw o  steps fo rw a rd , one  
s te p  back " approach in th e  d e ve lo p m e n t o f th e  EE C 's e n v iro n m e n ta l p o lic y  4, a n d  
th e re fo re  it is  w o rthw h ile  a n a lys in g  th e  m ain change s and th e ir possib le  im p a ct.
In fa c t, a lthough it seem s a t firs t g lance  th a t th e  am endm en ts m ade  to  fo rm e r 
T itle  V II o n  th e  E n v iro n m e n t a re  m o re  o f a  fo rm a l than  o f a  su b s ta n tia l n a tu re , th is  is  
n o t so t. F irs t o f a ll, a  co n c re te  C o m m u n ity  p o lic y  on  th e  e n v iro n m e n t is  re co g n ise d , 
rep lac ing  th e  fo rm er re fe re n ce  to  "action  b y  th e  C o m m u n ity  re la tin g  to  th e  
e n v iro n m e n t", w h ich  w as un d e rs to o d  by som e as o n ly  ena b lin g  spo rad ic  in te rv e n tio n s  
b y th e  C o m m u n ity . A s in  th e  S E A , th is  env ironm en ta l p o lic y  shou ld  c o n trib u te  to  th e  
increase  in  th e  q ua lity  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t, to  the  p ro te c tio n  o f hum an h e a lth , and to  a 
p ru d e n t a n d  ra tiona l u tilisa tio n  o f n a tu ra l resources.
5.2.2. Sustainable growth
4 S ee D avid  W ilk in so n , "Maastricht and the Environment: The implications for the 
EEC's environment policy of the Treaty on European Uniorf, in Jo u rn a l o f 
E n v iro n m e n ta l Law , 1992, vo l. 4 , ^ 2 ,  pp . 221;
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T h e  m a in  change is  th a t th e  am ended  T re a ty  e s ta b lish e s  the  C om m un ity 's  d u ty  to  
p ro m o te  a  "susta inab le  a nd  n o n -in fla tio n a ry  g ro w th  re sp e ctin g  the  e n v iro n m e n t" and 
th e  "ra is in g  o f th e  s ta n d a rd  o f liv in g  and q u a lity  o f life " th e re b y  en larg ing  th e  sco p e  o f 
th e  E E C 's  b a s ic  tasks 5. F in a lly , th e  am ended re fe re n ce  to  th e  p rom otion  o f m easures 
a t th e  in te rn a tio n a l le v e l tra n s la te s  th e  C o m m un ity  tre n d  to w a rd s  encourag ing  a  m ore  
im p o rta n t ro le  fo r th e  in te rn a tio n a l o rg a n isa tio n s  and  th e  agreem ents w hose a d o p tio n  
th e y  p ro m o te , in  d e a lin g  w ith  e n v iro n m e n ta l q u e s tio n s  6.
5.2.3. Subsidiarity Principle
A n o th e r re le va n t p ro v is io n  to  th e  d e ve lo p m e n t o f an e ffic ie n t C o m m un ity  
e n v iro n m e n ta l p o licy  is  th e  e x te n s io n  o f the  p rin c ip le  o f su b s id ia rity  to  a ll C o m m un ity  
a c tiv itie s  7. A cco rd ing  to  th is  p rin c ip le  the  E E C 's in te rve n tio n  sha ll b e  c o n fin e d  to  
th o se  a re a s  w here  th is  is  m ore  e ffe c tiv e  than  n a tio n a l in te rve n tio n  and in  any case 
sh a ll b e  k e p t to  th e  m in im u m  e x te n t nece ssa ry  8  T h e re b y , th e  fo rm a l p a rtia l p rin c ip le , 
e s ta b lish in g  th a t ac tion  in  th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l fie ld  by th e  C om m un ity  w a s s u b je c t to  
th e  c o n d itio n  th a t th e  p ro p o se d  o b je c tiv e s  co u ld  be b e tte r a tta ined  a t C o m m u n ity  
ra th e r th a n  a t in d iv id u a l M e m b e r S ta te  le ve l, w a s  su b s titu te d  by a  g e n e ra l p rin c ip le  
o f s u b s id ia rity  9.
5 S ee a rtic le  2 a o f th e  E E C  T re a ty  a s  am ended b y  the  T re a ty  on  th e  E uropean  U n io n , 
h e re a fte r th e  M a a strich t T re a ty ; It is  in te resting  to  note  th e  com parison  be tw e e n  th e  
te rm  a d o p te d  o f "su s ta in a b le  g ro w th " and th e  te rm  u sed  in  th e  1987 R e p o rt o f th e  
B ru n tla n d  C om m ission  o f "s u s ta in a b le  d eve lop m en t;
6  S ee  a ls o  J o in t P ub lic  H e a rin g  o n  th e  D ra ft D ire c tive  fo r  L ia b ility  caused  b y W a s te , 
in  w h ich  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  E E C 's  adhering to  the  re c e n tly  approved  C o u n c il o f 
E urope C o n ve n tio n  on  C o m p e n sa tio n  fo r D am age to  th e  E n v iro n m e n t w as 
Q uestioned;
'A r t ic le  3 b  o f th e  M a a s tric h t T re a ty ;
8  F o r a  m o re  d e ta ile d  a n a ly s is  o f th e  p rin c ip le  o f s u b s id ia rity  se e  Ftenaud D ehousse , 
"D o e s  subsidiarity really matter" , E U I W orking  P apers in  Law  92/32, Ja n u a ry  1993, 
a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  th e  ra tio n a le  b e h in d  such a  p rin c ip le  w a s  to  lim it th e  g ro w th  o f 
C o m m u n ity  po w e rs  by ta k in g  d e c is io n s  "as  c lo se ly  a s  p o s s ib le  to  th e  c itiz e n ";
9  S e e  A rtic le  130 r/ 4  o f th e  EEC  T re a ty  as am ended by th e  S E A ;
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In th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l fie ld  th e  C om m unity has fo llow ed  a  type o f a d m in is tra tive  
s u b s id ia rity  accord ing  to  w h ich  th e  leg is la tion  adopted usua lly  se ts  a  re g u la to ry  
fra m e w o rk  w ith in  w h ich  M e m b e r S tates in te rp re t and  estab lish  th e  s p e c ific  
re q u ire m e n ts  10 1. A t th e  sam e tim e , the  T rea ty, b y  g iv in g  M em ber S ta te s  th e  rig h t to  
m a in ta in  o r in troduce  m ore  s trin g e n t p ro te ctive  m easures ” , as long as these  a re  
n o tifie d  to  th e  C om m ission  a nd  com patib le  w ith  th e  T re a ty , a llow s co n s id e ra b le  
d iffe re n ce s  in each  M em ber S ta te 's  nationa l s tanda rds o f environm en ta l p ro te c tio n 12
5.2.4. States Aids and other Financial Aids
T he o n ly  am endm en t to  a rtic le  92 , regard ing sta te  a id s  does n o t m ake it v e ry  
c le a r w h e th e r the  a ids g ra n te d  in  th e  environm en ta l fie ld  a re  to  be ju s tifie d  under n ° 3 
b) o r th e  new  n° 3 d )  13. S in ce  th is  new p o in t d) co n s id e rs  th a t any s ta te  a id  to  
"p ro m o te  cu ltu re  and h e rita g e  co n se rva tio n " is  co m p a tib le  w ith  the  com m on m a rk e t 
in so fa r as it does not a ffe c t "tra d in g  cond itions and c o m p e titio n  in  th e  C o m m u n ity  to  
a n  e x te n t th a t is  co n tra ry  to  th e  com m on  in te rest", som e d o u b ts  w ill p ro b a b ly  a ris e  as 
to  th e  g ro u n d s  on w h ich  a  s p e c ific  a id  should b e  based. T he  ju s tific a tio n  fo r fu tu re  
su b s id ie s  o r g ran ts  g iv e n  by M e m b e r S tates in  o rde r to  increm ent th e  e ffe c tiv e  
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f en v iro n m e n ta l s ta n d a rd s  w ill h ave  to  b e  a n a lyse d  ca se  by ca se .
5.2.4.1. -Cohesion fund
10 S ee D a v id  W ilk in so n , p p . 2 2 6 ;
11 S ee a rtic le  100a/ 4  a s  a m e n d e d  by th e  M aastrich t T re a ty ;
12 See R énaud D ehousse, C h ris tia n  Joerges, G ia n d o m e n ico  M ajone and  F ra n c is  
S nyder, "Europe after 1992 - New regulatory strategies"  in  EUI W o rk in g  P apers in 
Law  /9 3 , a cco rd ing  to  w h ich  th e  m ore  th e  EEC uses g e n e ra l ru les, th e  m ore  d iffic u lt 
it is  to e n su re  th e  u n ifo rm ity  o f th e ir su b sta n tive  im p le m e n ta tio n  w ith in  M em ber 
S ta tes;
13 See D a n ie l A lexand er, "Competition, subsidy and environmental protection in  EC 
E n v iro n m e n t and P lannig  Law , C h a p te r 15, accord ing  to  w h ich  these fin a n c ia l a ids  
m u st a c tu a lly  in vo lve  th e  e xp e n d itu re  o f s ta te  resources and m ay b e  co n s id e re d  
exem ption s to  the  p o llu te r pays p rin c ip le ;
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F u rth e rm o re , C om m un ity  fin a n c ia l co n trib u tio n s  to  th e  ob jectives e s ta b lish e d  in 
its  e n v iro n m e n ta l p o licy  a re  n o w  co ve re d  by a rtic le  130 d) 1\  w hich o b lig e s  th e  
C o u n c il, a c tin g  in  accordance  w ith  th e  re fe rre d  c o -d e c is io n  procedure, to  e s ta b lish  a 
C o h e s io n  Fund responsib le  fo r p ro v id in g  ce rta in  fin a n c ia l con tribu tio ns fo r a p p ro ve d  
p ro je c ts  in  th e  fie ld  o f e n v iro n m e n t and  tra n s p o rt in fra s tru c tu re  in G reece , Ire la n d , 
P o rtu g a l and  S pa in , to  c o v e r th e ir  increased  co s ts  due  to  the  in troductio n  o f h ig h e r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l s ta nda rds.
S.2.4.2. Derogation
T h e  n e w  p ro v is io n  on  te m p o ra ry  d e ro g a tio n s  m ay b e  understood as an in d ire c t 
fin a n c ia l c o n trib u tio n  from  th e  C o m m u n ity . In fa c t, w hen  th e  C om m unity, fo llo w in g  the  
norm a l p ro ce d u re , adopts a  c e rta in  m e a su re  th a t im p lic a te s  d isp ropo rtiona te  c o s ts  to  
th e  M e m b e r S ta te 's  p u b lic  a u th o ritie s , th e  la tte r m a y se e k  a  tem porary d e ro g a tio n  14 5.
5.2.5. The Basic Principles and the Precautionary Principle
N o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e se  change s, th e  C o m m u n ity  p o lic y  con tinues to  be  based  on  
th e  "b a s ic  tria d  p rin c ip le s" 16 th a t p re v e n tiv e  a c tio n  shou ld  be  ta ke n , th a t 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age sh o u ld , a s  a  p rio rity , b e  re c tifie d  a t source and th a t th e  
p o llu te r sh o u ld  pay.
In a d d itio n  to  these  b a s ic  p rin c ip le s , th e  p re ca u tio n a ry  p rin c ip le  is a lso  in c lu d e d ; 
th is  is  re fle c te d  in the  C o m m u n ity 's  o b lig a tio n  to  a im  a t h ig h  le ve l p ro te c tio n , m aybe 
as a  c o n firm a tio n  o f fo rm e r a rtic le  1 0 0 a (3 ). T h is  p rin c ip le  c a n  a lso  be seen  in th e  fa c t
14 T he  a rtic le s  re fe rred  to  if  n o t s ta te d  o th e rw ise , a re  fro m  the  EEC  T re a ty  as 
am ended  b y  th e  T rea ty  on  th e  E u ro p e a n  U nion;, h e re in a fte r th e  M aastrich t T re a ty ;
15 S ee a rtic le  13 0 s / 5 as am ended  b y  th e  M a a strich t T re a ty ;
16 M ich a e l S c o tt Fee ley, P e te r M . G ilh u ly  and R e g in a ld  K .S .A m m ons, " W(h)ither goes 
the EEC proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Waste", 15 B oston C o lle g e  
In te rn a tio n a l a n d  C om para tive  Law  re v ie w , 1992, p p . 241 ;
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th a t o th e r C om m un ity  p o lic ie s  m u s t take  environm en ta l p ro te c tio n  requ irem en ts  in to  
a cco u n t17. In  o th e r w o rd s , fro m  now  th e  de fin itio n  and im p lem en ta tion  o f the  o th e r EC 
p o lic ie s  w ill inc lude  e n v iro n m e n ta l p rio ritie s  and a  h igh  le v e l o f p ro te c tio n  has been 
e x te n d e d  to  a ll en v iro n m e n ta l m e a s u re s 18.
5.2.6. The Legislative Process
A n o th e r re le va n t in n o va tio n  th a t confirm s th e  T re a ty  on European U nion as an 
im p o rta n t s te p  to w a rd s  th e  deepe n ing  19 and  im p ro ve m e n t o f C om m un ity  
e n v iro n m e n ta l law  is th e  p ro v is io n  ind ica ting  th a t th e  C o u n c il w ill n o rm a lly  a d o p t 
e n v iro n m e n ta l lega l in s tru m e n ts  b y  a  q u a lifie d  m a jo rity  vo tin g , w here  vo te s  a re  
w e ig h te d  ro u g h ly  in  a cco rd a n ce  w ith  each  M em ber S ta te 's  popu la tio n  20.
The m a in  a d van ta ge  to  e x te n d in g  th e  scope o f th e  ru le  o f q u a lifie d  m a jo rity  is  th a t 
it renders it  d iffic u lt fo r a  s in g le  M e m b e r S tate  to  ve to  a  le g is la tiv e  p roposa l th e re b y  
easing  th e  ado p tio n  o f m ore  s trin g e n t environm enta l ru le s . H ow ever, th is  q u a lifie d  
m a jo rity  v o te  and its  co n se q u e n t advan ta ges are e xc lu d e d  w here  the  p ro v is io n s  to  be 
adopted  a re  o f a  fisca l n a tu re , conce rn  tow n and c o u n try  p lann ing , land use, 
m anagem e n t o f w a te r re so u rce s a n d /o r energy supp ly  21, u n le ss  c o n tra rily  d e fin e d  b y 
th e  C ouncil ac ting  in acco rdance  w ith  the  co -opera tion  p ro ce d u re  22.
T he u se  o f th is  "co -o p e ra tio n  p rocedure " 23, a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  the  M em bers o f 
th e  E uropean P arliam en t a re  g iv e n  a  second read ing  o f le g is la tiv e  p roposa ls, w as
17 S e e  a rtic le  I3 0 r / 2  a s  am ended  b y  th e  M aastrich t T re a ty ;
18 T h e  sco p e  o f a  h igh le v e l o f p ro te c tio n  w as extended  beca u se  a rtic le  1 0 0 a  o f th e  
S E A  re q u ire d  it  in  the  h a rm o n isa tio n  o f m easures a ffe c tin g  th e  in te rn a l m a rke t;
19 S ee  G iandom e n ico  M a jone , "Deregulation and re-regulation: policy making in the 
EC since the Single Act* in  EUI W o rk in g  Papers in  S P S  n2  9 3 /2  a firm in g  th a t o ne  o f 
th e  in d ica to rs  o f a  q u a lita tiv e  d e epe n ing  o f EC re g u la tio n  is  th is  in tro d u c tio n  o f 
q u a lifie d  m a jo rity  vo ting  fo r m ost e n v iro n m e n ta l le g is la tio n ;
S ee  a rtic le  130s as am ended  b y th e  M aastricht T re a ty ;
21 S e e  a rtic le  130s/ 2  as am ended  b y  th e  M aastrich t T re a ty ;
22 S e e  a rtic le  1 3 0 s /1 as am ended  b y  th e  M aastrich t T re a ty ;
23 S e e  a rtic le  189c a s am ended  b y th e  M aastricht T re a ty ;
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a lso  e x te n d e d  and g e n e ra lise d . F u rth e rm o re , a  new  co m p le x  form  o f "co -d e c is io n "
ni
p ro ce d u re  , w h ich  a p p lie s  in  c a s e s  o f gene ra l a c tio n  p rogram m es and fo r m easures 
a im in g  a t e s tab lish ing  th e  in te rn a l m a rke t 24 5, w as ado p te d , allow ing an a b so lu te  
m a jo rity  o f th e  P a rlia m e n t to  v e to  s p e c ific  le g is la tiv e  proposals. It is , h o w e ve r, 
q u e s tio n e d  w h e th e r th is  p ro c e d u re  re p re se n ts  an  e n la rg e m e n t o f the P a rlia m e n t's  ro le  
and  a  fa c ilita tio n  in th e  a d o p tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l m easu res o r if it m ay w e ll m ean 
g re a te r d e la y s  in  the  a d o p tio n  o f s p e c ific  e n v iro n m e n ta l le g is la tio n .
T o  su m  up, the  c o -o p e ra tio n  p ro ce d u re  w ith  th e  P a rlia m e n t in co m b in a tio n  w ith  
th e  ru le  o f q u a lifie d  m a jo rity  v o tin g  in  th e  C o u n c il has b e co m e  the  norm a l le g is la tiv e  
p ro ce d u re  in  th e  a d o p tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l le g is la tio n  26.
5.3. T he Evolution of Environmental Liability Rules
It is  lik e ly  th a t the  id e a  fo r a  D ire c tiv e  on  E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility  o rig in a te d  e a rlie r 
in  th e  C o u n c il o f E n v iro n m e n ta l M in is te rs , w hen, in  re a c tio n  to  the  S andoz a cc id e n t, it 
s ta te d  th a t lia b ility  law  w as a  k e y  e le m e n t fo r  a ch ie v in g  grea te r e n v iro n m e n ta l 
p ro te c tio n  27  and  th e re b y  u rged  th e  C o m m iss ion  to  e xa m in e  the  s itu a tio n  an d  th e  
p ro b le m s o f th e  E uropean sys te m  o f c iv il lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  28. S oon 
a fte rw a rd s , th e  E uropean P a rlia m e n t a lso  reco m m e n d e d  th a t th e  C o m m iss io n
24 S ee a rtic le  189b as a m e n d e d  b y  th e  M a a strich t T re a ty ;
25 S ee re s p e c tiv e ly  a rtic le  130s and  a rtic le  100a as am ended by th e  M a a s trich t 
T re a ty ;
26 F o r a  m o re  d e ta ile d  a n a lys is  o f th e  d iffe re n t E C 's le g is la tive  p ro cedure s see 
W ilk in s o n , A p p e n d ix  1 , p p . 235 ;
27 C o u n c il o f E n v iro n m e n t M in is te rs  in 5 /11 /86 , B u ll. E E C  11-1986, p o in t 2 .1 .1 4 6 : 
"ke y  e le m e n ts  to  be p u rsued  in a  b ila te ra l C o m m u n ity , o r m u ltila te ra l fra m e w o rk , in 
a ch ie v in g  b e tte r e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  o f o th e r m a jo r w aterw ays a ffe c tin g  th e  
C o m m u n ity  sh o u ld  be p ro m p t c le a n  u p , re s to ra tio n  and e q u ita b le  com pensa tion  and 
lia b ility  a rra n g e m e n ts  fo r p o llu tio n  d a m a g e  o f th o s e  w ho  o rig in a te d  it” ;
28 S ee C o u n c il R e so lu tio n  o f 2 4 /1 1 /8 6 , c ite d  in  p o in t 1 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  
M e m o ra n d u m ;
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proposed  a  C o m m u n ity  sys te m  o f fa u lt lia b ility , fo cu s in g  m ain ly on h igh  risk 
o p e ra tio n s  in vo lv in g  ch e m ica ls  and high risk a c tiv itie s  29. These re a ctio n s w ere 
m a in ly  a  response to  th e  s tro n g e r pub lic  dem and fo r m ore e ffic ie n t system s o f 
a cc o u n ta b ility  and co m p e n sa tio n  o f the  dam age to  the  e n v iro n m e n t30.
T hese  d e ve lo p m e n ts  cu lm in a te d  in th e ir fo rm a l in c lu s io n  in the  4 th  E n v iro n m e n t 
A c tio n  P rogram m e (1 9 8 7-19 92) w here  the  C om m iss ion  w as com pelled  to  re d e fin e  
re sp o n s ib ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age 31. M ore  re ce n tly , the  5 th  E nv ironm en t 
A c tio n  P rogram m e, a p p ro ve d  in  D ecem ber o f 1992, sp e c ifica lly  envisages the  
h a rm o n isa tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  law  reg a rd in g  a ll typ e s  o f p o llu tio n  32
5,3.0.1.____The Polluter Pavs Principle
The "p o llu te r pays" p rin c ip le  has been considered  a  fu ndam en ta l canon  s ince  the  
1s t E n v iro n m e n t A c tio n  P rog ram m e, w hich s ta te d  th a t nuisance p re ve n tio n  and 
e lim in a tio n  co s ts  sh o u ld , in  p rin c ip le , be supported  b y th e  p o llu te r 33. H ow ever, it 
shou ld  b e  added th a t th e  in te rp re ta tio n  o f th is  p rin c ip le  has deve loped as has 
E uropean in te g ra tio n  34.
O n th e  o n e  hand, th e  firs t e x p lic it re fe rence in  th e  T re a ty  its e lf to  th e  im portance  
o f com pensa tion  th ro u g h  lia b ility  law  can be se e n  in  th e  fo rm a l in se rtio n  o f th e
29 E uropean P a rlia m e n t R e so lu tio n  on  A ction  to  T ake  C oncern ing  R ecen t P o llu ta n t 
D ischa rges in  th e  E nv ironm en t o f th e  R hine, De. B 2  -1 2 5 9 /8 6 , O J C 7 o f 12 /10/1987, 
pp . 116;
30 F o r a  m ore  de ta iled  re p o rt o f th e  evo lu tion  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  law  in  th e  
C om m un ity  see  p o in t 2 .2 .3 . o f th e  G re e n  P aper ;
31 T h is  c o m m itm e n t is  co n s id e re d  a  resta tem ent o f th e  p ro v is io n  on th e  s tric t lia b ility  
o f th e  w aste  producer, co n ta in e d  in  th e  in itia l p ro p o sa l fo r  th e  D ire c tive  84/361 on  
T ra n s fro n tie r M ovem ent o f H a za rd o u s  W aste;
32 C o m m iss ion  o f th e  E uropean  C om m un ities, *Towards Sustainability: A European 
Community Programme of Policy and Action in relation to the Environment and 
Sustainable Development”, 1992;
33 S ee  1s t E nvironm en t A c tio n  P rogram m e, J .O .C .E . 112 o f 2 0 /12 /7 3 ;
34 S ee fo r th e  evo lu tion  o f th e  p rin c ip le  regard ing th e  in cre a s in g  im p o rta n ce  g ive n  to  
e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  C h a p te r 3 , p a rag rap h  3 .3 .;
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"p o llu te r pays" p rincip le  in  the  T re a ty  o f R om e by th e  S ing le  E uropean A c t 35 36, 
a cco rd in g  to  w hich environm en ta l co s ts  should  be  in te rn a lise d  so  th a t th e y  a re  fu lly  
a cco u n te d  fo r in the  p rice  o f goods and se rv ices. In  o th e r w ords, under th e  p o llu te r 
pays p rin c ip le  th e  environm en t w ill acqu ire  a fin a n c ia l va lu e  w hich is  ta ke n  in to  
a cco u n t a s  p a rt o f the m a n u factu rin g  process in  th e  sam e w ay as o th e r ra w  m a te ria ls
36
A ll th e s e  deve lopm ents took in to  acco u n t the  c u rre n t s ta te  o f C om m un ity  law  and 
its  M e m b e r S ta te s ' na tiona l law s, w h ich  usually p ro v id e  d iv e rs e  and som etim es w e a k 
s u b s ta n tiv e  ru les not guaran te e ing  an e ffic ie n t and adequ a te  co m pensa tion  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age. T he  d iffe re n tia tio n  o f n a tio n a l lia b ility  system s is co n s id e re d  
by m ost to  d is to rt the  co m p e titio n  ru le s  and endanger th e  acco m p lish m e n t o f th e  
s in g le  m a rk e t, b u t a  fu rth e r co n s id e ra tio n  o f these p ro b le m s is  n o t th e  m a in  fo cu s  o f 
th is  w o rk  37 38
5.3,0,2.___Partial Harmonisation o f Liability Law
A lth o u g h  th e  C om m unity re co g n ise d  th e  need  fo r a  u n ifo rm  re g u la tio n  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l law , it  decided  to  b e g in  w ith  o n ly  a p a rtia l h a rm o n isa tio n  o f lia b ility  law , 
w ith in  th e  fra m e w o rk  o f E uropean W a s te  R egu la tion  3a. S e ve ra l c ritic ism s  w e re  m ade 
o f th is  p a rtia l ha rm on isa tion , and e ve n  th e  C om m ission  its e lf recogn ised  th a t ce rta in  
aspects o f e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  law  sh o u ld  n o t be  re g u la te d  o n ly  in re la tio n  to  w aste
35 A rtic le  25s o f th e  S EA , now  a rtic le  13 0 (r)a o f T re a ty  o f R om e;
36 S ee  C liffo rd  C hance , "E u ropean  environmental law guide*;
37 S ee  p o in t 1 o f th e  G reen P aper;
38 T h e  m a in  C om m un ity in s tru m e n ts  in  th is  fie ld  a re  th e  E E C  C ouncil D ire c tive  
75 /442  on W a s te , th e  EEC C o u n c il D ire c tiv e  78/319 on  T o x ic  and D angerous W astes 
inc lud in g  b o th  th e  proposed a m e n d m e n ts  o f 1988 and 1989, th e  C om m issions 
C o m m u n ica tio n  S E C (89) 934 fin a l o f 18 /9 /89  on a C o m m u n ity  S tra tegy fo r  W aste  
M anagem ent; and the  EEC C o u n c il D ire c tiv e  o f 6 /1 2 /8 4  on th e  S u p e rv is io n  and 
C on tro l w ith in  th e  European C o m m u n ity  o f th e  T ra n s fro n tie r S h ip m e n t o f H azardous 
W aste as a m e n d e d  in 1986, (h e re in a fte r D ire c tive  on W a ste  S h ip m e n t);
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dam age, a s , fo r exam ple , th e  p o ss ib le  im p lem enta tion  o f a n  European C om pensa tion  
Fund to  p a y  fo r  gen e ra l e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age . In  fa c t, the  harm on isa tion  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l law  has fo r  long be e n  perce ived as n e ce ssa ry , in order to  e lim in a te  
d is to rtio n s  o f co m p e titio n  ca u se d  b y  th e  d iffe re n ce s in  th e  n a tio n a l so lu tion s 39 40.
O n th e  o n e  hand, it is  g e n e ra lly  understood th a t w a ste s  a re  harm fu l because o f 
th e ir na tu re  a n d /o r o f th e ir  a ccu m u la tive  e ffe c t and th e re fo re  any e n v iro n m e n ta l 
p o lic y  shou ld  a im  a t th e ir re d u c tio n , recyc le  o r th e ir e lim in a tio n . It should u su a lly  be  
the  p ro d u ce r w ho  gu a ra n te e s th is  adequate  tre a tm e n t o f its  ow n w aste in  o rd e r to  
suppress a n y  h a rm fu l c h a ra c te ris tic s  41. O n the  o th e r h a n d , th e  h igh  pe rcen tag e  o f 
dam age to  p u b lic  hea lth  a n d  to  th e  e n v ironm en t caused  b y  in d u s tria l w aste  p o llu tio n  
and w aste  s ite s  is  like ly  to  have  b e e n  one o f th e  reasons fo r th e  urgent need fo r 
re g u la tio n  o n  lia b ility  in  th is  p a rtic u la r fie ld  42. Th is co nce rn  h ad  a lready been fo rm a lly  
recogn ised in  th e  1984 D ire c tiv e  o n  W aste  S h ipm ent, w h e re  th e  C ouncil co m m itte d  
itse lf to  a d o p tin g  a D ire c tive  on  C iv il L ia b ility  caused b y W a s te  43.
A s  a  re s u lt, th e  d ra ft D ire c tiv e  on  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r E nvironm en ta l D am age 
C aused by W a s te  and a n o th e r d ra ft D ire c tive  on  th e  L a n d fill o f W a ste , w h ich  inc lude s 
ce rta in  lia b ility  p ro v is io n s, w e re  proposed  by the  C o m m iss io n  44. The d iffic u ltie s
39 S ee  p o in t 1 0  o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t;
40 F o r a  m ore  de ta ile d  d e sc rip tio n  o f th e  reasons a nd  ty p e s  o f ha rm on isa tion  see 
E ckard R e h b ind e r and R icha rd  S te w a rt, "Environmental Protection Polie/, v o l. 2 , 
C hap te r V III, P a rt A ;
41 S ee P a trice  Leve l, "Proposition du Directive CEE du Conseil concernant la 
responsabilité civile pour les dommages causés par les dechets? in R evue  des 
A ffa ires  E uropée nes, P aris, 1991, n2 4 , pp .35;
42 S ee E xp la n a to ry  S ta tem en t o f th e  E uropean P a rlia m e n t 1 s t R eport o f 2 9 /5 /9 0 , 
Doc. A 3 -1 2 6 /9 0 /P a rt B, SYN 21 7 ;
43 A rtic le  11 (3 ) o f th e  D ire c tive  on  W a s te  S hipm ent, w h ich  s ta te s : T h e  C o u n c il sh a ll, 
acting in acco rdance  w ith  th e  p ro ce d u re  re ferred to  in  a rtic le  100a o f th e  T re a ty , 
de te rm ine  no la te r th a n  th e  3 0  S e p te m b e r 1988 the  c o n d itio n s  fo r im p le m e n tin g  the  
c iv il lia b ility  o f th e  p roduce r (o f w a ste ) in  th e  case of d a m a g e  o r any o th e r p e rso n  w ho 
m ay b e  a cco u n ta b le  fo r th e  sa id  da m a g e  and sh a ll a lso  d e te rm in e  a  sys te m  o f 
insurance";
44 S ee d ra ft D ire c tiv e  on th e  L a n d fill o f W a s te , OJ n2 C  1 9 0 ,2 2 0 /9 1 , pp . 1 ;
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encountered during the decision-making process of these proposals have led the 
Commission to reconsider the question of environmental liability in general, by 
adopting the so-called "Green Paper"45 467.
¿3.0.3. Civil Procedural Law
As is known, civil liability regulation and the definition of its limitations are in most 
Member States closely linked with procedural law, and therefore a uniform system of 
liability rules necessarily means a certain harmonisation of the civil procedure 
regimes . Although such interdependence is now largely recognised, Member States 
have to date considered that procedural law comes under the exclusive competence 
of the national legislator, and have not been willing to accept harmonisation in this 
field “7.
It was only with cases such as the Thalidomide case that the Community felt the 
need to regulate certain aspects of procedural law, namely those regarding the 
situations of product liability law 48. The provisions of Directive 85/374, by failing to 
ease the plaintiffs burden of proof, made it difficult for any potential plaintiffs to prove 
the causal connection between their injury and the defendant's conduct. In the
45 Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage - Communication from the 
European Commission, COM(93) 47;
46 Confirming the need for legal harmonisation, both at substantive and procedural 
levels see Alan E. Boyle, "international Law and Transboundary A cess to 
Environmental Justice!' in the Conference Acess to Environmental Justice in Europe 
held in 18/4/94 at the European University Institute, who considers that such 
harmonisation may contribute to simplify the burden facing transboundary plaintiff 
and clarify the responsibilities of transboundary defendants;47 See Ludwig Krämer, "Focus on European Environmental Law", Chapter 12, who 
considers that the law of judicial procedures is regarded as out of bonds by existing 
national systems and that it is not felt that there is a true need to harmonise and 
reform existing rules;
48 In relation to product liability see Christian Joerges in "European product safety, 
internal policy an d  the new approach to technical harmonisation and standards: The 
juridification o f product safety  policy1, according to which the manufacturers of 
defective products should be subject to strict liability as a form of "compulsory 
insurance of consumers against particular hazards involved in the use of products;
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Thalidomide case the result was that the court was unable to ascertain liability on the 
part of the producer of the drug 49.
5 .4 .  T h e  P r o p o s a l  f o r  a  C o u n c il  D ir e c t iv e  o n  C ivil L ia bilit y  
f o r  D a m a g e  c a u s e d  b y  W a s t e  50 and  t h e  G r e e n  P a p e r
The Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste was drafted to 
harmonise the Member States' legislation in order to promote the following objectives: 
a) to encourage producers to reduce and monitor their production and disposal of 
waste - the "prevention" goal -51 52b) to ensure fair compensation for victims of 
environmental harm - the "compensation" goal -62. c) to promote the internalisation of 
the societal costs related to the production of waste by encouraging producers to 
include the indemnification costs in the price of the products or services causing the 
polluting waste - the "internalisation" goal53. This last goal, by aiming at including the 
costs of covering the risks of environmental liability in the prices of the respective 
products or services, may be considered as distorting the implementation of the 
"polluter pays" principle. In fact, the producers of the waste that caused the 
environmental damage will, by including those liability costs in the final prices of the
49 Ludwig Krämer in iCompensation for disaster dam age and community law" in 
Focus on European Environmental Law;
50 Commission Original Proposal for a Council Directive on civil liability for Damage 
caused by waste, COM(89) 282 final - SYN 217 in OJ n0 C 251, 4/10/89, pp. 3; ; 
Commission Amended Proposal n OJ na C192,23/7/91, pp. 6;
51 See point 3 of Explanatory Memorandum and;
52 See point 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum, supra note; also Feeley supra note; 
Sheehan; , The EEC's Proposed Directive on civil liability for dam age cau sed  by 
waste: Taking over when prevention fails", in Ecology Law Quarterly, vol. 18,1991, r^ 
2 pp. 405-458;
59 See point 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum;
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goods, transfer such costs to the final consumer, thereby giving rise to a new 
"polluted pays" principle 54 5.
An integrated analysis of the proposed civil liability regime follows, comparing the 
initial draft provisions with the amended proposal submitted by the Commission 56. 
The amendments suggested by the European Parliament 56 and the opinions of the 
Economic and Social Committee 57 are also taken into account58. Furthermore, the 
analysis will try to compare this proposal to the recently promulgated Green Paper, 
since not only does it represent the Commission's last position towards environmental 
liability, but it is also a result of the difficulties encountered throughout the discussion 
of the draft Directive 59.
Taking into account the long and difficult path that this proposal has been 
following there may be some truth in the informal signs indicating that this draft 
Directive will not be adopted at all but will instead be incorporated into a future 
Directive on Environmental Liability in General. Nevertheless, discussion of this 
proposal should not be considered as being in vainas being in vain, since not only has 
it contributed to the Green Paper conclusions, but it has also illuminated the way for 
the Member States' legal systems.
54 See Andrew Bryce, "Control o f w aste: existing njies and requirements and the 
proposed directive on civil liabiiity on w aste" in EEC Environment and Planning Law, 
ed. by David Vaughan Q.C.;
55 Civil Liability Directive;
56 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizen's rights 1 st Report of 
29/5/90, Doc A3-0126/90/Part A and B, SYN 217 and 2nd Report of 5/11/90, Doc 
A3.0272/90;
57 See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), OJ r^  C 251, 4/10/89,
o o .3 ;
Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended Proposal;
59 On the characteristics of the Green Paper the speech of Béatrice Thomas, mA 
propos d e  quelques réflexions sur la responsabilité civile pour la réparation d es  
dom m ages à  l'environnement* in the Conference on "Insurance for Environmental 
Damage" stating that the main objective of such instrument is to specify all the 
theoretical and practical aspects on the compensation of environmental damage and 
to propose different possibilities of environmental liability systems;
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Since the beginning of the first discussions about this draft Directive, most 
Member States have either stopped approving any regulations on the subject of 
environmental liability or have adapted their legal concepts to those which have been 
proposed by the Community. If a general Directive on Environmental Liability is to 
enter the "European arena”, it is clear that the five years of continous effort will not be 
disregarded and that the conclusions and solutions that have been reached will be 
taken into account.
This comparative approach should throw some light on the problems and 
limitations that the Community encounters when proposing a uniform civil liability 
regime throughout its Member States. The different reactions to the difficulties 
encountered not only reflect the permanent conflict between the industry-oriented 
positions and the more environmental friendly views on the problem, but they also 
restate the continuous debate about the different possible structures and 
characteristics that a civil liability system for environmental damage may have.
5.4.1. Scope of the Proposed Directive, and of anv potential 
Directive on Environmental Liability
In broad terms, the draft directive aims at being applicable to every waste 
containing or contaminated by certain substances or materials that in a certain 
quantity or concentration are a risk to health and to the environment®°. Thereby, the 
producers of such wastes, if generated within or imported into the EEC, are to be held 
liable for the damage caused wherever this damage occurs 60 1.
60 Directive on Toxic and Dangerous Waste 78/319/EEC, article 12/b);
61 See Article 1 of the Amended Proposal and Explanatory Memorandum;
71
C H A P T E R S
C O M M U N I T Y  L A W
7 2
Furthermore, the Commission accepted one of the suggestions of the Parliament, 
which was to include the exclusive economic area of the Member States in the 
geographical scope of the final proposal.
5.4.1.1—  Definition o f  environm ental dam age
As already mentioned 62, the Commission divided into two the categories of 
damage and injury to the environment, especially because of the difficulties in 
quantifying environmental damage as such. The liability for damage to individuals 
includes not only their physical injury but also their death and damage to their 
property, the latter including both its deterioration and destruction 63.
In the amended Proposal the Commission adopted the Parliament suggestion to 
substitute "injury to the environment" by "impairment to the environment" 641 which 
now means any "significant physical, chemical or biological deterioration of the 
environment". The Parliament was of the opinion that the concept of impairment 
should include the situations of continuous pollution but the Green Paper questions 
whether this last definition includes less significant impacts on the environment, for 
example those continuous forms of pollution that gradually deteriorate the 
environment65.
5.4.1.2. T ypes o f  wa s te  to b e  c o v er ed  bv  the D irective 
The idea that the scope of the Directive is directly connected to the definition 
given to the term waste has raised some doubts. The draft Directive defines waste by 
referring to the definition given by the Council Directive 75/442 according to which
62 See Chapter 1, ll/a on the definition of environmental damage;
63 Explanatory Memorandum;
64 See supra note 20;
65 See point 2.1.7 of the Green Paper;
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waste is "every substance or object whose owner has to get rid of according to the 
provisions of national law" ^  However, since a new Directive on Waste 6 7 689was 
approved in 1991, maybe its enlarged definition of waste should be taken into 
consideration and the draft Directive amended accordingly.
By not distinguishing between hazardous and non-hazardous waste, the draft 
Directive aims at covering all types of waste, with the exception of nuclear waste and 
waste caused by oil pollution ^  This non-distinction was the target for one of the 
Parliamentary criticisms which suggested that the definition of waste was too broad 
and that the Directive should not apply to non-hazardous waste. Although the ESC 
also considered this definition too broad, its reasons were that the Directive did not 
distinguish between recyclable and non-recyclable waste. The rationale behind the 
importance given to this last distinction is that waste handed over for recycling 
supposedly poses less risks than any other type of waste and therefore such
CQ"environment friendly" technologies should not be penalised . The Committee 
further suggested that liability should end when the waste is "handed over for 
recycling", but regrettably did not clarify whether the recycler should be liable for any 
environmental damage that his faulty conduct might cause 70.
5.4.1.3. _ E xclusions from  th e s c o p e
Finally, in order to avoid the overlapping of its liability rules with other existing 
liability regimes, the draft Directive excludes from its scope nuclear waste and
66 See Directive 75/442 on Waste, J.O.C.E. L194 of 15/7/1975;
67 See Directive on Waste. J.O.C.E. L 78 of 26/3/91;
68 In the Original and Amended Proposal;69 However, Pierre V.F.Bos, "The proposed Regulation on the Supervision and 
Control o f Movement o f W aste: som e comments" in EC Environment and Planning 
Law who believes that both recyclable and non-recyclable waste give rise to the same 
problems in the light of the protection of the environment and applying distinct 
regimes would violate the principle of non-discrimination;
70 See paragraph 4 of the Opinion of the European and Social Committee;
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pollution caused by hydrocarbons, as where such pollution cases are covered by the 
relevant International Agreements in force in the Member States 71. Nevertheless, the 
Parliament was of the opinion that since impairment to the environment caused by 
nuclear waste is not covered by the Paris Convention 72 it should not be excluded 
from the scope of this Directive 73 but this suggestion did not prevail in the final draft.
5.4.1.4. S co p e o f  a  p o ss ib le  Directive on  Environm ental Liability in
Genera!
The Commission acknowledged in the Green Paper that any liability system 
needs to specifically determine its scope, for example by clearly defining the polluting 
activities and/or substances to which such a system shall be applied. The reasoning 
against the feasibility of such definition is that it is difficult to legally determine which 
activities should be subject to strict liability. These reasons are not, however, 
sufficient since legal certainty in this field should prevail over legal flexibility, meaning 
that potentially-Iiable parties must have this legal certainty in order to know the exact 
consequences of their activities and to plan any future preventive and compensating 
measures if damage occurs.
Regarding the possibility of a general Directive on Environmental Damage, if a 
strict liability regime is to be adopted the Green Paper suggests the factors which will 
have to be considered in determining its scope. Among the factors concerning a 
specific polluting activity that should be analysed are the types of hazard it may pose.
71 See article 13/2 and article 12fl of the Amended Proposal;
72 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, 26/7/60; 
and the Brussels Convention of 31/1/63 and the Protocols attached to these 
conventions;
73 See indent 4 of the Explanatory Statement to the Parliaments 2nd Report;
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the probability and extent of damage it may cause, and the feasibility of 
compensating for such damage.
Furthermore, whether a certain activity is to be made subject to a no-fault liability 
system depends on whether such a regime induces economic operators to manage 
their pollution risks and/or to prevent environmental damage more efficiently and on 
whether the financial burden on the activity sector is not so heavy as to stifle future 
investment. As already mentioned, a general regime which is too broad in scope may 
unjustly penalise certain types of dangerous activities but on the other hand a system 
whose scope is too narrow may distort the "polluter pays" principle by improperly 
allocating the costs of repairing environmental damage. In other words, a regime 
whose scope is too narrow will ignore the usefulness of the "polluter pays" principle, 
by allowing the loss to lie where it falls under the principle of causum  sentit dominus
74
5,4,2. Principles of Liability
5A.2.1,_Strict liability o r  fault liability
By imposing strict liability for physical injury, damages to property and injury to 
the environment caused by waste, the Directive follows the current tendency in the 
Member States 74 5 and at Community level 76 to substitute the traditional fault with 
strict liability principles 77. Furthermore, the proposed civil liability rules will, to a 
certain extent, be complemented by and complementary to with the products liability
74 See Bruggemeier, in Ecological Responsibility, Guntner Teubner (ed.);
75 See for a brief survey on the recent evolution in Member States and international 
law towards strict liability for environmental damage, point 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. of the Green Paper;
76 See Directive 85/374 on defective products and Proposal for a Waste Directive;77 See also point 4 of the Explanatory Memorandum;
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law; their interpretation should take into account the developments in products liability 
law, namely the new concepts of risk liability78.
As the Green Paper has efficiently summarised, a fault-based liability system 
would impose an over heavy burden on the plaintiff since he has to prove that the 
polluter's action which caused the environmental damage was wrongful. In other 
words, the plaintiff would have to establish that the defendant, by committing a 
negligent or intentional unlawful polluting act, was at fault 79. Although in Member 
States national law, the concept of fault varies according to their different civil liability 
theories, in general terms it can be said that someone acted with fault if he intended 
to cause damage or if he did not take sufficiently care to avoid such damage. The 
latter concept of negligence has been the subject of several doctrines which discuss 
whether the polluter should know or not know of the possibility of causing damage and 
also at what point careless is to be considered as negligence.
Under certain fault liability regimes, the fault of the polluter can be established by 
proving that he had breached a certain duty of behaviour. Although the faulty 
infringement of such duty can be proved by simply establishing that the polluter's 
actions have breached a specific environmental statute, not all damage to the 
environment is previously and specifically evaluated by statute provisions. Therefore, 
the plaintiff may still find it difficult to prove that the polluter acted wrongfully and, 
consequently, to obtain compensation or restoration for the environmental damage 80. 
Since the recent evolution in the concept of fault is based more on positive 
environmental regulation and less on the moral judgement of the polluter's behaviour
78 See Hans-Dieter Sellschopp, "Multiple Tortfeasors/com bined polluter theory, 
causality and assumption o f proof/statistical proof, technical insurance asp ects* in 
Transnational Environmental Liability and Insurance by Ralph P. Kröner;
79 See point 4.1.1. of the Green Paper;
80 See point 2.1.1 of the Green Paper;
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81, such a system does not always guarantee an effective implementation of the 
polluter pays principle.
On the contrary, according to those who support the substitution of this liability 
system, the semi-automatic character of no-fault liability for environmental damage is 
more in line with the effective application of the polluter pays principle and the long­
term accomplishment of the internal market . In broad terms, strict liability is 
considered more effective for environmental protection since it eases the burden of 
proof on the plaintiff more than do those special mechanisms which are being 
introduced in some fault liability systems, for example the shifting of the burden of 
proof under certain conditions. Under this no-fault system the plaintiff will not have to 
prove that the defendant acted with fault, but will simply have to establish the causal 
link between the injury suffered and the polluting activities. This means that it should 
be easier to allocate the compensation costs to the polluter who actually caused the 
environmental damage, instead of "leaving the loss to lie where it falls" because of 
the difficulties in proving faulty behaviour81 2 83.
This is not the place to describe the pros and cons of both types of liability 
systems : however it should be said that strict liability has also been adopted in 
order to strengthen the prevention purpose, by motivating waste producers to dispose 
legally of their wastes and thereby avoiding future potential damage. Not only should 
it increase these "incentives for better risk management" but, if several of its 
elements are efficiently defined, it means that civil liability can become a coherent 
environmental protection mechanism in which polluting activities can operate 
according to established guidelines.
81 See David Wilkinson, "EEC G reen Paper on Remedying Damage to the 
Environment', in European Environmental Law Review, June 1993, pp. 159;
82 See point 4.1.2 of the Green Paper;






F or th e  C om m iss ion , th e  p rim a ry  re sp o n s ib ility  lie s  w ith  th e  producer, w ho is 
de fin e d  in  th e  in itia l proposal a s  "a n y  n a tu ra l o r le g a l pe rso n  w hose occu p a tio n a l 
a c tiv itie s  p ro d u ce  w aste  a n d /o r a n yo n e  w ho  ca rrie s  o u t p re -p ro ce ss in g , m ix in g  o r 
o th e r o p e ra tio n s  resu lting  in a  ch a n g e  in  th e  na tu re  o r co m p o s itio n  o f th is  w a ste " 84. 
This lia b ility  sys te m  is  ju s tifie d  by th e  n o tio n  o f p ro fe ss io n a l risk  85 based on  the  
p roduce r's  re s p o n s ib ility  fo r th e  e lim in a tio n  o f its  ow n  w a s te s . These "o rig in a l 
p roduce rs " 86 a re  to  be  held lia b le  u n til th e y  have  le g a lly  tra n s fe rre d  th e ir w astes to  a  
licensed  tre a tm e n t o r d isposa l fa c ility  87 8.
T h e  C o m m iss io n  ju s tifie d  th is  p rim a ry  a ttrib u tio n  o f lia b ility  to  th e  p ro d u ce r by 
co n s id e rin g  th a t h e  is  th e  econom ic o p e ra to r w ith  th e  b e s t and  m o s t d ire c t know ledge 
o f th e  n a tu re , co m p o s itio n  and c h a ra c te ris tic s  o f the  w a s te  and  th e re b y  th e  pe rson  in  
the  b e s t p o s itio n  to  a vo id  any e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age b y  h is  w a s te . F in a lly , accord ing  
to  th e  G reen  P a p e r, the  channe lling  o f lia b ility  shou ld  be  an e ffic ie n t and e q u ita b le  
so lu tio n  to  th e  p ro b le m  o f th e  d is trib u tio n  o f costs and  sh o u ld  co n trib u te  to  the  
p re ve n tio n  ro le  o f s tr ic t lia b ility  8S. T h e re fo re , the  G reen  P a p e r considers th a t it is 
m ore e ffe c tiv e  to  channe l lia b ility  to  th e  p a rty  w ith  th e  b e s t te c h n ic a l know ledge, 
la rg e r re so u rce s  a n d  e ffec tive  co n tro l o f th e  a c tiv ity  89.
In  o rd e r to  ensure  tha t th e  id e n tific a tio n  o f th e  re sp o n s ib le  person is a lw ays 
possib le , the  p ro v is io n s  define th e  "p ro d u ce r" as the  im p o rte r o f th e  w aste in to  the
84 S upra  O rig in a l P roposa l, a rtic le  2 ^ 1  a );
85 S ee 8 th  R e c ita l o f th e  A m ended P roposa l P ream ble;
86 S ee F ee ley, s u p ra  6 ;
87 S ee O rig in a l P ro p o sa l, a rtic le  2 ^ 2  c );
88 See G reen  P a p e r, p in t 2 .13.;





C om m unity 90, th e  person w ho a t th e  tim e  o f th e  in c id e n t had e ffe c tiv e  co n tro l o f the  
w aste an d /o r th e  person responsib le  fo r  th e  s ite  to  w h ich  th e  w a s te  has been la w fu lly  
transfe rred , u n le ss  th e se  p e rsons id e n tify  th e  actua l p roduce r.
H ow ever, su ch  a  "p roducer pays" p rin c ip le  has b e e n  c ritic is e d  by the  P a rlia m e n t 
and the  ESC , w h ic h  considered  th a t th e  licensed  c a rrie r o r d is p o s e r w ith  the  "a c tu a l" 
contro l o f the  w a ste , a t the m om ent in  w h ich  the  in c id e n t o c cu rre d , should  a lso  be 
sub ject to  p rim a ry  re sp o n sib ility . It w as a lso  added th a t th e  lia b ility  o f these  new 
responsib le  p a rtie s  should end  w hen th e  w aste w as le g a lly  tra n s fe rre d  to  an 
authorised w aste  d isposa l fa c ility  91, accord ing  to  p ro v is io n s  o f th e  D ire ctive  on 
W aste 92.
B .4 .2 .2 .1 .  E l im in a t o r  o f  W a s t e
In fa c t, in th e  am ended P roposa l th e  C om m ission a ls o  in c lu d e d  th e  P arliam ent's  
suggested co n ce p t o f e lim in a to r o f w aste  93, w ho w ill b e  he ld  lia b le  unless he  can 
prove th a t "in th e  absence o f fa u lt on h is  p a rt, th e  p ro d u ce r d e c e iv e d  h im  as to  the  
tru e  ch a racte r o f th e  consignm ent o f w a s te ". In o th e r w o rd s , th e  e lim in a to r o f w aste  
m ay exclude  h im s e lf fro m  lia b ility  if  he  ca n  prove  th e  m is s ta te m e n t o f th e  p ro d u ce r 
regard ing th e  n a tu re  o f the  w aste  o r th e  ty p e  o f tre a tm e n t e n v isa g e d .
T hereby, pe rsons such as th e  c a rrie r o r o th e r d isp o se rs , w ho  m a y a t som e tim e  
have had e ffe c tiv e  co n tro l o f th e  w aste , h a ve  no sepa ra te  lia b ility , s in c e  th e  p ro d u ce r 
is  held p rim a rily  lia b le  fo r any dam age  ca u se d  by these pe rso n s. T h is  encourages th e  
producer o f w aste  to  v e rify  th a t th e  e lim in a to r he chooses has a ll th e  a d m in is tra tive
90 See a rtic le  2 e, paragraph o f th e  d ra ft D ire c tiv e ; fo r a  s im ila r id e n tific a tio n  see th e  
D irective  o n  P ro d u ct S a fe ty  o f 2 5 /7 /1 9 8 5 ;
91 1 1 th  re c ita l o f th e  A m ended P ro p o sa l's  P ream ble  and a rtic le  2 / 2  c )
92 See D ire ctive  7 5 /4 4 2  on W aste ;
93 A m endm ent no 8  and 10  o f th e  P a rliam en ts  2nd R eport; S ee a lso  12th re c ita l o f 





licences re q u ire d . In o ther w ords, it w ou ld  seem  th a t th is  p ro v is io n  estab lishes o n ly  a  
k ind  o f se co n d a ry  lia b ility  o f th e se  persons, even if a t so m e tim e  th e y  have th e  a c tu a l 
co n tro l o f th e  w aste , since th e y  w ill ra th e r than th e  p ro d u ce r o n ly  be lia b le  if th e y  
ca n n o t id e n tify  th e  la tte r w ith in  a  "re a so n a b le  period" o f tim e .
S.4.2.2.2. The C arrier o f W aste
T h e  P a rlia m e n t fu rth e r suggested  th a t th e  ca rrie r o f w a ste  sh o u ld  a lso b e  lia b le  
under th is  D ire c tiv e  94> but th e  C om m ission  adopted th is  su g g e s tio n  on ly  p a rtia lly . 
A ccord ing  to  th e  P arliam ent's  suggeste d  am endm ent, if  th e  p ro d u ce r consigne d  th e  
w aste  to  an  a p p ro ve d  earner, w ho is  s u b je c t to  th e  C o n ve n tio n  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r  
D am age C aused during  T ra n s p o rt95, th is  c a rrie r w ou ld  be  lia b le  fo r any dam age  o r 
im pa irm en t to  th e  environm en t o ccu rrin g  w hen  th e  w aste  w as u n d e r h is  co n tro l, up to  
the  fin a n c ia l lim its  app lica b le  un d e r a rtic le  9  o f th e  re fe rre d  C o n ve n tio n  96. In  such  a  
s itu a tio n , th e  p ro d u ce r w ould o n ly  be  lia b le  fo r th e  a m oun t th a t exceeded those  
a pp lica b le  lim its  a n d  w ould be su b s titu te d  by the  c a rrie r in th e  a m oun ts  up to  those  
lim its. T he  C o m m iss io n 's  proposed a rtic le  97 98 is  som ew hat le ss  e xte n s ive , s in ce  it 
m ere ly e s ta b lish e s  th a t in the  s itu a tio n s  co ve re d  by th e  C o n ve n tio n  re fe rred  to , the  
ca rrie r s h a ll b e  lia b le  w ith in  th e  a p p lica b le  lim its . A  lite ra l in te rp re ta tio n  o f th is  a rtic le  
w ould seem  to  b e  th a t it envisages th e  c a rrie r's  lia b ility  as p a ra lle l to  the  p roducer's 
lia b ility  s in ce  th e y  w ill be e qua lly  re sp o n s ib le  In m y v ie w , h o w e ve r, th is  a rtic le  
should  be  in te rp re te d  tak ing  in to  a cco u n t th e  am endm ents s u g g e s te d  by P a rlia m e n t.
94 See A m e n d m e n t no  1 and no 8  o f th e  P a rlia m e n ts  2nd  R eport;
95 C onven tion  on  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r D am age caused  during  th e  C a rria g e  o f D angerous 
G oods b y  R oad, R a il, and  In land W a te rw a y  ve sse ls  o f 1 0 /10 /8 9 ;
96 A m endm ent no  1 0 o f the  P arliam ents 2 nd  R eport and E xp la n a to ry  S ta tem ent;
97 See a rtic le  3 o f th e  A m ended P ro p o sa l;





s.4.2.2.3. P u b lic  A u th o ritie s
The p ro v is io n  regard ing th e  lia b ility  o f the  p ro d u ce r w a s  am ended b y the  
C om m ission m a in ly  due to  th e  c ritic is m s  m ade o f th e  te rm  "o ccu p a tio n a l a c tiv itie s ” , 
and th e  su g g e s tio n  o f th e  P a rlia m e n t th a t th e  in d u stria l a c tiv itie s  like ly  to  p roduce  
dangerous w a ste  99 10 should  a lso  be  e x p lic itly  inc lude d . T he  fo rm e r concept w as 
substitu ted  by th e  no tion  o f "co m m e rc ia l a nd  industria l a c tiv itie s " , th a t on ly co ve rs  
p ro fessiona l p ro d u ce rs  and th e  in d u s tria l a c tiv ity  o f p u b lic  o r n o n -p ro fit-m a k in g  bod ies 
101. In fa c t, th e  p oss ib le  e xc lu s io n  o f p u b lic  bodies fro m  th e  sco p e  o f the  D ire c tive  
w as one o f the  m a jo r concerns in itia lly  fo rm u la te d  by th e  P a rlia m e n t, w h ich  considers 
th a t a p u b lic  b o d y  responsib le  fo r c o lle c tin g , dum p ing  a n d /o r m anaging w aste , 
including househ o ld  w aste, sh o u ld  a lso  b e  he ld  lia b le  102. N e ve rth e le ss , by re fe rrin g  
to  the  co n ce p t o f person "as any n a tu ra l o r lega l p e rson  as d e fin e d  by p u b lic  o r 
p riva te  law ” it se e m s th a t the  C o m m iss io n  re fo rm u la ted  its  in itia l po s itio n  to  in c lude  
pub lic  a u th o ritie s  o r o th e r p u b lic  in s titu tio n s , and the  m a n a g e m e n t o f a d isposal s ite  
by a p u b lic  a u th o rity  103 w ith in  th e  sco p e  o f th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  104.
99 P o in t 6  o f the  E xp lana to ry S ta te m e n t;
100 It w as o n ly  su b s titu te d  in a rtic le  2^/1 a) and no t in a rtic le  1 a b o u t th e  scope o f th e  
D irective ;
101 See O p in ion  o f th e  ESC, pp . 4 ;
102 See p o in t 10 o f the  E xp lana to ry  S ta te m e n t o f P arliam en ts 1s t R eport, pa rt B ; see 
a lso  R üd iger Lum m ert, w ho co n firm s  th e  d is tin c tio n  be tw een  th e  S ta te  taking  p a rt in 
businees life  like  a  p riva te  in d iv id u a l and w hen it is m e re ly  e xe rc is in g  its  so ve re ig n  
functions;
103 S ee p a ra g ra p h  1 0  o f the  E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t o f th e  2 nd P a rlia m e n ts  R e p o rt;
104 See S hee la n , p p . 431 , w ho c itin g  an in te rv ie w  w ith  M ich e á l P rie u r, con firm s th e  
con tra ry id e a  th a t th e  d ire c tive 's  scope d o e s  no t inc lude p u b lic  w a ste  producers and 
handlers. T h is  id e a  re fe rs  to  to  th e  tra d itio n a l d is tin c tio n  in  m ost E uropean co u n trie s  
betw een p riv a te  law  and p u b lic  a d m in is tra tive  law . O n e  shou ld  a lso  m ention th e  
p o ss ib ility  o f p u b lic  w aste  p roducers, fo r e xa m p le  a  ce rta in  p u b lic  co m p a n y, acting  as 
a  p riva te  co m p a n y;
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5.4.2.x__L en der liability
F urtherm ore , su ch  a  d e fin itio n  o f p roduce r and  th e  in te rp re ta tio n  o f the  c o n c e p t o f 
"a c tu a l co n tro l" h ave  ra ise d  so m e  doubts as to  w h e th e r banks 105 a nd  o th e r 
co m m e rc ia l in te rm e d ia rie s  c a n  b e  he ld  lia b le  fo r th e  p o llu te r com pany w h o m  th e y  
have  fin a n c ia lly  su p p o rte d , e ith e r th rough  lo a n s  o r le a s in g s. In o th e r w ords, banks 
fe a r th a t th e y  w ill be m a d e  lia b le  fo r  th e  c le a n -u p  co s ts  if  th e y  are co n s id e re d  to  h a ve  
p ra c tise d  som e fo rm  o f o w n e rs h ip  o r co n tro l o v e r a  b o rro w e r's  a c tiv itie s 106.
O n  th e  o the r h and , b y  e s ta b lis h in g  a  sys te m  o f s tr ic t lia b ility  to g e th e r w ith  a  ru le  
o f jo in t and se ve ra l lia b ility , th e  proposed D ire c tiv e  m ay be co n s id e re d  to  g iv e  
p re fe re n ce  to  the  s o -c a lle d  "d e e p -p o cke t" ap p ro a ch . A cco rd in g  to  ¿ iiis th e o ry  such  a  
sys te m  w ould  resu lt in  th e  p la in tiff's  su ing  th e  d e fe n d a n t w ith  th e  b e s t fin a n c ia l 
ca p a c ity  to  pay fo r a n y  c o m p e n sa tio n  o r re s to ra tio n  co s ts . S ince  the  "ric h e s t" d o e s  n o t 
a lw ays correspond to  th e  "p rin c ip a l p o llu te r", such  a  system  d is to rts  an  e ffe c tiv e  
a p p lica tio n  o f the  "p o llu te r p a y s " p rin c ip le .
Instead  o f th e  D ire c tiv e 's  "a c tu a l co n tro l”  co n c e p t, th e  G reen P aper su g g e sts  th a t 
in o rd e r to  ach ieve  th e  in te n d e d  use fu lne ss o f any s tr ic t lia b ility  syste m , such  lia b ility  
shou ld  be channe lled  to  th e  "p a rty  hav ing  th e  e x p e rtis e , resources, and o p e ra tio n a l 
co n tro l to  ca rry  o u t th e  m o s t e ffe c tiv e  risk m a n a g e m e n t"107. T h is  m ay w e ll m e a n  th a t 
banks can  be held as lia b le  p a rtie s  if  it is co n s id e re d  th a t a t som e stage  th e y  had 
s u ffic ie n t co n tro l o ve r th e  b o rro w e r's  a c tiv itie s  to  be a b le  to  assess and p re v e n t any 
p o ss ib le  environm en ta l d a m a g e .
105 C hris tophe er V an  d e r H a u w a e rt, iClean Take-overs in the European Single 
Market" in  E uropean B u s in e ss  Law  R eview , N o v e m b e r 1991, pp. 26 8  in  w h ich  th e  
p o ss ib ility  o f lender lia b ility  o f b a n ks , w hen e .g . it is  fo re c lo s in g  a  m o rtg a g e  on  
po llu te d  land, is  re fe rre d  to ;
06 S ee C hapter 4 ; se e  a lso  C h ris to p h e  N itsch e  and C h ris  H o p e ,"Bank as Policeman 
- money tendering and the proposed European environmental legislatiorf. U n iv e rs ity  
o f C am bridge , R esearch  P a p e rs  in  M anagem e n t S tu d ie s , O ctobe r 1993;





U nlike  C E R C LA , ne ithe r th e  d ra ft D irective nor the  G reen Paper p rovide  fo r a 
secu red  le n d e r exem ption and thereby leave the form er question unsolved. Th is idea  
o f banks a s  "innocen t purchasers" 108 being held liable fo r dam age caused by w aste  
co n s id e re d  to  be under th e ir co n tro l, has seriously frightened the environm en ta l 
business m a rke t, in  p a rticu la r the  financia l investm ent m a rk e t In any fu tu re  D irective  
o n  E n v iro n m e n ta l D am age, the  in terests o f both sides o f the  m arket w ill have to  be 
w e igh ted  in  o rd e r to  d e fine  the "e xten t to  which lia b ility  trave ls  horizonta lly" so as to  
in c lude  o r n o t these  fin a n c ia l pa rties , who have a less d ire c t re lation w ith the  po llu ting  
a c tiv ity  109.
S.4.2.4.___ Information Right
U n like  th e  C ouncil o f Europe C onvention, the  dra ft D irective  does not provide  fo r 
a n y sp e c ific  rig h t o f access to  environm ental in form ation. However, the C om m unity 
has a lre a d y adopted a  sp e c ific  D irective  on the freedom  o f Access to  In form ation on 
th e  E n v iro n m e n t, w hich enables any natural and legal person to obtain from  any 
p u b lic  a u th o rity  in fo rm ation  re la ting  to  the  state o f the  e n v iro n m e n t110.
F u rth e rm o re , the  C om m unity has recently established the European 
E n v ironm en ta l A gency w hose ro le is  "to  supply M em ber S ta tes w ith ob jective , re liab le  
and co m p a ra b le  in fo rm ation  a t th e  European level, enabling them  to  take  the  
n e ce ssa ry  m easures and to  ensure tha t the public is property inform ed about the  s ta te  
o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t"111.
108 S ee  V a n  d e r H auw aert, " if such innocence is possible!";
109 S ee W ilk in so n , pp. 160;
110 S ee  C o u n c il D irective  90/313/E E C  of 7/6/90, L 158/56;
111 S ee  E E C  R egulation r£  1210/90 of 7/5/90;
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A s  to  w h ich  p a rtie s  sh o u ld  h a ve  sta n d in g  un d e r th is  e n v ironm en ta l lia b ility  
sys te m , tw o  m ajor g ro u p s  m a y  b e  d is tin g u ish e d  d u rin g  th e  D ire c tive 's  d iscu ss io n  
p ro ce ss . O n th e  one h a n d , th e  p riv a te  p a rtie s  o r th e ir h e irs  w ho m ay b rin g  a  le g a l 
a c tio n  w h e n  a  de fe n d a n t's  a c t h a s  ca u se d  th e m  p e rso n a l o r p roperty dam a g e . O n  th e  
o th e r h a n d , th e  pub lic  a u th o ritie s  a n d  co m m o n -in te re s t g ro u p s, the  la tte r h a v in g  been 
re fe rre d  to  as those  "s p e c ia l-in te re s t g ro u p s  o r e s ta b lish e d  a n d  re co g n ise d  
a sso c ia tio n s  w hose co rp o ra te  a im  is  to  p ro te c t th e  e n v iro n m e n t and p u b lic  h e a lth " 112 13
are  a ls o  g ive n  stand ing  u n d e r th e  d ra ft D ire c tive .
&£2J*__Public authorities
A lth o u g h  in th e  firs t d ra ft, th e  D ire c tiv e  ve s te d  th e  p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  w ith  th e  rig h t 
to  b rin g  a c tions fo r in ju ry  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t m , in th e  am ended p ro p o sa l th e ir 
s ta n d in g  w as le ft to  the  M e m b e r S ta te s  in te rn a l law .
5J.Ì2,__Environmental associations
S e v e ra l com m ents w e re  m a d e  co n ce rn in g  th e  s ta n d in g  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l 
o rg a n isa tio n s  -  such as c o m m o n -in te re s t g ro u p s  -  b y  th e  P a rlia m e n t, in  th e  
G re e n p e a ce  R ecom m enda tion  s u g g e s tin g  th a t th e  s ta n d in g  o f such g roups sh o u ld  be 
h a rm o n ise d  a t C o m m un ity  le v e l, an d  by th e  E uropea n  F edera tion  o f W a ste  
M a n a g e m e n t accord ing  to  w h ich  th e  sta n d in g  o f th e se  g ro u p s  shou ld  n o t e ve n  be  
a d m itte d , in  o rd e r to  a vo id  le g itim a tin g  an  u n lim ite d  n u m b e r o f p o te n tia l p la in tiffs  114.
1 2 P o in t 7  o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  M e m o ra n d u m ;
113 A rtic le  4s/  3 and  4 o f th e  O rig in a l P ro p o sa l;
114 F E A D  S ta tem en t on  th e  D ra ft D ire c tiv e  o f th e  C o m m iss io n  o f th e  E uropean 
C o m m u n itie s  concern ing c iv il lia b ility  fo r  dam age ca used  b y  w aste , o f 2 /5 /9 0  as c ite d  





A t firs t g la n ce  there seem s to  be no major difference between the two versions o f 
th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  concerning the  standing of com m on-interest g ro ips. but the fina l 
ve rs io n  o f th e  proposal seem s to  lim it the Member S tates’ initial discretion m 
d e te rm in in g  w he ther environm ental organisations should have the nght to bong a 
le g a l a c tio n  fo r  in ju ry to  the  environm ent. In other words, in itia lly the Com m ission 
p a rtia lly  acce p te d  the  P arliam ent's suggestion that those groups which have as their 
o b je c t the  p ro te c tio n  o f nature and o f the environment, shall be uniform ly granted 
s ta n d in g . A fte rw a rd s, th e  in itia l restriction that le ft it to the  Member S tates’ law to 
d e te rm in e  w h ich  o f these groups should be considered fo r standing purposes was 
su b stitu te d  b y a  restric tion  according to which only the conditions under w hich such 
g ro u p s  m ay b rin g  legal actions w ere to  be le ft to national legislation. The Commission 
and th e  P a rlia m e n t have thereby som ewhat weakened the form al lim itation on tho 
M em ber S ta te s ' d iscre tion  and u n til practical im plem entation by the Member States 
b e g in s , it w ill be  d ifficu lt to  decide w hether this change is relevant or not.
N e ve rth e le ss , a stronger in tention o f harmonisation in the final version should bo 
acknow led ged , probably th e  result o f a  compromise between the different reactions 
re fe rre d  to  above 115. Furtherm ore, in the Green Paper the Commission 
d ip lo m a tic a lly  avo ided  th is  issue by not referring to  any possible solutions tor any 
fu tu re  C o m m u n ity  law  in s tru m e n t
A g a in , th e  prob lem s th a t arise in the  situations where public waste producers or 
d isposers a re  responsib le  fo r the dam age suffered are left unsolved, since it remains 
u n c le a r w h e th e r com m on-in terest groups w ill have the right to sue public authontics 
fo r im p a irm e n t caused to  th e  environm ent or not. Such problem s derive from  base 
question s a b o u t those  situations o f im pairm ent to the environm ent where the damage
115 S e e  point 7 of the Explanatory Memorandum in which the Commission explicitly
s ta te s  that it w a s  not its intention to harmonise the standing rules but only to establish
an  in term ediate  so lu tion ;
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o ccu rs  in  p roperty  th a t is  n o t p riv a te ly  ow ned. W ho is  considered to  have  a  legal 
in te re s t in  su ing  fo r dam ages in flic te d  on such "p u b lic  g o o d s "116 17?
T ra d itio n a lly , m o s t c iv il lia b ility  th e o rie s  h a ve  c o n s id e re d  th a t on ly  th e  S ta te  had a 
rig h t to  b rin g  an a c tio n  fo r th e  com pensa tion  o f a  p u b lic ly  ow ned good a n d  on ly  
re c e n tly  h a ve  these  a cce p te d  th a t ce rta in  re p re se n ta tive  g roups m a y have  a s th e ir 
o b je c t th e  p ro te ctio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t and shou ld  th e re fo re  be g ive n  s ta n d in g  to  
e ffe c tiv e ly  fu lfil th e ir fu n c tio n  in  so c ie ty . L e a v in g  s u c h  a  d iscuss ion  fo r a  la te r 
m o m e n t, th e  fo llo w in g  p re m ise  is  appea ling : th e  e n v iro n m e n t, no m a tte r h o w  it  is 
d e fin e d , be long s to  a ll o f us a n d  w e  should  b e  a b le  to  d e fe n d  it in d e p e n d e n tly  o f any 
p u b lic  in itia tiv e .
5.4.4. Remedies
A rtic le  4  o f th e  O rig in a l P ro p o sa l, by e n a b lin g  th e  v a rio u s  p o te n tia l p la in tiffs  to  
ta ke  le g a l a c tio n  to  o b ta in  e ith e r th e  p ro h ib itio n  o f th e  po llu tin g  a c t, a n d /o r the  
re im b u rse m e n t o f e xp e n d itu re  to  restore  th e  e n v iro n m e n t and to  p re v e n t and 
co m p e n sa te  th e  dam age , w e n t fa r  beyond th e  tra d itio n a l re lie f o f th e  v ic tim 's  losses 
117, p ro v id in g  fo r both  to r t an d  c le a n u p  a ctio n s.
L a te r o n , in  a  co m p ro m ise  w ith  th e  P a rlia m e n t's  recom m ended  m o d ific a tio n s , the  
C o m m iss io n  am ended th is  a rtic le , b y  c la rify in g  and u n ify in g  th e  rem ed ies th a t sha ll
116 In  re la tio n  to  the  re v ie w  o f C o m m u n ity  m easures u n d e r a rtic le  1732/2 o f th e  EEC  
T re a ty  se e  E ckard  R ehb ind e r a n d  R ichard  S te w a rt, * Environmental Protection Poiic/, 
v o l. 2 , C h a p te r V I, P a rt B , w ho  re fe r to  th e  EC J o p in io n  th a t a th ird  p riv a te  p a rty  is 
a cco rd e d  s tand ing  o n ly  w here  th e  re levan t d e c is io n  is  o f "d ire c t and  in d iv id u a l 
co n ve rn " to  th a t p a rty . A c c o rd in g ly , they co n s id e r th a t associa tio ns do  n o t have 
s ta n d in g  s in c e  by th e ir n a tu re  th e y  ca n  not be a ffe c te d  b y  d e c is io n s  co n ce rn in g  o n e  o f 
th e ir m em bers  and the  la tte r's  in te re s ts  can not be  a g g re g a te d ;
117 P a tric k  T h ie ffry , "Les nouveaux instruments juridiques de la politique communitaire 
de Tenvironnement*, in  R evue d e  D ro it E uropeen, P aris , A n n . 28 , n2 4 , O c t-D e z  1992, 





be m ade a v a ila b le  to  e v e ry  k in d  o f p la in tiff. N e ve rth e le ss , it d im in ished  th e  in itia l 
im pe tus w h ich  d iffe re n tia te d  th e  D ire c tiv e  system  fro m  th e  c lass ica l system s o f c iv il 
lia b ility , b y  le a v in g  it fo r th e  M e m b e r S ta tes to  d e te rm in e  w h ich  p la in tiffs  m ay bring  a  
le g a l a c tio n  fo r e n v ironm en ta l d a m a g e  and w h a t re m e d ie s  a re  ava ilab le  to  them .
5.4.4 A. Evolution
A t le a s t in  theo ry , th e  re m e d ie s  in itia lly  a va ila b le  d iffe re d  accord ing  to  w h ich  p a rty
in s titu te d  th e  le g a l p roceed ings 118. R eturning to  th e  d is tin c tio n  m ade concern ing  th e
p a rtie s  w ith  s tand ing , it seem s th a t bo th  the  p riv a te  p a rtie s , in  re la tion  to  th e  persona l
o r p ro p e rty  dam age th e y  s u ffe re d , and the  p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  and co m m on-in te rest
g roups, in re la tio n  to  in ju ry  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t119 120, co u ld  su e  to  put an end to  th e
a c tiv ity  caus ing  the  e n v iro n m e n ta l harm  12° . N ow adays, an in junctio n  m ay be
ob ta in e d  to  p ro h ib it an a c t th a t has caused o r th a t m ay c a u s e  dam age o r im p a irm e n t
to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t, and th e  co m p e n sa tio n  fo r d a m age  stricto sensu is a ls o  p oss ib le  
121
F u rth e rm o re , an in ju n c tio n  o rd e rin g  th e  re in s ta te m e n t o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t a n d /o r 
th e  e xe cu tio n  o f p re ve n tive  m e a su re s  w as g e n e ra lise d  to  e ve ry  person th a t co u ld  
b rin g  a  le g a l a c tio n . O n  th e  o th e r hand, th e  re im b u rse m e n t o f expenses m ade to  
p re ve n t th e  dam age o r in ju ry  to  th e  environm en t a n d /o r to  re in s ta te  th e  e n v iro n m e n t 
w a s  one o f p o ss ib le  rem ed ies th a t rem a ined  unchanged 122.
A cco rd in g  to  the  la s t ve rs io n  o f th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  a n d  th e  am endm en t o f th e  
p ro v is io n  in  issue , in p rin c ip le  a ll th e  p a rtie s  re fe rre d  to  s till have  th e  rig h t to  in s titu te
118 S ee F e e le y, supra n o te , pp . 2 6 3 ;
119 D am age and in ju ry to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t as d e fin e d  in  a rtic le  22/1 c) an d  d) o f th e  
O rig in a l P ro p o sa l;
120 U sing th is  concep t to  e m b ra ce  th e  dam age and in ju ry  to  the  e n v iro n m e n t as 
d e fin e d  by th e  proposed D ire c tive ;
121 S ee a rtic le  4®/1 b), su b p a ra g ra p h  (i) and (ii) o f the  A m ended  P roposa l;
122 A rtic le  42/1 b ), subparag raph  (¡ii) o f the  A m ended P ro p o sa l;
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le g a l p roceed ings fo r th e  above-m en tioned re fe rre d  ca u se s  o f action . In o th e r w ords, 
th e  m a jo r d iffe re n ce  now  is  th a t it is up to  th e  M e m b e r S ta tes in te rn a l law  to  
d e te rm in e  th e  persons w ho m a y bring a  le g a l a c tio n  a nd  th e  rem ed ies a v a ila b le  to  
th e m , a lthough  th e  n a tio n a l law s are  o b lig e d  to  p ro v id e  fo r th e  sam e rem ed ies 
re fe rre d  to  a b o v e 123.
N e ve rth e le ss, e ve n  if th e  M em ber S ta te s  n a tio n a l law  does n o t re s tric t the  
re m e d ie s  th a t should  m ade a va ila b le , it m ay h appe n  th a t its  c iv il p ro ce d u re  law  
e s ta b lish e s  a  p re re q u is ite  fo r c la im in g  those re m e d ie s , acco rd in g  to  w h ich  th e  p la in tiff 
m ust have  persona lly su ffe re d  th e  dam age o r m u s t h a ve  a  d ire c t and la w fu l in te re s t in 
b rin g in g  such  legal a c tio n s . T h e re fo re , it is  n o t c o m p le te ly  c le a r w h e th e r each 
M e m b e r S ta te  m ay re s tric t c e rta in  rem edies to  o n ly  c e rta in  typ e s  of p la in tiff.
5A.4.2. Private parties
T h e  th ird  and the  fifth  cause  o f action  seem ed  to  b e  e xc lu s ive ly  d ire c te d  tow ards 
p riv a te  p a rtie s , by e nab ling  th e m  to  seek th e  re im b u rse m e n t o f expenses m ade  to  
co m p e n sa te  fo r p ro p e rty  da m a g e  124 and th e  in d e m n ific a tio n  o f p e rso n a l dam age 
re s p e c tiv e ly . A lthough  th e  fin a l ve rs io n  o f th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  s till co n s id e rs  the  
p o s s ib ility  o f ob ta in ing  co m p e n sa tio n  fo r dam age  stricto sensu it is  o p e n  to  d iscuss ion  
w h e th e r p riv a te  p a rtie s  shou ld  o r  should  n o t h a ve  th e  rig h t to  su e  fo r pe rsona l 
dam ages.
F in a lly , accord ing to  c e rta in  au thors, th e  la s t m o d ifica tio n s  m ay e ve n  be 
co n s id e re d  a s a  un ique a p p ro x im a tio n  to  ce rta in  e le m e n ts  o f th e  A m erican  co n c e p t o f
123 A rtic le  42/1 b) o f the  A m ended  P roposa l;
124 S e e  Freem an, pp. 18, and S heehan, pp. 4 3 4 ; T he  firs t considers th a t a rtic le  4^/1
c) o n ly  co ve rs  property dam age  and  th e re fo re  su b p a ra g ra p h  1 e) w ould  lo g ic a lly  re fe r 
to  p e rso n a l dam age, b u t the  la s t a u tho r by ig n o rin g  th e  e xp ress re fe re n ce  m ade  to 
a rtic le  2QJ^ c) (ii) does n o t m ake su ch  a d is tin c tio n ;
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"p riv a te  a tto rn e y  g e n e ra l" 125. In  o th e r w ords, un d e r th e  A m erican  system  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility , th e  p o llu te r's  re sp o n s ib ility  is  u n d e r co n sta n t th re a t o f be ing  
h e a v ily  pen a lise d  due to  lega l a c tio n s  b rough t b y  p riv a te  in d iv id u a ls , w h ich  th re a t 
c o n s titu te s  an im p o rta n t in c e n tiv e  fo r  th e  co m p lia n ce  o f th e  p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  w ith  
e n v iro n m e n ta l re gu la tio ns.
In fa c t, the  D ire c tive  does n o t seem  to  fo rb id  a p riv a te  in d iv id u a l fro m  ta k in g  a  
le g a l a c tio n  aga inst an im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t d iffe re n t from  th e  dam age he 
s u ffe re d , and  even if he has n o t su ffe re d  any s p e c ific  dam age  he m ay c la im  th e  
re in s ta te m e n t o f the  im o a ire d  e n v iro n m e n t. In  o th e r w o rd s , it  m ay be possib le  fo r a  
p riv a te  p a rty  to  seek co m p e n sa tio n  fo r im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t, even though  
he  has n o t p e rso n a lly  su ffe re d  a n y  d a m a g e .
S.4.4.3. Public authorities and Common-interest Groups
In itia lly , pub lic  a u th o ritie s  c o u ld  o n ly  ta ke  le g a l a c tio n  to  ob ta in  a n  in junctio n  
o rd e rin g  th e  cessation  o f the  a c tiv ity  causing th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age and /o r to  
o b ta in  th e  re im bursem en t o f th e  co s ts  o f p re ve n tive  m e asures th a t it had ta ke n . 
F u rth e rm o re , th e y  co u ld  a lso  b rin g  c leanup  a c tio n s  fo rc in g  th e  de fend an ts to  re sto re  
th e  e n v iro n m e n t to  its  s ta te  p rio r to  th e  in ju ry  and if th e y  had in cu rre d  expenses 
d u rin g  th e  c leanup , th e y  co u ld  a s k  fo r re im b u rs e m e n t126 . In  th e  fin a l ve rs io n , th is  
s p e c ific  re fe re n ce  to  p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  w as d e le te d  a n d  its  stand ing  w ill a lso  be 
d e c id e d  b y each  M em ber S ta te 's  in te rn a l law .
O n th e  o th e r hand, co m m o n -in te re s t groups w ere o n ly  a llow ed to  ta ke  a  le g a l 
a c tio n  to  o b ta in  "the p ro h ib itio n  o r cessa tion  o f th e  a c t ca u s in g " the  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
dam age , as long as th e  M em ber S ta tes  in te rn a l law  g a v e  th e m  sta n d in g  fo r su ch
125 S ee T h ie ffry , pp. 9 7 2 ;
126 A rtic le  4 s/ 1 a ),b ) a nd  d ) by reference of a rtic le  3s- of th e  O rig in a l P roposa l;
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a c tio n s . A lthough th e y  w ere a lso  a llow ed to  seek th e  re im bursem ent o f expenses 
in c u rre d  in restoring the  e n v iro n m e n t, th e y  co u ld  n o t obta in  an o rd e r fo r  the 
d e fe n d a n ts  to  restore  th e  e n v iro n m e n t th e m s e lv e s 127 128.
A cco rd in g  to  the  fin a l am endm en ts, c o m m o n -in te re s t o rgan isa tions h a v in g  as 
th e ir s o c ia l o b je c t the  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t, h a ve  th e  rig h t to  seek a n y  o f the 
re m e d ie s  p rovided  fo r by th e  D ire c tiv e  o r to  jo in  in  a n y  o f th e  legal p ro ce e d in g s  th a t 
h ave  a lre a d y  been b ro u g h t b e fo re  th e  C ourt. H o w e ve r, th e  co n d itio n s  u n d e r w hich 
th e se  p a rtie s  m ay b ring  a  lega l a c tio n  sha ll be e s ta b lis h e d  by na tiona l law .
A lth o u g h  th is  la s t a m endm en t to o k  in to  a cco u n t th e  P a rliam en t's  su g g e stio n , the  
C o m m iss io n  d id  not a d o p t th e  p a rt o f th a t su g g e stio n  w h ic h  a llow ed M em ber S ta te s  to  
lim it, a t a  na tiona l, reg iona l o r lo c a l le ve l, w h ich  g ro u p s  w ere au th o rise d  to  bring 
a b o u t su ch  actions. M em ber S ta te s  no  lo n g e r have  th e  pow er to  d e c id e  if  these 
g ro u p s  h a ve  th e  rig h t to  seek su ch  rem ed ies b u t th e y  m a y  d e te rm ine  th e  co n d itio n s  
u n d e r w h ic h  th is  rig h t sh a ll be e xe rc ise d .
S.4.4.4. Limitations of Liability
T h e  C om m ission  m a in ta in e d  ce rta in  lim ita tio n s  to  the  re in s ta te m e n t o f the 
e n v iro n m e n t, fo llow ing  th e  sa m e  p o s itio n  w hen  it in itia lly  recogn ised th a t su ch  an 
a c tio n  c o u ld  "in vo lve  co s ts  o u t o f a ll p ro p o rtio n  to  th e  d e s ire d  re su lt" 126 b u t these 
lim ita tio n s  d o  n o t app ly to  d a m age  stricto sensu.
A cco rd in g  to  the  proposed  lim ita tio n s , th e  p la in tiff m ay not se e k  th e  above - 
m e n tio n e d  re in s ta te m e n t o r re im b u rse m e n t, if th e  co s ts  fo r  such  actions "su b s ta n tia lly  
e xce e d " its  consequen t b e n e fits  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t and if o th e r "re in s ta tiv e " 
m easures m ay b e  "u n d ertaken  a t a  s u b s ta n tia lly  lo w e r c o s t" 129. In o th e r w o rd s , th is
127 A rtic le  42/4 o f the  O rig in a l P ro p o sa l;
128 P o in t 6  o f th e  E xp lana to ry M em orandum ;
129 A rtic le  4®/2 o f the  O rig in a l a nd  A m ended  P ro p o s a l;
90
C H A P T E R  5
C O M M U N I T Y  L A W
9 1
"c o s t-b e n e fit"130 * lia b ility  lim ita tio n  o b lige s the  p la in tiff to  a cce p t cheaper re insta ting  
m easures, e ve n  if suggeste d  b y  th e  defendants, as long a s  th e y  adequa te ly  re in sta te  
th e  e n v iro n m e n t o r re im b u rse  th e  expend itu re  in cu rre d  to  th is  end. The p la in tiff m ay, 
ho w e ve r, a lw ays fo rce  th e  d e fe n d a n t to  take  su ch  a lte rn a tiv e  m easures o r dem and 
th e  re im b u rse m e n t o f e xp e n se s  h e  in cu rre d  to  im p le m e n t th e  m easures h im se lf.
A  q u e s tio n  rem ains a s  to w h e th e r such c o s t-b e n e fit a n a ly s is  a b so lu te ly  p recludes 
th e  a d o p tio n  o f m ore co s tly  m e a su re s  w hen th e  su g g e ste d  a lte rn a tive  m easures do  
n o t a d e q u a te ly  ach ie ve  th e  d e s ire d  resu lts  o r a re  no t "su b s ta n tia lly ” le ss  co s tly . F o r 
e xa m p le , if  th e  a lte rn a tive  m e asures suggested by th e  d e fe n d a n t o r b y  the  ju d g e  
h im s e lf a re  n o t su b s ta n tia lly  le ss  co s tly , m ay th e  p la in tiff im p lem ent h is  p roposed 
re in s ta tin g  m easures e ve n  if  its  c o s ts  exceed its  co n se q u e n t b e ne fits  ?
A p a rt fro m  these  c o s t-b e n e fit lim ita tio n s  no  fu rth e r fin a n c ia l c e ilin g s  w ere  
a dop te d , s in c e  the  C om m iss ion  n o t o n ly  co ns ide re d  th e m  u n ju s tifie d  to  a ch ie ve  th e  
a im s o f th e  proposed lia b ility  sys te m  b u t even co n tra ry  to  th e  T rea ty 's  p o llu te r p a y  
and  p re ca u tio n a ry  p rin c ip le  132; co n tra ry  in th e  sense th a t th e  a p p lica tio n  o f th e se  
p rin c ip le s  m ay be d is to rte d  s in c e  th o se  re sto ra tio n  co s ts  th a t exceed th e  esta b lish e d  
lim its  w ill p robab ly  be p a id  by s o c ie ty  in genera l, o r in o th e r w ords by th e  ta xp a ye r. 
O n  the  o th e r hand, if p o llu te rs  know  in advance th a t th e y  w ill no t have to  pay m ore  
th a n  a c e rta in  am ount fo r  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam ages, th e y  m a y  ta ke  few er m easures to  
p re v e n t th is  "o u t-o f-b o u n d s" d a m a g e  133. If any lim its  o n  lia b ility  are  to  b e  a ccep ted , 
th e y  sh o u ld  b e  se t a t such  a  h ig h  le v e l th a t th e y u  do  n o t n e g a te  th e  use fu lness o f th e  
p ro p o se d  s tric t lia b ility  syste m .
130 S ee F reem an, pp . 21 fo r a  com parison  w ith  th e  C E R C LA 's co s t-e ffe c tive n e ss  
app roach ;
13‘ S ee S heehan , pp. 4 3 5 ;
132 S ee p o in t 8 b) o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  M em orandum ;
133 S ee 2 .1 .6  o f the  G reen  P aper;
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T h e  P arliam ent's , on th e  o th e r hand, w as o f th e  op in ion  th a t u n lim ite d  s tric t 
lia b ility  w ould  render in su ra n ce  under th is  D ire c tive  d iffic u lt, if n o t im p o ss ib le  i34. 
T h e re fo re  it suggested th a t w h e n  th e  de fe n d a n t w as n o t a t fa u lt, a lthoug h  rem a in ing  
s u b je c t to  s tric t lia b ility , he  sh o u ld  be a b le  to  p ro fit fro m  p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lish e d  
lim ita tio n s  on the a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s  th a t m a y be  a w a rd e d 13S. A lthoug h  th e s e  lim its  
w e re  n o t accepted b y  th e  C o m m iss io n  in th e  p roposed  D ire c tive  b u t th e y  w ere 
n e ve rth e le ss  cons ide re d  n e ce ssa ry  in  th e  G reen  P aper.
In  fa c t, th e  G reen P a p e r fu rth e r suggeste d  th a t w hen  th e  p o llu te r w as n o t a t fa u lt, 
b u t u n fo resee ab le  dam age  h a d  s till occu rre d , fo r  w h ich  h e  w as no t in su re d  a n d  cou ld  
n o t h ? ve  ta ke n  any p re v e n tiv e  m easures, he  shou ld  o n ly  be  he ld  lia b le  up to  ce rta in  
lim its . It fu rth e r s tre sse d  th a t th e  a im  o f any lia b ility  sys te m  should b e  to  p re v e n t any 
fu tu re  e nv ironm en ta l d a m a g e  a n d  to  com pensa te  fo r res to ra tion  co s ts  a nd  n o t to  
in d isc rim in a te ly  pu n ish  a ll p o te n tia l p o llu te rs 136.
SAA^ S.___ Compensation for economic or other non-materiat damage
F in a lly , th e  q u e stio n s  o f w h e th e r and to  w h a t e x te n t dam age fo r loss o f p ro fit, 
e co n o m ic  loss o r o th e r n o n -m a te ria l dam age shou ld  b e  recove rab le  w as le ft to  the  
M e m b e r S ta tes n a tio n a l law  137. A m ong  th e  q u e stio n s  th is  raises is  w h e th e r th is  
re fe re n ce  to  dam ages sh o u ld  b e  in te rp re te d  a s in c lu d in g  b o th  dam age in  stricto sensu 
and th e  im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t o r n o t. C o n s id e rin g  th a t each tim e  a  ce rta in  
p ro v is io n  app lies to  b o th  ty p e s  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam a g e , th e  d ra ft D ire c tiv e  usua lly  
s ta te s  so  s p e c ifica lly , p ro b a b ly  th is  com pensa tion  fo r lo ss  o f p ro fit a p p lie s  o n ly  to  
d a m age  stricto sensu.
134 S e e  p o in t 17 o f E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t o f th e  P a rlia m e n ts  1st R eport;
135 S e e  a rtic le  1 1 ^/2 ,3 , a n d  4 o f th e  am endm en t n2 18 o f th e  P arliam en ts 2nd  R eport;
136 S e e  p o in t 2 .1 .6 . o f th e  G reen  P a p e r;
137 S e e  a rtic le  4s/ !  d) a n d  4  o f th e  A m ended  P roposa l;
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D o u b ts  w ill p ro b a b ly  a ris e  as to  w h e the r it w ill be  possib le  to  d e m a n d  
co m p e n sa tio n  fo r su ch  d a m a g e  in  the  sam e le g a l a c tio n  b ro u g h t un d e r the  
im p le m e n tin g  m easures o f a  fu tu re  D irective . In o th e r w ords, if th e  n a tio n a l law  o f a 
M em ber S ta te  a llow s fo r  th e  com pensa tion  o f such d a m ages, w ill th e  p la in tiff h a ve  to  
b ring  a  co m p le te ly  se p a ra te  le g a l action  o r w ill it b e  p o ss ib le  fo r h im  to  p re se n t h is 
dem and  in  th e  p roceed ings b ro u g h t under th e  D ire c tive s ' im p lem entin g  p ro v is io n s?  In 
th e  firs t s itu a tio n , th e  a c tio n  w ill have to  b e  b ro u g h t accord ing  to  th e  co n d itio n s  
e s ta b lish e d  by the  M em ber S ta te s ' in te rna l ru le s , e ve n  if  fo r  exam ple , it e s ta b lish e s  a  
sys te m  o f fa u lt lia b ility . In  th e  second, th e  co n d itio n s  to  be fu lfille d  a re  th o se  
e s ta b lis h e d  by th e  D ire c tive , a cco rd in g  to  its  s tr ic t lia b ility  system .
5.4.4.6. Punitive Damages
A lth o u g h  the  D ire c tive  h a s  increased th e  num ber o f rem edies a v a ila b le  to  th e  
p la in tiff, it does not p ro v id e  fo r  p u n itive  dam ages, s in c e  its  a im  is m ore  p re v e n tiv e  
than  re p re ss ive . A s  an A m e rica n  author e n v io u s ly  s ta te s , th is  p roposed D ire c tiv e , 
u n like  C E R C LA , "is  n o t v in d ic tiv e  and con ta ins  no re fle x iv e  m ora l co n d e m n a tio n  o f 
p o llu te rs ".
5.4.5. Burden of Proof
5.4.5.1. From the "Overwhelming Probability” to the Standard of Proof 
Test
O n e  o f the  m o st c ritic is e d  a rtic le s  o f th e  O rig in a l P roposal w as th a t w h ich  
e s ta b lish e d  th e  causa tion  re q u ire m e n ts  to  be  fu lfille d  u n d e r th is  s tric t lia b ility  system
138. A lth o u g h  a s tric t lia b ility  sys te m  usually fa c ilita te s  th e  p la in tiffs  tra d itio n a l b u rden  138
138 S ee ch a p te r on a  co m p a riso n  o f the  d iffe re n t c iv il lia b ility  system s
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o f p ro o f, h e  s till has to  e s ta b lish  th e  ca u sa l co nnectio n  be tw een  the  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
dam age  a n d  th e  d e fend an t's  a c t139 140.
A c c o rd in g ly , under th e  o rig in a l p roposa l th e  p la in tiff s till had to  p rove  th e  
e x is te n ce  o f th e  dam age a n d  to  e s ta b lish  th a t th e  p ro d u ce r's  w aste had, by an 
"o ve rw h e lm in g  p ro b a b ility " 14°, ca u se d  such  dam age o r in ju ry  to  the  e n v iro n m e n t14t. 
T h is  p ro v is io n  w as la te r am ended  b y  th e  C om m ission , w h ic h  had a lready e xp la in e d  
th a t th e  E n g lish  te x t had u n in te n tio n a lly  inc lude d  th e  te rm  o f "o ve rw h e lm in g  
p ro b a b ility " in s te a d  o f "b a la n ce  o f p ro b a b ilitie s "142. T he  C om m ission  a lso  accep ted  
the  P a rlia m e n t's  suggestions 143 th a t su ch  a "burden  o f p ro o f sh a ll be no h ig h e r th a n  
the  s ta n d a rd  bu rd e n  o f p ro o f in  c iv il la w ".
A cco rd in g  to  th is  a m endm en t, th e  p la in tiff s till has to  p rove  the  ca u sa l lin k  
be tw een th e  d e fe n d a n t's  w a ste  a nd  th e  dam age o r im p a irm e n t to  the  e n v iro n m e n t, 
su ffe re d  o r lik e ly  to  be su ffe re d , th e re b y  c le a rly  a d o p tin g  p re v e n tiv e  a ctio n  c la u se s. 
A lthoug h  th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  le a ve s  it to  th e  M em ber S ta te s ' in te rn a l law  to  d e te rm in e  
th is  bu rden  o f p ro o f, it does n o t p ro v id e  th a t it s h a ll be  n o  h ig h e r than th e  s ta n d a rd  
one  in  c iv il la w  144, w h ich  co n c e p t se e m s  to  leave to o  w id e  a  m arg in  o f d isc re tio n .
S.4.5.2. —  Joint and Several Liability
T he  C o m m iss io n  d id , h o w e ve r, ease  th is  bu rden  o f p ro o f on  th e  p la in tiff b y  
e s ta b lish in g  th a t w hen  the  sa m e  d a m a g e  o r im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t has been  
caused  by m o re  th a n  one p e rs o n 14S, a ll th e  re sponsib le  p a rtie s  w ill be he ld  jo in tly  a n d
139 S ee  p o in t 2 .1 .2 . o f the G re e n  P a p e r
140 S uch  a c o n c e p t w ould  le a d  to  d iffe re n t in te rp re ta tio n s  by e a ch  nationa l c o u rt w h ich  
w ou ld  p ro b a b ly  tra n s fo rm  it in to  a m o re  s trin g e n t ca u sa tio n  re qu irem en t;
141 A rtic le  42 /6  o f the  O rig in a l P ro p o sa l;
142 S ee F e e le y  .sup ra  note, p p . 264 a n d  a lso  po in t 3 .2  o f th e  E S C  O p in ion ;
143 A rtic le  42/1 c ) o f th e  P a rlia m e n ts  2 n d  R eport;
144 S ee a rtic le  42/1 c) o f th e  A m e n d e d  P roposa l;
145 In  the  O rig in a l P roposa l, th e  p ro v is io n  re fe rred  o n ly  to  th e  p roduce r;
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se v e ra lly  lia b le . In o th e r w ords, th e  p la in tiff w ill o n ly  have  to  estab lish  th e  ca u sa l lin k  
be tw een  th e  in ju ry  su ffe re d  and o n e  o f th e  w astes th a t ca u se d  it, and th e  p ro d u ce r o f 
su ch  w aste  w ill be held lia b le  fo r  th e  to ta l am ount o f the  dam age. Even if  th is  person 
is  o n ly  re sp o n s ib le  fo r p a rt o f th e  dam age, he w ill be he ld  lia b le  fo r the  fu ll am oun t o f 
th e  d a m age  b u t w ill be a b le  to  se e k  red ress under the  a p p lica b le  M em ber S ta tes  law .
T h is  p ro v is io n  fo r jo in t and s e v e ra l lia b ility  ra ised  se v e ra l c ritic ism s, fo r  e xa m p le  
th a t it  w o u ld  s tim u la te  th e  "deep  p o cke t s y n d ro m e "146 o r th a t it w ould endan ger th e  
in s u ra b ility  o f th e  p roposed  lia b ility  syste m . A ccord ing  to  th e  firs t c ritic ism , th e  p la in tiff 
w o u ld  p ro b a b ly  sue th e  p ro d u ce r w ith  th e  b e s t fin a n c ia l ca pac ity  to  sa tis fy  a n y 
co m p e n sa tio n  th a t m ay b e  g ra n te d , even  though  th e se  p e rsons m ay b e  responsib le  
fo r o n ly  so m e  sm a ll p a rt o f the  e n v iro n m e n ta l d am age , th e re b y  d is to rting  th e  "p o llu te r 
p a ys" p rin c ip le .
The G re e n  Paper a lso  recogn ise s th e  use fu lne ss o f th e  jo in t and s e ve ra l lia b ility  
ru le , e s p e c ia lly  in cases o f ch ro n ic  p o llu tio n  w here  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  is  caused  
by th e  c u m u la tiv e  e ffe c ts  o f d iffe re n t po llu tin g  a c tiv itie s . In  such  s itu a tio n s , n o t o n ly  
ca n  it be  v e ry  d iffic u lt to  lin k  each  in d iv id u a l a c tiv ity  to  a  s p e c ific  am ount o f dam age 
b u t such d am age  m ay n o t be d iv is ib le  a t a l l147. T he  P a p e r goes on to  co n s id e r th a t 
th e se  d iffic u ltie s  m ay be  e ffic ie n tly  d e a lt w ith  by a  jo in t and  se ve ra l lia b ility  ru le  in  th e  
m anner re fe rre d  to  a b o ve  w h e re b y  the  tra n sa c tio n  c o s ts  w ou ld  be  a cco rd in g ly  
reduced .
N e ve rthe le ss, the  d isa d va n ta g e s  o f a  jo in t and s e v e ra l lia b ility  ru le  m u st a lso  be  
a ckn o w le d g e d ; it w ill p ro b a b ly  in c re a s e  the  a m oun t o f su b se q u e n t c o n trib u tio n  a c tio n s
146 S ee G e o ffre y  Thom pson, "Environmental liability in Canada: the risks for lenders, 
receivers and trusteesf in  E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility , C h a p te r IV , P art A , w h o  co n s id e rs  
th a t u n d e r th e  deep p o cke t syn d ro m e , fin a n c ia lly  v ia b le  e n titie s  can end u p  paying  fo r  
fo r  th e  s h a re  o f c lean -up  costs  th a t shou ld  have  been b o rn e  by o thers w ho  are  now  
u n a b le  to  p a y  o r w ho c a n n o t be  lo ca te d ; See Ian  D o o little . "Environmental Liability" in  
In te rn a tio n a l F inancia l Law  R eview , Ju n e  1992, S u p p le m e n tu m , pp. 21 ;
147 S ee p o in t 2 .1 .5 . i) o f th e  G re e n  P aper;
9 5
C H A P T E R S
C O M M U N I T Y  L A W
9 6
w ith  w h ich  th e  co u rts  w ill h a ve  to  d e a l and  again  in c re a se  th e  respective  tra n sa c tio n  
co s ts . The G re e n  Paper suggeste d  th a t such tra n sa c tio n  c o s ts  co u ld  be d im in ish e d  by 
p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lish in g  the  "o rd e r in  w h ich  p o te n tia lly  lia b le  p a rtie s  shou ld  be su e d "; 
th e  p roposed  D ire c tive  does th is  to  so m e  e x te n t b y  e s ta b lish in g  a prim ary lia b ility  on  
th e  p ro d u ce r o f th e  w aste, fo llo w e d  b y  a  secondary a ttrib u tio n  o f lia b ility  to  persons 
d e fin e d  in  a rtic le  2^/2 . T he  ch a n n e llin g  o f lia b ility  is  a lso  re fe rre d  to  as a  m ean o f 
reducing  th o s e  tra nsaction  co s ts , b u t if  th e  d e fe n d a n t is s till g ive n  the  rig h t to  seek 
redress fro m  th e  o th e r re sp o n s ib le  p a rtie s  than  th is  in s tru m e n t w ill n o t reduce  
co n trib u tio n  a c tio n s .
5 .4 .6 . D e fe n c e s
T he  C o m m iss io n  in itia lly  p ro p o se d  148 as p o ss ib le  d e fe n ce s  force majeure, as 
d e fin e d  by C o m m u n ity  Law  149 150, and  co n trib u to ry  n e g lig e n ce , w hen the  dam age  w as 
a lso  caused  b y  th e  fa u lty  o r n e g lig e n t c o n d u c t o f th e  in ju re d  p a rty  o r ano the r pe rson  
un d e r h is  re s p o n s ib ility  15° . It la te r a cce p te d  th e  P a rlia m e n t's  p roposa ls  o f de fe n ce s  
d ue  to  th e  in te n tio n a l acts  o f th ird  p a rtie s  o r fo r th e  e x c lu s io n  o f lia b ility  o f th e  
e lim in a to r o f w a s te  due  to  th e  p ro d u ce r's  m iss ta te m e n ts  re g a rd in g  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  
w a ste . F o r s o m e  authors th is  e n la rg e m e n t o f the  p o ss ib le  d e fe n ce s  seem  to  b e  a  
p a rtia l re tu rn  to  th e  tra d itio n a l sys te m  o f fa u lt lia b ility .
148 S e e  a rtic le  6  and  7 o f th e  O rig in a l P ro p o sa l;
149 S ee O p in io n  o f th e  ES C , p o in t 3 .3  a n d  P a rlia m e n t 2nd  R e p o rt w h ich  c ritic is e  th e  
"fo rce  m a je u re " d e fin itio n  g iv e n  by th e  C o u rt o f Ju s tice  ju d g e m e n t o f 5 /2 /8 7  on  th e  
case  nfi 145 /85 , Denkavit Belgi£ v. The Belgian State, EC R  198 7 -2 . The EC J d e fin e d  
th e  c o n ce p t " in  th e  sense o f unusua l a n d  u n fo resee ab le  c ircu n s ta m ce s , beyond  th e  
tra d e rs  c o n tro l, th e  consequences o f w h ic h  co u ld  h a ve  n o t b e e n  avo ided  e ve n  if a ll 
d ue  c a re  h a d  b e e n  exerc ised";
150 A rtic le  7 ,2 n d  paragraph  o f th e  C o m m iss io n s  p roposa ls ;
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U n like  th e  P roducts L ia b ility  D ire c tiv e  151 152, no d e fence  re g a rd in g  th e  d e ve lo p m e n t 
risks  w a s e ve n  d iscussed du rin g  th e  p repara to ry w orks fo r th is  D ire ctive . A lth o u g h  th e  
idea fo r such  a  defence, w h ich  w o u ld  ta ke  into accoun t th e  s ta te  o f s c ie n tific  and 
te ch n ica l kn ow ledg e  at th e  tim e  th e  in c id e n t occurred , w as su p p o rte d  by th e  in d u stry - 
o rie n te d  s id e  o f th e  "d iscussion  ta b le ", it  never re ce ive d  a n y  se rio u s  co n s id e ra tio n  in  
th e  d is c u ss io n s  a t C om m unity le ve l o n  env ironm en ta l lia b ility .
In  th e  C o u n c il o f E urope C o n ve n tio n , on  the  o th e r hand , th is  idea  w as s u b je c t to  a 
s p e c ific  re se rva tio n , accord ing  to  w h ich  th e  C on tracting  P a rtie s  m ay in c lu d e  in th e ir 
in te rn a l le g is la tio n  an add itio n a l g ro u n d  fo r exem ption  co n ce rn in g  d e ve lo p m e n t risks
152
5JJLL__ Force Ma/eare
A cco rd in g  to  the  co ncep t o f force majeure as a  g ro u n d  fo r e xe m p tio n , if  the  
d e fe n d a n t p ro v e s  th a t th e  dam age  o r im pa irm en t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t re su lte d  n o t 
fro m  h is  fa u lty  conduct b u t fro m  a  ca se  o f force majeure, a s  d e fin e d  in  C om m un ity  
law , h e  w ill n o t be  held lia b le . S in ce  th e  concept o f force majeure, regard ing  th e  c iv il 
lia b ility  o f p riv a te  in d iv id u a ls , is  n o t re fe rre d  to  o r d e fin e d  in  any C om m un ity  lega l 
in s tru m e n t it  w a s  necessary to  use  a  d e fin itio n  g ive n  by th e  E C J 153.
In fa c t, a cco rd in g  to c e rta in  ca s e s  o f the  ECJ, co n ce rn e d  w ith  m atte rs o f com m on 
a g ricu ltu ra l p o lic y , force m a je u re  is  de fin e d  as th o se  "u n u su a l and un fo reseeab le  
c ircu m sta n ce s , beyond th e  tra d e rs  c o n tro l, th e  consequ ences o f w h ich  co u ld  have  n o t 
been a vo id e d  even if a ll due  c a re  had been e x e rc is e d "154. N eve rthe le ss, th e  
P a rlia m e n t cons ide re d  th is  d e fin itio n  o f force majeure g ive n  b y  th e  ECJ u n su ita b le  fo r
151 C o u n c il D ire c tive  85 /374  o f 25/11 /8 5 ;
152 S e e  a rtic le  352/1 b) o f th e  C o u n c il o f Europe C o n ve n tio n ;
153 S ee  C a se  C -338/89, Danske Sfagterieroi 7 /5 /9 1 , pp . T -2 3 1 5 ;
154 S ee  E C J C ase r£  145 /85 , Denkavit België v. The Belgian State o f 5 /2 /8 7 , EC R  
1987-2 ;
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the field of civil liability and thereby suggested the adoption of the classic definition in 
International Law 15S; this suggestion was not accepted by the Commission in its 
amended proposal and since it took into account the recent definition given in the 
Council of Europe Convention it is therefore subject to the same criticism that it gives 
an exhaustive list of cases of "force majeure".
In the end, the reference to "force majeure as defined in Community law" was 
maintained and therefore the future and past jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice will be of great importance in interpreting this concept.
5JJ.2.___Fault of the Injured Party
Initially, it seemed as if the producers' liability would only be disallowed or 
reduced in the cases of contributory negligence of the injured party 156, an 
incoherence that was noted by the Parliament157 158and accordingly amended by the 
Commission 15S. In fact, under most systems of civil liability the concept of fault of 
the injured party is wider than contributory negligence since the former also includes 
the victim's intentional wrongful conduct
Nevertheless, the concept of faulty conduct of the victim is still not referred to in 
the amended provision, leaving a room for doubt as to whether a kind of strict liability 
of the injured party was hereby created. In other words, it seems that if the producer 
can prove that the injured party, or any person under the injured party's responsibility, 
contributed wholly or partly to the damage or injury to the environment, his own
155 See amendment n2 13 of the Parliaments 2nd Report, which excludes any person 
from liability if he proves that any damage "resulted from any act of war, hostilities,
insurrection or a natural phenomena of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character", and also the commentary to article 6 on part IV of its Explanatory 
Memorandum of the 1st Report; 
t56 See 14th recital of the Original’s Proposal Preamble;
157 See Amendment n2 2 of Parliaments 2nd Report;
158See 16th recital of the Amended Proposal Preamble;
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liability will be accordingly waived, without his having to prove any fault in the victim's 
behaviour. Furthermore, it is also arguable whether this defence includes not only the 
injured party’s faulty conduct in the production of the damage but also his failure to 
minimise such damage.
5A.6.3. Contributory Acts of Third Parties
On the other hand, the Commission adopted the Parliament's amendments which 
suggested two new types of defences: one regarding the intentional intervention of a 
third party and another for the producer's misstatements regarding the nature of the 
waste159 160.
The defence for an intentional intervention of a third party means that, if the 
producer can prove that not only it was not his fault but also that it was the intentional 
conduct of a third party that caused the damage , he shall be relieved of liability. 
Therefore, the rationale on which the former version of this article based itself was 
hereby abandoned 161. In fact, this rationale was the same as the parallel provision in 
the Directive 85/374 on Defective Products, according to which the producer could 
always proceed against third parties through the national rights of recourse.
The second defence refers to the possibility of the eliminator of waste avoiding 
liability if he can prove that the producer, when consigning the polluting waste, 
wrongfully informed him of the nature of that waste . In this case, as in all the other 
defences, the person seeking to exclude himself from liability will have to prove that 
there was no fault, including negligence, careless or ignorance, on his part
5.4.6A. Authorisation bv Public Authorities
159 Article 7fi of the Amended Proposal;
160 Article 62/1 a) of the Amended Proposal;
161 See point 8/c 3) of the Explanatory Memorandum;
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Furthermore, the proposed Directive explicitly establishes that the existence of a 
permit issued by a public authority does not limit or exclude civil liability for damage 
and injury to the environment162. According to several authors, such an exclusion of 
a permit from the possible defences follows the trend in most Member States where 
the mere holding of official authorisations does not discharge the producer of waste 
from his environmental liability163.
Usually, the purpose of any environmental permit is not only to enable the 
government to control the polluting activities below an acceptable level but also to 
regulate the unavoidable use of the environment by the economic operators. 
Nevertheless, since acceptable levels are difficult to establish and are also subject to 
constant change, even if the activity causing it has been previously authorised 164, 
damage to the environment may still occur.
In the Green Paper, the Commission seems to have reconsidered the position 
taken in the proposed Directive, by distinguishing between environmental damage 
which results from the polluter's non-compliance with the conditions set by the 
relevant permit, and/or the non-existence of the permit from the situations where the 
environmental damage results from activities which fully comply with conditions set in 
the public authorisation.
On the one hand, the Green Paper - like the proposed Directive - suggests that 
the polluter shall be liable for any damage he causes when he exceeds the quantity 
and quality limits established in the authorisation under which he operates. On the 
other hand, it asks why, if the polluter has fully complied with all the requirements set 
in the permit, he should still be considered liable for the whole amount of the damage. 
The rationale behind this is that an economic operator should not be unjustly
162 Article 62/2 of both the Original and Amended Proposal;163 For the French Law, see Prieur, "Droit d e I'Environnement", 2a edit, n2 940;
164 See point 2.1.5. i) of the Green Paper;
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penalised for relying on the authorisation given by the competent public authorities. 
By way of example, if any European citizen, either individual or corporate, is given a 
legal permit which authorises him e.g. to discharge his waste waters into a river, he 
should not be held solely liable for the damage occurring from discharges within the 
established limits.
The Community's acknowledgment that public authorities should also be held 
responsible for their decisions and activities that unduly impair the environment, it 
may be too radical 165. In fact, the Green Paper expressly suggests that public 
authorities which have granted a "pollution” authorisation should be held liable for the 
damage caused by the authorised activities, as long as these fully comply with the 
standards set. This principle is based on the assumption that these regulatory bodies 
are given the competence but also the duty to evaluate the quantity and quality of 
polluting activities that may be accepted in the specific environment for which they 
are responsible.
Although public authorities should be held responsible for their, sometimes 
"irresponsible", decisions, their liability should not be strict or at least should be joint 
and several with the polluters themselves. Since the public authority is not a polluter, 
to subject it to strict liability would not only distort the "polluter pays" principle but also 
create a "polluted pays" principle because any public costs would be passed on to the 
taxpayers. According to such joint and several liability suggestion, although the 
polluters would have been duly authorised they would be expected to operate in good
165 For a general view on the responsibility of the administrative authorities see J.Ph. 
Colson, "Police d es déchets et responsabilité administrative", J.C.P. 1991, ed. E, 
supplément au na27, in Cahiers de Droit de PEnterprise, nM, pp. 2;
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faith and within the legal limits 166 and if not they should be considered to have 
contributed to the damage.
5.4.6.S.___Contractual derogation
Originally, the proposed Directive established that the producers' liability could 
not be limited or excluded in relation to the injured person, but this reference to the 
victim was later deleted 167. in its present state the provision establishes that no 
person, considered liable under this Directive may contractually limit or exclude such 
liability.
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether certain contractual clauses, limiting or 
excluding liability, are possible among professionals, if they do not limit third parties 
rights; for example, the limitative clauses celebrated between the buyers of a specific 
industrial real estate and the owners of the selling company, according to which the 
costs of any potential damage caused by waste accumulated by the past owners shall 
be equally apportioned.
Furthermore, it should also be possible for the producer to obtain contractual 
indemnities from those to whom he committed the waste 168. In other words, the 
producer can contract with the carrier or with any other person to whom he legally 
transferred the waste, that if damage or injury to the environment caused by the 
transferred waste occurs, as a result of the latter actions, they will be responsible 
towards him for any related indemnification costs 169. These contractual 
arrangements do not exclude the producer's or any person's liability under the draft
1 fifiIf the Government authorises you to destroy a unique natural resource not only 
you have the moral obligation not to do it, but there will surely exist prevailing laws that forbid such actions;
167 Compare article 8s of the Original and of the Amended Proposal;168 See Bryce, 1991;
169 See point 5 of the Explanatory Memorandum;
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Directive, which is not negotiable, but oblige the carrier or any other responsible 
person to compensate the producer for any liability he incurs because of them.
5,4.7. Limitation periods
S JmL L __ Expiration period
Initially, the expiration period of three years was to be counted from the moment 
the plaintiff knew of or should have known of the damage or injury to the environment 
and of the producer's identity 17°, but reference to the identity of the producer was 
withdrawn in the amendments adopted by the Commission. Furthermore, originally 
this period of three years applied only to the plaintiff's taking legal action to obtain an 
injunction 170 71, but this limitation was also amended and this expiration period now 
applies to all legal actions that can be brought172.
Besides this a general expiration period was established, according to which no 
actions shall be brought after a period of thirty years from the moment the incident 
giving rise to environmental damage or impairment occurred. Although the 
Parliament was of the opinion that such expiration period was too long, it has 
remained unchanged. The rationale for this was that although any right to 
compensation for damages should be disallowed after a certain period, the definition 
of this period should take into account those types of pollution whose effects are not 
immediately visible, for example the disposal of waste in permanent deposit sites.
The term "incident" must be defined in order to decide from when the expiration 
period of thirty years is to be be counted. Although in relation to the transitional period 
of the draft Directive it was partially clarified that it shall not apply to the incidents
170 See article 9^ 1 of the Original Proposal;
171 See article 9^ 1 which refers to article 4V1 a) of the Original Proposal;
172 See article 9s/! and article 4^ 1 of the Amended Proposal;
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occurring before its entry into force, any future Directive should follow the Council of 
Europe Convention and clearly exemplify the different meanings of the term incident
J A Z Z ____Retroactive application
5.4.7.2.1. tn the proposed Directive
In fact, it is very important to clarify the above mentioned doubts regarding the 
moment when the "incident" occurred 173. Should this reference be interpreted as the 
moment when the polluting activity occurred or the moment when the damaging 
effects of the polluting acts were felt, which in certain situations of waste disposal 
usually occur several years later 7 For example, the permanent disposal of waste 
may in the future have cumulative effects resulting in environmental degradation.
The interpretation of the term "incident" is important for the possibility of 
retroactive liability, contrary to the economic principle of predictability, according to 
which any economic operator has the right to know the legal consequences that his 
acts may possibly have 174. For example, if the concept of incident includes the 
continuous effects of a polluting waste disposal, past waste producers would be 
retroactively subject to this new liability system 175. Although such an interpretation is 
contrary to the Commission's stated purpose of limiting the Directive's scope to 
prospective application 176, its implementation into internal law or the interpretation 
made by national courts may create some problems.
173 Article 13 of the Original Proposal;1 4 Freeman, George Clemon Jr and McSIarrow, Kyle, "The Proposed European 
Community Directive on Civil Liability for W aste - The Implications for US. Superfund 
reauthorization in 1991• 46 Business Lawyer, 1990-1991,1, pp. 8;
175 See Freeman, who considers that if incident is interpreted to include not just the 
original disposal of waste, but continuing pollution as well, then arguably any current 
pollution could subject past generators to new liability , even if the wastes were in 
someone else's possession after the date of the Directive's enactment;
176 Point 8 of the Explanatory Memorandum;
104
C H A P T E R  5
C O M M U N IT Y  L A W
105
In the meantime, some part of the doctrine tends to accept the interpretation that 
the Directive does not apply to damages to the environment resulting from polluting 
acts which occurred before the implementing national measures came into force 177. 
The Green Paper is also very clear in specifying that the instrument of civil liability 
should not be used to repair for environmental damages inherited from the past
5.4.8. Insurance
Environmental risk insurance is a recent service, and the lack of statistics and 
precise information on environmental risks has led insurers to go back on their initial 
impetus. In fact, several problems may be encountered by the insurer when providing 
coverage for environmental damage, namely the definition of such damage, its 
predictability and its probable extent.
These problems make it almost impossible to determine the insurability of such 
damage, which, when obtained, is thus usually far from perfect. In the meantime, the 
policy of the insurance market has varied from imposing ceilings on the amount of 
damages to be covered, to limiting such coverage to certain types of environmental 
damage and/or raising the insurance premiums.
5.4.8.1. Evolution in Community Law
In the Directive on Waste Shipment178, which partially stimulated this proposal, 
and in the 4th Environment Action Programme the Council advocated the 
implementation of a system of compulsory insurance. However, in the initial Directive
177 See Patrick Thieffry, "La responsabilité civile du pollueur les projets 
communautaires et la convention du Conseil de l'Europe0, in Gazette du Palais, 
5/8/93, pp.966;
178 Directive ns 84/631 on Waste Shipment;
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the Commission did not consider it appropriate to regulate insurance, particularly at a 
time when the insurance sector was backing out of the field of environmental damage
179
5A.8.2. The Final Proposal
The Parliament's suggestions were, however, partially accepted, obliging the 
producer and the eliminator of waste to be covered by an adequate financial scheme, 
either by insurance or some other financial security 179 80. This reference to "any other 
financial security" was introduced to cover those situations of self-insurance, which 
are being increasingly adopted in order to compensate for the recent lack of 
insurance coverage. Besides these situations of self insurance, financial security can 
be given by the State, which, excluded from the scope of mandatory insurance can 
self-insure for waste products or producers through a Bank guarantee or by a 
compensation fund.
The Directive also required the producer to include the name of his insurers in his 
annual report, probably to make such information available to any potential claimant 
to a compensation for damages 181. This requirement is considered by some as 
inadequate because not all the producers are obliged to present an annual report and 
the mere reference to the insurers name is insufficient, since it does not clarify more 
specific information regarding the type and amount of insurance coverage182.
j;
S.4.8.3. -  Limits on Liability - •
179 See point 9 of the Explanatory Memorandum;
180 See article 1W  of the Amended Proposal;
181 See article 3^ 2 of the Amended Proposal;
182 See Patrice Level, "Proposition d e  Directive CEE du Conseil concernant la 
Responsabilité Civile pour les  Dommages Causés par les  D échets" in Revue des 
Affaires Européenes, Paris, nM, 1991, pp. 47;
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The Parliament's suggestion was somewhat misinterpreted since originally it also 
provided for specific limits on liability183 which were not adopted. Taking into account 
the difficulties in insuring environmental damage and the unnecessary unlimited 
liability when the polluter acted without fault, the Parliament had suggested a 
limitation scheme according to which the different types of damages to be awarded 
were to be limited in amount184.
5.4.8A. The G reen P aoer
Further on, the Green Paper extensively described the evolution and shortcoming 
of mandatory insurance for environmental damage. In broad terms, the main pitfalls 
that compulsory insurance as a compensation instrument may encounter are that 
coverage for such complex risks, such as those from which environmental damage 
usually arises, can be prohibitively expensive and/or its availability limited to a certain 
roof or completely non-existent.
The Green Paper's major concern, to be considered in any future Community law 
on Environmental Liability in general, is that if insurance is to be made compulsory it 
should be available in the market, under exactly the same conditions for which it is 
required. In fact a system of compulsory insurance not only implies that all the 
environmental risks should be covered but it may also create discrepancies between 
differently sized firms.
5.4M*__Insurers as Licensers. Qf^ industry
Furthermore, if an obligation for mandatory insurance is accepted, this may well 
transform insurers into environmental "policemen" since they will feel compelled to
183 Amendment n218 of the Parliaments 2nd Report;
184 See paragraph 17 of the Explanatory Statement in the Parliaments 2nd Report and above paragraph on limitations on liability;
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e v a lu a te  th e  industry 's  q u a lity  o f risk  m anagem ent. T h e  insurance m a rke t w ould 
e x e rc is e  a  "q u a s k e g u la to ry  fu n c tio n " 185 186b u t b y  ch o o s in g  w hich p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  
sh o u ld  b e  g ive n  in su ra n ce  co ve ra g e , it w o u ld  s tim u la te  them  to  a d o p t b e tte r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  m e a su re s . N everthe le ss, th is  d e ve lop m en t w ou ld  le a d  to  a 
c lo s in g  o f th e  insu rance  m a rke t th e re b y  underm in ing  th e  e ffo rts  o f sm a lle r in d u s trie s .
S.4.8.6. Future perspectives
T h e  D ire c tiv e  as it s ta n d s  in  th e  present is  to o  v a g u e , a llow ing M em ber S ta te s  to  
d e te rm in e  a lm o s t e v e ry  d e ta il o f th e  proposed lia b ility  system . H ow ever, if the  
D ire c tiv e  w e re  to  im pose  m a n d a to ry  insurance , th e  sys te m  sp e c ific  co n d itio n s  w ould  
h ave  to  be p re c ise ly  e s ta b lish e d  to  a vo id  any p o te n tia l d is to rtio n s  in  its  
im p le m e n ta tio n .
T h e  E E C  is  p re se n tly  co n s id e rin g  a  th re e -tie r sys te m , accord ing  to  w h ic h  th e
S ta te  w o u ld  co ve r a p a rt o f th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  b y  estab lish ing  n a tio n a l funds
o r s u p p o rtin g  sm a lle r co m p a n ie s  th e re b y  co m p le m e n tin g  th e  a c tiv itie s  poo ls  fo rm e d
b y th e  d iffe re n t b ranches o f a c tiv itie s . B esides th e se  tw o  in itia l res to ra tion  phases, an
in su ra n ce  schem e w o u ld  be  e s ta b lish e d  to  c o v e r th e  re m a in in g  p a rt o f th e  dam age 
186
5.4.9. Compensation fund
A lth o u g h  th e  C o m m iss io n  recogn ised  th e  need to  com pensate  the  v ic tim , 
p a rtic u la rly  in those  ca se s  w here  it is  d iffic u lt to  e s ta b lish  lia b ility , it co n s id e re d  th a t it 
w as p re fe ra b le  to  p o s tp o n e  th e  re g u la tio n  o f su ch  s itu a tio n s  . W hen re fe rrin g  to  the  
s itu a tio n s  w here  the  pe rso n s  re sp o n s ib le  ca n n o t be id e n tifie d  o r w here  th e y  a re  no t
185 S e e  W ilk in so n  (1 9 9 3 ), pp. 161
186 S e e  A n n e  S urzu r, p p . 18;
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capab le  o f p ro v id in g  fu ll co m pensa tion  fo r the  e n v ironm en ta l dam age th e y  caused , 
th e  p ro p o sa l considers th a t th e  p o ss ib ility  o f these  ca se s  be ing  so lve d  by th e  
e s ta b lish m e n t o f a  E uropean C om pensa tion  Fund should  b e  ta ke n  in to  co n s id e ra tio n
1S7
and d u ly  d iscussed.
T hese  co n s id e ra tio n s  a re  lin k e d  w ith  the in trin s ic  lim ita tio n s  o f any c iv il lia b ility  
system , w h ich  in  ce rta in  cases is  n o t capable o f p ro v id in g  th e  desired  re s to ra tio n  o f 
th e  e n v iro n m e n t o r the  co m p e n sa tio n  o f the  co s ts  th e re b y  incu rred . T he  d iffic u ltie s  
e ncoun te red  a re  m ain ly re la te d  to  th e  type  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age caused  such a  
long  tim e  ago  th a t it m ay p ro ve  im possib le  to  id e n tify  th e  responsib le  p a rty  o r to  
e s ta b lish  th e  causa l co n n e ctio n  w ith  the  po llu tin g  in c id e n t. F or exam ple , in  cases 
such  as th e  perm anent d isp o sa l o f hazardous w aste  o r th e  long -te rm  e ffe c ts  o f a c id  
ra in , it m ay p ro ve  d iffic u lt fo r th e  p la in tiff to  d isco ve r an  in d iv id u a lise d  re sponsib le  
p a rty  and  e ve n  if he d o e s  so it he  m ay not a b le  to  lin k  its  s p e c ific  a c ts  w ith  th e  
in c id e n t w h ich  con tribu te d  to  th e  g lo b a l dam age . F u rth e rm o re , th e  s itu a tio n  w here  
th e  lia b le  p a rty  m ay in th e  m e a n tim e  have becom e in s o lv e n t w ill a lso  m ake it a lm o s t 
im p o ss ib le  fo r th e  p la in tiff to  be a d e q u a te ly  com pensa ted  fo r  th e  dam age su ffe re d .
A ll th e s e  s itua tion s co u ld  b e  adequately d e a lt w ith  un d e r a  p re -e s ta b lish e d  
co m p e n sa tio n  schem e w h ich  w o u ld  fund  the  re sto ra tio n  o f th e  dam aged e n v iro n m e n t 
o r pay th e  requ ired  co m p e n sa tio n  costs. U su a lly  su ch  com pensa tion  fu n d s a re  
m a in ta ine d  b y  taxes or c o n trib u tio n s  im posed on  th e  eco n o m ic  opera tors m o s t c lo s e ly  
co n n e c te d  w ith  the  env ironm en ta l dam age  in question . T h e  schem e w ou ld  u su a lly  lin k  
th e  fund  co n trib u tio n s  to  th e  p o te n tia l th a t each e conom ic  op e ra to r has fo r  caus ing  
p o llu tio n , s in c e  th is  w ould  induce  m o s t po ten tia l p o llu te rs  to  a vo id  any dam age  in th e  
firs t p la ce  a n d  it w ou ld  c o rre c tly  im p le m e n t the "p o llu te r p a ys " p rin c ip le . In  fa c t, if th is  187
187 See paragraph  10 o f the  E xp lana to ry M em orandum  and a rtic le  1 1 ^2  o f th e  
A m ended  P roposa l
188 S ee 2 .1 .5  iii) of the G reen  P a p e r
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p rin c ip le  is  respected, th e  a llo ca tio n  o f p o ten tia l lia b ility  costs  am ong th e  s e v e ra l 
o p e ra to rs  o f a  specific  e conom ic  s e c to r leads to  a n  e ffe c tiv e  in te rn a lisa tio n  o f th e se  
co sts .
A s  th e  G reen Paper c o rre c tly  s tressed , in d iv id u a l lia b ility  is  extended in to  a  m ore  
c o lle c tiv e  fo rm  o f a llo ca tio n  o f re sp o n s ib ility  w hich is  re s ta te d  in  a "p rin c ip le  o f sh a re d  
re s p o n s ib ility  fo r the im p a c t o f m u ltip le  a c ts" 189 190. S uch c o lle c tiv is a tio n  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  m ay be ju s tifie d  in  se ve ra l w ays, fo r  exam ple  th e  p o s s ib ility  
th a t c e rta in  lia b ility  costs ca n  be  b e tte r supported  b y a  g ro u p  o f p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  
th a n  by o n e  o f its  in d iv id u a l m em bers. A no ther reason  fo r  conside rin g  th is  sys te m  
p re fe ra b le  to  a  c iv il lia b ility  system  is  its  fin a n c ia l a b ility  to  com pensa te  o r re s to re  any 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age in a  m ore speedy and less co s tly  w a y. N e ve rthe le ss, s e v e ra l 
q u e s tio n s  h a ve  been le ft open  re g a rd in g  the  s tru c tu re  o f su ch  a  system , fo r e xa m p le  
w h e th e r th e  use o f the  funds to  th e  resto ra tion  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t sh o u ld  be  
co n tro lle d  a n d  by whom .
5,4.10. Conclusion
T h e  im p a c t o f th e  proposed  D ire c tiv e , if  it is  a p p ro ve d  in  its  cu rre n t s ta tu s , is  
lik e ly  to  le a d  th e  producer to  a  c a re fu l cho ice  o f th e  c a rrie rs  and d ispose rs  o f h is  
w a s te , w h ich  w ill resu lt in  th e  w a ste  d isposa l m a rke t be ing  m a in ly  reduced to  th e  
la rg e r o p e ra to rs  . It is p ro bab le  th a t, th e  sm a lle r o p e ra to rs  w ill no t be a b le  to  re s is t 
th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f th is  c iv il lia b ility  re g im e  , s ince  e ith e r th e y  w ill be p o te n tia lly  lia b le
189 S ee  p o in t o f th e  G reen P aper;
190 S ee  A n d re w  B ryce , "C o n tro l o f w a ste , e x is ting  ru le s  a n d  requ irem en ts  and th e  
p roposed  D ire c tiv e  on C iv il L ia b ility  o n  W a ste " in EC E n v iro n m e n t and P lann ing  Law , 
C h a p te r 9 , w h o  considers th a t th e  p ro b a b le  im p a ct o f th is  p ro p o sa l w ill b e  a  m o re  
c a re fu l s e le c tio n  o f ca rrie rs  and d isp o se rs  by th e  p ro d u ce rs , the  in cre a se  in  
c o n tra c tu a l a rrangem en ts  lik e ly  to  e n su re  th a t a dequ a te  in d e m n itie s  e x is t fo r th e  
p ro d u ce r o n e  w aste  leaves h is  p la n t and fin a lly  th e  lia b ility  o f w a ste -d isp o sa l 
co m p a n ie s  w ill co n tin u e  fo r a  to o  le n g th y  lim ita tio n  p e rio d ;
1 1 0
CH A PTER 5
COMMUNITY LAW
111
fo r  an u n lim ite d  a m oun t o f dam ages o r the  in su ra b ility  o f such dam ages w ill im pose  
on  th e m  unreason ab le  co s ts  .
H o w e ve r, co n s id e rin g  th e  tim e  th is  p roposal is  be ing  taken  to  a p p ro ve  and th e  
d iffic u ltie s  it is e ncoun te ring , it is  m ore than lik e ly  th a t th is  sp e c ific  D ire c tive  w ill n o t 
be  a d o p te d  b u t w ill b e  subsum ed in a  m ore rad ica l and overa ll p ro p o sa l fo r  a  
D ire c tive  on  L ia b ility  fo r E n v ironm en ta l D am age in G e n e ra l 19 92 193. The G reen  P a p e r 
th u s  re p re se n ts  the  c u rre n t s ta g e  o f th e  d iscussion reg a rd in g  env iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  in  
E urope , fro m  w h ich  e m erges th e  pre ference fo r a  g e n e ra l reg im e in s te a d  o f p a rtia l 
re g u la tio n  o f lia b ility  fo r  en v iro n m e n ta l dam age. F u rthe rm ore , it recogn ise s the  c iv il 
lia b ility  sys te m  as h a v in g  an im p o rta n t en forcem en t fu n c tio n  in the  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t, w h ile  a lso  show ing  se ve ra l o f its  lim ita tio n s  w h ich  c a ll fo r o th e r fo rm s o f 
c o m p e n s a tio n .
F in a lly , it conc lude s th a t it w ou ld  be desirab le  to  co m b in e  the  "s tre n g th s  o f a 
lia b ility  re g im e  w ith  th e  ad va n ta g e s o f a  com pensa tion  system " , p ropos in g  an 
in te g ra te d  approach to  a  e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  syste m . B rie fly , th e  G reen P a p e r 
p roposes a  s tric t lia b ility  syste m  supp lem ented by a  com p lem en ta ry  co m p e n sa tio n  
fu n d . In  o th e r w ords, dam ages th a t cou ld  be re la te d  to  th e  p o llu tin g  a c ts  o f a  s p e c ific  
p o llu te r w o u ld  be  sued fo r  un d e r c iv il lia b ility , and  th o se  dam ages fo r w h ich  p a ym e n t 
is  im p o ss ib le  w ou ld  be  co m p e n sa te d  fo r by a  p re -e s ta b lish e d  com pensa tion  fund.
O n th e  one hand, th is  in te g ra te d  lia b ility  reg im e w o u ld  seek com pensa tion  u n d e r 
c iv il lia b ility  law s on ly  w h e n  th e  d am age  cou ld  b e  c a u sa lly  lin ke d  to  a  s in g le  p a rty . O n  
th e  o th e r hand, se ve ra l co m p e n sa tio n  funds, sp e c ific  lor e ach  industry  secto r, w o u ld  
be  se t u p  in  o rde r to  c o v e r fo r a ll dam ages and th e re b y  in te rn a lise  a ll p o llu tio n  co s ts
191 S ee W ilk in so n , pp. 130;
192 S ee p o in t 1/1 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t o f th e  "Report on Preventing and 
Remedying Environmental Damage" from the Committee on the Environment Public 
Health and Consumer Protection, 8 /4 /94 , Doc E N \R R \250 \25 0373 , A3 - 0232 /94 ;
193 S ee p o in t 4 .2 . o f th e  G reen  P aper;
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194. A m ong  th e  m any p rob lem s th a t co u ld  be re so lve d  w ith  su ch  a  co m b ina tio n , one  
o f th e  m o s t im p o rta n t is th a t th e  ne e d  fo r re tro a c tive  a p p lic a tio n  to  duty co m p e n sa te  
fo r p a s t d a m a g e  w ou ld  be a vo id e d . 194
194 S e e  a m ong  o the rs, R ose, J u lia n , ■Civil Liability", in E n v iro n m e n t S cience  and 




6 .1 .  In t r o d u c t io n
i
It sh o u ld  n o t be  fo rg o tte n  th a t, d e sp ite  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f th e  C om m un ity lia b ility  
la w  in s tru m e n ts  th a t h a ve  been  a n a lyse d , th a t s e ve ra l E uropean co u n trie s  are  n o t 
su b je c t to  C om m un ity  re g u la tio n . F o r exam ple , a s  a  so u rce  o f po ten tia l tra n s fro n tie r 
p o llu tio n , C e n tra l and E aste rn  E u ro p e  m ay d e ve lo p  d a n g e ro u s ly  in the  ye a rs  to  com e 
and the  e ffe c ts  o f such d e ve lo p m e n t on the  E uropean en v iro n m e n t sh o u ld  n o t be 
ig no red  1 . In fa c t, d u e  to  th e ir  p o litic a l and e co n o m ica l tra n sfo rm a tio n , these  
co u n trie s  m ay u n fo rtu n a te ly  be  le ss  dem anding  in re la tio n  to  the  in s ta lla tio n  and 
fu n c tio n in g  o f the  tra d itio n a l p o llu tin g  in dustries  2. B ecause  th is  cause o r m ay 
th re a te n  to  cause  dam age in  a n o th e r coun try, to  a ch ie ve  an  e ffic ie n t p ro te c tio n  o f th e  
e n v iro n m e n t any fu tu re  le g a l in s tru m e n t should  app ly  to  th e  la rgest num ber o f S ta tes 
poss ib le .
1 S ee  "Environmental Liabilities -  Dirty Legacy'' in  T he  E conom ist, S ep tem ber 18 th - 
2 4 th  1993, p p . 92  w hich re fe r to  th e  tendency o f the  fo rm e r com m unist co u n trie s  to  
sp end  th e ir  lim ite d  resources o n  c lean in g  up o ld  s ite s  to  fa c ilita te  fu tu re  s e llin g  
in s te a d  o f u s in g  th e  m oney to  p re v e n t new  p o llu tio n ;
2 S ee G iandom e n ico  M a jone , "Deregulation or re-regulation: Policy making in the 
EEC since the Single Act,in  E U I W orking  P aper S P S  n2 93/2, e x p lic itin g  th e  
p ro b le m s o f so c ia l dum p ing  and  co m p e titive  d e re g u la tio n  under w h ich  th e  co u n trie s  
re fe rre d  to  m ay a tte m p t to  g a in  advantages b y  low ering  th e  le ve l o f re g u la to ry  
co n s tra in ts ;
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The im p o rta n ce  o f an In te rn a tio n a l T re a ty  th a t w o u ld  h a ve  a b roader g e o g ra p h ica l 
sco p e  th a n  th e  one  o f any C o m m u n ity  law  in s tru m e n t is  th u s  c le a r. U ntil now , o n ly  a  
few  in te rn a tio n a l lega l in s tru m e n ts  estab lish  a  sys te m  o f s tric t lia b ility  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age 3, nam e ly  th e  1989 B asle  C o n ve n tio n  on the  C o n tro l o f 
T ra n sb o u n d a ry  M ovem ents o f H a za rd o u s  W aste a nd  th e ir D isposa l, the  In te rn a tio n a l 
M a ritim e  O rg a n isa tio n  In itia tiv e  on L ia b ility  and C o m p e n sa tio n  in  connection  w ith  th e  
C a rria g e  o f H azardous and N o x io u s  S ubstances by S ea  4 and th e  1989 G e n e va  
C o n ve n tio n  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r D a m a g e  caused d u rin g  th e  C a rriage  o f D angerous 
G oods by R oad , R ail and In la n d  N a v ig a tio n  V e s s e ls .
N e ve rth e le ss , it w as s till m iss in g  a  T re a ty  w h ich  s p e c ific a lly  concerned its e lf w ith  
e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  and re g u la te d  it  in  m ore g e n e ra l te rm s  and such a  tre a ty  w as 
a d op te d  b y th e  C ouncil o f E u rope  a  fe w  d a ys  be fo re  th e  G re e n  P aper being p re se n te d  
by th e  EEC C om m ission .
6.2. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION
T he  C o n ve n tio n  on C iv il L ia b ility  fo r  D am age R e su ltin g  fro m  A c tiv itie s  D angerous 
to  th e  E n v iro n m e n t5 has been open fo r  s ig n a tu re  s in c e  th e  1 o f June  1993 6, no t o n ly
3 A cco rd in g  to  A lexand re  K iss, "Present limits to the enforcement of state 
responsibility for environmental damagef, in In te rn a tio n a l R esponsib ility  fo r  
E n v iro n m e n ta l H arm , C h a p te r 1, th e  m a in  so lu tio n s  a d o p te d  by S tate  P a rtie s  to  
s e ve ra l in te rn a tio n a l tre a tie s  a re  s tr ic t lia b ility , th e  pe rson  lia b le  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l 
dam age  is  d e te rm in e d  by a  le g a l fic tio n , th e  co m p e te n t c o u rt is  designa ted  and th e  
e n fo rce m e n t o f th e  fo re ig n  c o u rt d e c is io n s  is  ensu red ; fo r a  fu rth e r b rie f d e sc rip tio n  
on th e  in te rn a tio n a l ag reem en ts th a t h a ve  been co n c lu d e d  o n  lim ita to n  o f d isch a rg e s  
endagering  th e  e n v iro n m e n t see  P e te r W e tte rs te in , "Recent Trends in the 
Development of International Civil Liability, in  N o rd ic  J o u rn a l o f In te rn a tio n a l Law , 
1991 , vo l. 6 0 , rf*  1 -2 , pp. 51;
4 S e e  IM O , 1 0 /1 0 /8 9 ;
5 H e re a fte r "th e  C onven tio n ";
6 F o r a  d e ta ile d  d e scrip tio n  o f th e  p ro ce d u re  w hich led  to  th e  adop tio n  o f th e  p re se n t 
te x t o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  see Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe Convention, 
G e n e ra l In tro d u c tio n ;
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to  the  m e m b e rs  o f the  C o u n c il o f E urope but a lso  to  o th e r non-m em ber S ta tes  7. A s  
m e n tio n e d  above , p rob lem s o f tra n s fro n tie r p o llu tio n  a re  n o t exclus ive  to  th e  M em ber 
S ta te s  an d  th e re fo re  th e  e n la rg e m e n t o f the  g e o g ra p h ica l scope o f such  a le g a l 
in s tru m e n t is  considered  necessary fo r the  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  European and o f th e  
g lo b a l e n v iro n m e n t.
T he  re la tio n  betw een th is  C on ve n tio n  and any p o te n tia l EEC D ire c tive  on  th e  
sam e m a tte r ra ises se ve ra l in te re s tin g  questions, fo r e xa m p le  w h e the r the  m ore  
e n v iro n m e n t-frie n d ly  EEC  M em ber S ta tes w ill u n ila te ra lly  ra tify  the  C onven tio n  and 
im p le m e n t it, instead o f w a itin g  fo r  th e  "dream ed" EEC D ire c tiv e  8. A t th is  s tage, the  
C om m un ity  has to  choose, as so o n  as possib le , be tw een  ra tify in g  the  sa id  C onven tion  
o r a d o p tin g  its  ow n D ire c tiv e  o n  th e  sub ject 9. F u rth e rm o re , no t o n ly  does th e  
C o n ve n tio n  s p e c ifica lly  e xp ress th a t it is open  fo r s ig n a tu re  and subsequen t 
ra tific a tio n  b y  th e  EEC its e lf10 b u t even  th e  G reen  P aper g iv e s  serious co n s id e ra tio n  
to  th is  p o s s ib ility .
6.2.1. Relationship w ith the EEC legal system
i C o n s id e rin g  th a t th e  EEC  C om m iss ion  w as d ire c tly  in v o lv e d  in th e  n e g o tia tio n  o f 
th is  C o n ve n tio n , it seem s th a t th e  la tte r has m ore  ch a n ce s  o f su rv iva l th a n  th e  EEC  
d ra ft D ire c tiv e . In  fa c t, e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  la w  in  E u ro p e  is  e vo lv in g  in  tw o w ays:
7 The  C o n ve n tio n  is  a lso  open fo r  s igna tu re  to  EEC  M e m b e r S tates, to  co u n trie s  o f 
A E LE , to  th e  PEC O S S ta tes a n d  to  o ther n o n -m e m b e r S ta tes o f th e  C o u n cil o f 
E urope , th e o re tica lly  u n til the  31 o f January 1995;
8 S ee J u lia n  Rose, "C iv il L ia b ility ", in  E nvironm en ta l S c ie n ce  and T echno lo gy, v o i. 
2 7 , n2 5 ,1 9 9 3 , pp. 784;
9 A s  it w ill be  fu rth e r co n c lu d e d , th e  C om m ission  w ill h a ve  to  pursue a  c o s t-b e n e fit 
a n a lys is  to  decide  w he the r to  ra tify  the  re fe rre d  C o n ve n tio n  o r to  a d o p t its  ow n 
in s tru m e n t; see also G ia n d o m e n ico  M ajone, "Deregulation or re-regulation: Policy 
Making in the EEC since the Single Marker:
10 S ee a rtic le  32^1  o f th e  C o n ve n tio n ;
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o n  one s id e  th e  EC C om m iss ion  is  h a v in g  d iffic u ltie s  w ith  the  adoption  o f its  d ra ft 
D ire c tive  and  on  th e  o th e r s id e  th e  p re se n t C on ve n tio n  has a lready been adop ted  by 
th e  C o u n c il o f E urope a n d  is  open  fo r  s ig n a tu re .
T ra d itio n a lly , th e  ra tific a tio n  o f  in te rn a tio n a l tre a tie s  b y  th e  EC M em ber S ta te s  
has b e e n  lim ite d  by th e  co m m o n  ru le s  th a t h a ve  a lre a d y  been adopted  b y th e  
C o m m u n ity . In  o th e r w o rd s , if  th e  C o m m un ity  has a lre a d y  prom u lga ted  a  law  o n  a 
ce rta in  s u b je c t, its  M em ber S ta te s  n o  lo n g e r have th e  rig h t to  negotia te  in d e p e n d e n tly  
on  the  s a m e  sub ject. T h e y  no lo n g e r have th e  rig h t, e ith e r acting in d iv id u a lly  o r 
c o lle c tiv e ly , to  unde rtake  in te rn a tio n a l o b lig a tio n s  w ith  th ird  coun tries w h ich  m ay 
a ffe c t th o s e  com m on ru le s  11. E ve n  if  th is  p re -e m p tio n  system  is s till p re d o m in a n t, 
n o t o n ly  h a s th e  C om m un ity  n o t y e t p ro m u lg a te d  a e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  reg im e b u t 
even  if  it  had  done  so  th e  C o n ve n tio n  p ro v id e s  th a t in  th e ir m utual re la tio n s . EC 
M em ber S ta te s  sh a ll a p p ly  EC ru le s  o n  th e  su b je c t e xce p t w here  these have n o t y e t 
been a d o p te d  12. T h is  m eans th a t in  th e  re la tio n s  am ong EC M em ber S ta te s , th e  
C o n ve n tio n  m e re ly  fills  th e  g a p s  w h e re  th e  C o m m u n ity  has not ye t adop te d  any 
com m on ru le s  and w here  it adds to  rig h ts  g ive n  b y  th e  P a rties to  th e  C on ve n tio n  
in te rn a l la w .
N e ve rth e le ss , in th e ir re la tio n s  w ith  th ird  co u n trie s  th e  EC M em ber S ta te s  w ill 
have  to  a p p ly  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  its e lf u n le ss  th e ir in te rn a l law  a n d /o r 
in te rn a tio n a l tre a tie s  by w h ic h  th e y  a re  b ound  a re  m ore  fa v o u ra b le  to  th e  "pe rson  w ho  
su ffe re d  th e  dam age” . In  o th e r w o rd s , basing its e lf on  a rtic le  609 o f th e  E uropean 
C o n ve n tio n  o f H um an R ig h ts , th e  C o n ve n tio n  d o e s  no t lim it o r de roga te  any o f the
11 S ee W ilk in s o n , pp. 134 ; see a ls o  C ase 2 2 /70 , Commission v. Council in E C J o f 
3 1 /3 /7 1 , "th e  A E T R  ca se ";
12 S ee a rtic le  252/2 o f th e  C o n ve n tio n ;
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victim's rights given by the Parties's internal law or applicable international 
agreements13.
Therefore, no conflict should be feared between the Convention and the EC legal 
regime, also because the Convention bases itself on existing EC law and provides for 
automatic amendment of its provisions when the EC legal instruments it refers to are 
modified 14 15.
6.2.2. The Relationship with other International Instruments
6.2.2.1.__ The Brussels Convention
The C o n ve n tio n  in q u e stio n  co n ta in s  seve ra l p ro v is io n s  regard ing co m p e te n ce , 
re co g n itio n  and e xecu tion  o f se n te n ce s th a t in  som e a sp e c ts  are  p a ra lle l to  th o se  
co n ta in e d  in  th e  B russels C o n ve n tio n  YS. A lthoug h  th e  B ru sse ls  C onven tio n  is  n o t 
th o ro u g h ly  d iscussed in th is  w ork its  im portance is  a b so lu te  and  it is  assuring  to  know  
th a t its  p ro v is io n s  are a p p lica b le  w h e n  an EC o r E FTA  M e m b e r S ta te  a re  in  question .
&ZZJL__ other International Instruments
F u rth e rm o re , the  C o n ve n tio n  sp e c ifica lly  p ro v id e s  th a t it sh a ll n o t app ly  to  
dam age re su ltin g  from  a  tra n s p o rt operation o r fro m  a  n u c le a r inc iden t th a t is  d u ly  
co ve re d  b y  in te rn a tio n a l o r in te rn a l law  and nor s h a ll it a p p ly  w here  it is in co m p a tib le  
w ith  th e  ru le s  o f the  a p p lica b le  law  re la ting  to  w o rkm e n 's  com pensa tion  o r so c ia l 
se cu rity  sch e m e s 16. In fa c t, s im ila r to  th e  EEC  d ra ft D ire c tiv e  17, th e  C o n ve n tio n  
s p e c ific a lly  exc ludes fro m  its  sco p e  o f a p p lica tio n  th e  d a m a g e  caused b y a  n u c le a r
13 S ee  a rtic le  2 5 ^1  o f th e  C o n ve n tio n ;
14 S ee  a rtic le  312 o f the  C o n ve n tio n ;
15 S ee  a rtic le  192 to  242 o f the  C o n ve n tio n ;
16 S ee  a rtic le  42/1 to  3 o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  and p o in t 45 o f th e  E xp lana to ry  R eport;
17 S ee a rtic le  12/2 o f the  EEC  d ra ft D irective ;
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substance which is covered by the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 and the Vienna 
Convention of 21 May 1963 18.
6.2,3. Scope ofJ_he Convention
in comparison with the EEC draft Directive, the Convention has a much larger 
scope since it envisages every kind of pollution resulting from dangerous activities. In 
other words, the intention of the Convention is to ensure adequate compensation for 
damage resulting from activities that are generally dangerous to the environment.
Furthermore, it applies not only to claims for compensation but also aims at 
preventing an incident and reinstating the environment and therefore it establishes 
this system of strict liability permitting few grounds of exemption.
¡LISA*__Definition of Environment
The Convention recognised the importance of defining the notion of Environment 
in order to facilitate the compensation for damage to persons and property and also to 
extend such compensation for damage to the environment19. Therefore, in response 
to the usual criticism made that the legal definitions of environment are too narrow, it 
provides a non-exhaustive list of resources to be included in this definition.
This list includes not only both abiotic and biotic natural resources, such as air, 
water, soil, fauna and flora but also their mutual interaction such as the habitat and 
the ecological balances. It further includes the cultural heritage, meaning the 
historical and artistic property that represent the environment created by Man within
18 See article 42/2 a) of the Convention;
19 See point 42 of the Explanatory Report;
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the natural environment, and the landscape in its cultural and natural characteristic 
aspects 20.
G.2.3.2. Tvoes of Dangerous Activities to be covered bv the Convention
In broad terms, dangerous activities refers to every activity performed at a 
professional level involving dangerous substances, genetically modified organisms or 
micro-organisms and operations concerning waste 21. The "professional level" means 
that the Convention shall not apply to domestic activities but only covers professional 
activities i.e. as industrial, commercial and some agricultural or scientific activities 22.
The first formal difference between the draft Directive and the Convention is that 
the latter establishes liability with respect to a dangerous activity and not by referring 
to waste 23. In fact, waste is not defined in the Convention, thereby avoiding the two- 
tier liability regime of the EEC draft Directive where only hazardous waste gives rise 
to liability.
Although dangerous activities are defined by referring to "dangerous substances", 
the above mentioned distinction still has some advantages. First, by accepting that 
environmental damage can be caused both by the polluting substance and by the use 
made of it, the Convention reference to dangerous activity establishes distinct liability 
regimes, according to activity of the person dealing with the polluting substance.
In other words, the Convention seems to be of the same opinion as the European 
and Social Committee, who, considering that the liability regimes should be different 
according to the uses made of the wastes, suggested that the EEC draft Directive 
should distinguish between recyclable and non-recyclable waste 24. Likewise, the
20 See article 2^ 10 of the Convention;
21 See article 2^ 1 a) of the Convention;
22 See point 19 of the Convention;
23 See article 12 and 2^/1 b) of the Draft Directive;
24 See point 4 of the European and Social Committee Opinion;
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Convention recognised the importance of a distinction based on the uses made of a 
polluting substance and established a separate regime to regulate the permanent 
deposit of waste 25, and another regime for the other polluting activities26.
6.2.3.2.1. Waste disposal sites
Therefore, the operation of a waste disposal site is considered a specific type of 
dangerous activity, since such an operation concerns the permanent deposit of waste, 
which will not be recycled, indefinitely or for a very long period 27 28. The temporary 
storage of waste is covered by including in the dangerous activities the operation of 
an installation for the "incineration, treatment, handling and recycling of waste" . 
These installations or sites are set out in a non-exhaustive list in Annex II; this list 
covers all the common treatment options such as incineration, sewerage treatment 
works, chemical recovery, recycling, etc.
5.2.3.2.2. Genetically Modified Organisms and Micro-organisms
Finally, the "production, culturing, handling, storage, use, destruction, disposal, 
release or any other operation dealing with" genetically modified organisms and 
micro-organisms which pose a significant risk for man, the environment or propertyis 
also considered a dangerous activity . These two categories of organisms are then 
defined 29, which definitions are based on the Council Directive 90/219/EEC 30, 
about the contained use of genetically modified organisms, and on Council Directive
25 See article 72 of the Convention and point 22 of the Explanatory Report;
26 See Wilkinson, David, 'The Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment: a Comparative 
Review", in European Environmental Law Review, May 1993, pp. 130;
27 See article 2^ 2 d) and point 21 of the Explanatory Report;
28 See article 2^ 1 of the Convention;
29 See article 29/3 and 4 of the Convention;
30 See Council Directive 90/219 of 23rd April 1990 in OJEC L117/1 ;
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90/220/EEC 3t, which regulates the deliberate release into the environment of 
genetically modified organisms.
6.2.3.2.3. Dangerous Substances
The Convention defines dangerous substances using three different methods:
a) a first part sets the general criteria according to which the 
substance or preparation with properties that pose a significant risk for man, the 
environment or property, are considered dangerous ;
b) a second method specifically establishes which types of properties 
are considered to pose the risk mentioned in the first part, according to the criteria 
referred to in the EEC Directive 67/548 on the Assessment, Classification, Packaging 
and Labelling of Dangerous Substances 31 23. Although the Convention submits the 
determination of the said properties to the referred EEC Directive it also gives a non 
exhaustive list of properties, by considering that when a substance is explosive, 
oxidising, extremely flammable, highly flammable, flammable, very toxic, toxic, 
harmful, corrosive, irritant, sensitising, carcinogenic, mutagenic, toxic for reproduction 
or dangerous for the environment it constitutes a risk to man, the environment and 
property 34.
31 See Council Directive 90/220 of 23rd April 1990 in OJEC L117/5;
32 See article 2e/2 a) of the Convention and point 24 of the Explanatory Report;
33 See supra note and Annex I, part A of the Convention; Council Directive 
67/548/EEC of 27 June 1967, in OJEC L196/, on the Approximation of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the classification, packaging and 
labelling of dangerous substances as amended for the 7th time by Directive 
92/32/EEC of 30 April 1992, in OJCE L154/1 and as adapted to technical progress for 
the 16th time by Directive 92/37/EEC of 30 April 1992, OJEC L154/30;
34 See article 2^ 2 a) of the Convention;
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b) the third part provides that all substances specified in the non- 
exhaustive list of Annex I, part B 35 36, and preparations which contain one or more of 
the listed substances, are dangerous substances æ;
Although these two final methods ensure a desirable degree of certainty, the 
operators will have to bear in mind that the three methods are not mutually 
exhaustive. In considering whether a certain substance is dangerous, one shall 
analyse if it is included in the list mentioned in Annex I, part B and if not, whether the 
substance contains properties mentioned in the second method. Finally, if this is not 
the case, substances and preparations will still be classed as dangerous if they pose a 
significant risk to man, the environment or property, thereby fulfilling the general 
criteria 37 389.
One should note that here, as with the genetically modified organisms or micro­
organisms, the Convention constructs its liability regime by effectively using an 
existing EEC regulatory instrument3S. In this case, the advantage of doing so is that it
AAavoids the difficulties in approving substance lists, such as delays or the agreement 
with future amendments 40.
35 See Annex I, part B of the Convention; the list has been modified and extended by 
Annexes I and II of the Directive 92/37/EEC but it is not reproduced in the Official 
Journal;
36 See article 2^ 2 b) of the Convention;
37 See point 26 of the Explanatory Report; For a very interesting comment on this 
final praesumption iuris et de iure that some substances pose a significant risk see W.
J. Ouwerkerk, "Environmental Liability from the perspective of an operator: Council of 
Europe Draft Convention on Civil Liability in Transnational Libility and Insurance, Part 
C, Chapter 3, considering that such general presumption is in conflict with the law in 
Paracelsus (1493-1541): "All substances are poisons; there is none which is not 
poison. The right dose differentiates a poison and a remedy";
38 See Wilkinson, pp. 131 ;
39 See the evolution of the Council Directive 76/464/EEC, known as the dangerous 
substances framework directive which did not refer to a previously established 
substance list;
40 See article 31s of the Convention which provides for an automatic incorporation of 
the amendments made to the Annexes of the referred Directives;
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6.2.4. Liability Principles
SJAJ.i__ Strict liability or fault liability
Unlike the EEC Proposal, the Convention only states that the explorer is 
responsible for the damages he caused without explicitly establishing that such 
liability shall be strict. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Explanatory Memorandum of 
the Convention defends a system of strict liability in order to guarantee an adequate 
compensation of the damages 41 and to encourage the operator to adopt every useful 
measure to avoid any future damages 42. On the other hand, as does the EEC 
Proposal, the Convention also links operational liability to civil liability as will be seen 
next.
&2A2*___Responsible party
Contrary to the EEC Proposal, in the Convention the primary responsibility lies 
not with the producer of waste but with the operator of the dangerous activity or of the 
waste disposal site 43. In other words, liability for a dangerous activity attaches to the 
operator who is defined as any person, of a public or private nature, in control of a 
dangerous activity 44f which definition seems broad enough to cover the activities of 
any individuals or body, whether corporate or not, including the State and its 
subdivisions 45.
Like lender liability, the crucial concept of this definition is the notion of control 
which shall exist when the person is effectively and globally in charge of the activity, 
for example if it has the legal, economical and/or financial power to determine how
41 See Explanatory Report to the Convention, point &7;
42 See Explanatory Report, point & 51;
43 See article 6 and 7 of the Convention;
44 See article 2 of the Convention;
45 See article 29/6 of the Convention and point 32 of the Explanatory Report;
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the dangerous activity is carried out. Therefore, it is the employer that shall be 
considered the operator and the courts can use the national administrative systems, 
responsible for the licensing of most dangerous activities around Europe and identify 
in advance the person that shall be held responsible for the licensed activity 46.
Nevertheless, as it does in relation to the producer of waste, the Convention also 
justifies the attachment of liability to the operator because he is best able to avoid the 
damage or limit its extent. Furthermore, if it is the operator's activity that caused the 
damage, channelling the liability to him guarantees an effective application of the 
"polluter pays" principle, since he will transmit this financial burden to the price of his 
products or services 47
Once more, the Convention shows its affinities with CERCLA 48 by channelling 
the liability to the owner or explorer of the waste site in question 49. in fact, the United 
States CERCLA legislation considers all past and present owners or operators of 
certain facilities potentially liable for clean up costs. However, the Convention differs 
from the Draft Directive and also from CERCLA in one specific aspect, namely in the 
distinction of regimes according to whether the dangerous activity is current or has 
ceased and the situation where such activity is the permanent deposit of waste 50.
On the one hand, in relation to dangerous activities, the liability is channelled to 
its explorer at the moment when the incident causing the pollution occurred 51. Oh the 
other, as far as the site of permanent deposit of waste is concerned the liability is
46 See point 30 of the Explanatory Report
47 See point 29 of the Explanatory Report;
48 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
pub. L96-510, 94 State 267 (1980), codified at 42 USC SS 9601-9657 1982 Supp. IV 
1986;
49 See Green Paper, pp. 31;
50 See infra paragraph on retroactive liability; see also Wilkinson, pp. 132;
51 See article 62/1 of the Convention;
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channelled to the owner of the site at the moment when the damage appears or to the 
last owner if the site has been closed in the meantime 52.
6*2A.3.__ Lender liability
Unlike the Draft Directive or the Green Paper, the Convention implicitly refers to 
a secured lender exemption, although under relatively tight conditions. In fact, in 
Explanatory Report's comments it is specified that any outside person "who has made 
it possible or facilitated a dangerous activity, for example by lending funds for 
investment, may not be considered to be the operator, unless he exercises the 
effective control over the activity in question"53.
This may well mean that the Convention tends to protect the banks and other 
lending institutions from being held liable for their borrowers polluting activity, which 
they do not control. Nevertheless, it remains questionable to what extent such 
persons are considered to be "in effective control" over the activity in question, which 
doubt is only clarified in relation to creditors holding collateral over certain equipment 
In fact, the final part of the comment states that those "creditors who exercise their 
rights by virtue of sureties held on equipment required for the dangerous activity" are 
not its operators and therefore shall not be considered liable for the damage caused 
by the polluting activity.
Although such a conditioned exemption seems to include both the shareholders 
and the creditors it is difficult to conceive a case where these lenders could be 
considered operators according to the meaning given by the Convention.
6.2JA.__ Information right
52 See article 7^ 1 of the Convention;
53 See point 31 of the Explanatory Report;
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It is interesting to exmine the introduction of a right of access to environmental 
information basically similar to the provisions of the Council Directive on the Freedom 
of Access to Information on the Environment M. Nevertheless, the Convention’s 
information right is not limited to the information in the hands of public authorities, as 
it is in the EEC draft Directive, but it also regards the information in the possession of 
the "operator", that is, the person who is in control of the dangerous activity 54 5. 
Furthermore, the Convention contains no obligation to publish a periodic report on the 
state of the environment..
Although such a right is subject to several restrictions to be established by 
internal law, for example in the cases of information considered confidential or 
commercial secrets, it may prove helpful for the plaintiff to obtain the "specific 
information necessary to establish his right to a compensation" 56. In fact, the 
Convention establishes seven situations in which the right of access may be restricted 
under internal law, especially because it would affect the confidentiality of public 
proceedings, international relations and national defence, matters of public defence 
and which are currently under investigation, the confidentiality of personal data or the 
interests of the environment concerned 57 58.
In relation to information held by public authorities, any natural or legal person 
may request such information without having to demonstrate a specific interest or that 
a damage has been caused 5a. Nevertheless, such a request may be refused if it is 
manifestly unreasonable or formulated in too general a manner or if it involves 
unfinished documents or data or internal communications. This refusal must be
54 See Council Directive of the European Communities 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990, L 
158/56;
55 See article 16s of the Convention;
56 For the several circumstances in which the right of access may be restricted or 
refused see article 142/2 and 3 of the Convention;
57 See article 142/2 of the Convention;
58 See article 142/1 of the Convention and point 71 of the Explanatory Report;
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clearly funded and if the person requesting the information disagrees with its decision 
it may seek a judicial or administrative review according to his internal legal system
59
On the other hand, in relation to information held by the operator, the victim of 




,•? The Convention defines public authorities not in general terms but only in relation 
to the environmental information they possess and are required to provide. In this 
sense, public authorities are "any public administration of a Party at national, regional 
or local level with responsibilities" with the exception of bodies in a judicial and 
legislative capacity 61.
Nevertheless, the Convention does not specifically refer to the public authorities 
as potential parties in a law suit brought under its provisions. It seems that the 
standing of public authorities and of individual private parties is left to be decided by 
the Contracting Parties's internal law.
6.2.5.2. Environmental Associations
Although clearer than the Directive, the Convention seems to restrict the range of 
persons who may bring a legal action for environmental damage by limiting this 
possibility to the associations or foundations which have as their object the protection 59601
59 See article 142/4 and 5 of the Convention;
60 See article 16s of the Convention;
61 See article 13a of the Convention;
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of the environment and only as long as they satisfy any other conditions established 
by the internal law of the Contracting Party where the request is submitted 62 Such 
organisations may request the prohibition of an unlawful dangerous activity, which 
poses a grave threat of damage to the environment; and that the operator be ordered 
to take preventive or reinstating measures.
Furthermore, each Contracting Party may stipulate which judicial or 
administrative body shall receive such a request and it may also require that these 
organisations have their "registered seat or the effective centre of its activities" in 
their own territory 63. Nevertheless, each Party may make a declaration of reciprocity 
according to which those organisations having their seat and complying with the legal 
conditions of another Party shall also have the right to submit a request64.
____Remedies
The Convention is much clearer and more precise regarding which parties can 
sue for which remedies, in that it specifies the organisations that may sue to obtain an 
injunction or interdiction. As mentioned above, only certain organisations may submit 
a request to the courts to prohibit a dangerous activity, if said activity is unlawful and 
poses a grave threat of environmental damage. They may also request that the 
operator be ordered to take measures to prevent an accident and/or a damage or to 
undertake the necessary reinstating measures 65. Nevertheless, as in the EEC 
proposed Directive, these possibilities may in certain cases, be restricted by the 
internal law of the Contracting Party 66.
62 See article 182/! of the Convention;
63 See article 182/3 and 5 of the Convention;
64 See article 182/5 of the Convention and point 83 of the Explanatory Report;
65 See article 182/1 of the Convention and point 80 of the Explanatory Report;
66 See article 182/2 of the Convention;
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6.2.6.1. C om pensation  fo r  Im pairm ent to  th e Environm ent
Furthermore, the Convention also provides for the compensation for impairment 
to the environment, although it limits such compensation to the costs of measures of 
reinstatement "undertaken or to be undertaken". This concept of measures of 
reinstatement is of prime importance since such measures aim at restoring the 
situation of the environment to that existing before the damage, even when there is 
no damage to person or property 67.
>' In other words, measures of reinstatement are those measures taken within 
reasonable limits which aim at reinstating or restoring "the damaged and destroyed 
components of the environment" 68 69.When this reinstatement of the environment is 
not feasible, such measures consist instead in the "introduction of the equivalent to 
the damaged or destroyed components into the environment" .
Although it seems that loss of profit arising from impairment to the environment 
may be compensated for, the Convention does not provide for general 
indemnification for such impairment to the environment
Limitations of Liability
Contrary to the EEC position the Convention does not establish any type of 
financial limits or ceilings. In this particular aspect, the Convention totally differs from 
all the others international instruments which usually adopt certain financial limits
67 See point 39 of the Explanatory Report;60 For another type of distinction see Robert E. Godin," Theories o f compensation? in 
Liability and Responsibility: Essays in law and morals, according to which there are 
two kinds of compensation: means-replacing which provides people with the 
equivalent means for pursuing the same ends, and ends-displacing;
69 See article 2^ 8 of the Convention;
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regarded as essential in the agreement upon any conventional liability regime . 
Nevertheless, if any international convention on liability accepts limited liability it 
should also provide for flexible mechanisms for adjusting its limitations amounts, 
thereby avoiding constant decreases in the real value of compensation amounts due 
to inflation.
6.2.7. Burden of proof
€.2.7.1. Causa! link
Although the traditional discussion is the choice of strict or fault liability one of the 
most important aspects of a system of environmental liability remains the causal link 
between the incident and the damage. Contrary to the Draft Directive the Convention 
does not specify which burden of proof link shall be required to establish the causal 
link between the incident and the damage but only requires that certain risks shall be 
taken into account by the court. In fact, the Convention has almost created a 
presumption of causal link following the present trend to facilitate the plaintiff to prove 
the causality in question.
Therefore, the Convention orients the court towards pondering the evidence 
concerning the causal link between the polluting incident or the permanent deposit of 
waste and the damage by requiring the court to take into account the increased risks 
of causing such damage inherent to such dangerous activity. In other words, the 
Convention facilitates the plaintiff's burden of proving the causal link between the 
polluting incident and the damage he suffered, by establishing that the specific risks a 70
70 See again Peter Wetterstein, supra note , who not only analysis the 1976 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims but also confirms that in the 
maritime field it is common to limit liability even in those countries that have not 
acceded to a particular convention;
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certain dangerous activity poses in causing a specific type of damage should be duly 
considered71.
6.2.7.2. Jo in t an d  S ev era l liability
Contrary to the EEC position on the subject, the Convention does not generally 
establish joint and several liability between all the persons responsible for the 
environmental damage. In principle, only the operator who was in control of the 
dangerous activity at the time the polluting incident took place, will be held 
responsible for the damage caused 72
Notwithstanding this formulation of its strict liability system, the Convention 
established three specific situations in which several operators may be held jointly 
and severally liable. The first is when the incident which causes the damage consists 
of a continuous occurrence; the second is when the incident consists of a series of 
occurrences having the same origin. The operators successively exercising the 
control of the dangerous activity and those exercising such control at the time of any 
such occurrence, may be held jointly and severally liable 73. Finally, the third 
situation is when the damage results from several incidents which have occurred in 
several installations or sites, for example cases of synergistic pollution 74. In these 
situations, each operator of all such sites shall be held jointly and severally liable for 
the whole amount of the damage 7S. This means that the plaintiff may choose which 
operator to sue, but he still has to prove the damage, the occurrence of an incident in 
the installation of the operator as well as the causal link between this incident and all 
or part of that damage
71 See article 10s and point 63 of the Explanatory Report;
72 See article 6^ 1 of the Convention;
73 See article 62/2 and 3 of the Convention;
74 See point 64 of the Explanatory Report;
75 See article 11a of the Convention;
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In any of these cases, if the operator proves that the damage is divisible and that 
only part of the damage was or could have been caused during the period he 
controlled the activity, he shall only be liable for that part of the damage 76. On the 
other hand, if he can not provide such proof, he will be liable for the full amount of the 
damages to be paid but will be able to exercise all rights of recourse, available under 
internal law, against third parties, in particular against the producer of waste or other 
operators 77.
Such a provision clearly differentiates the Convention principle of joint and 
several liability from that proposed by the EEC draft Directive, since the latter does 
not specifically provide the possibility for the defendant to limit his liability to the part 
of damage caused by his waste 78. In the end, the Commission recognised in the 
Green Paper that such a joint and several liability rule has some disadvantages, 
namely the increase of contribution actions in the courts and the appearance of the 
deep pocket syndrome 79. It also suggested that these disadvantages could be fought 
by channelling liability in a previously established order and/or by forbidding the right 
of recourse from the other responsible parties. However, the present system seems 
more efficient in that it enables the operator to prove that only part of the damage has 
been or could have been caused by his activity.
6.2.8. Defences
In principle, the Convention tends to limit the exemptions from liability, in order to 
assure that the damages to which it applies are adequately compensated for. This
76 See article 62/2 and 3 of the Convention and point 52 of the Explanatory Report;
77 See article 62/5 of the Convention and point 54 of the Explanatory Report ;
78 See article 5s of the Amended Proposal for a Directive on Civil Liability for 
damages caused by waste;
79 See point 2.1.4. of the Green Paper and chapter 3, paragraph 5 b);
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trend may be considered too severe since, as in the EEC proposed Directive, the 
Convention does not provide for any financial ceilings and does not even enable the 
Contracting Parties to adopt such ceilings as an option.
However, since the Convention does not apply exclusively 80, it allows the person 
who suffered the damage to bring a claim for compensation under internal law and/or 
under applicable international agreements, if these are considered more favourable. 
Whereas this possibility embraces both the provisions existing before or adopted after 
the Convention entered into force, it is unclear whether the Contracting Parties may 
restrict the grounds of exemption 81 82.
6.2.8.1. Force Maleure
In situations of force m ajeure, the operator shall be exempted from liability if he
proves that the damage in question "was caused by an act of war, hostilities, civil war,
insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible
character", thereby adopting the classic definition of force majeure in international law 
82
This was also the definition adopted by the Parliament in the amendments 
suggested to the EEC proposed Directive, since it considered the definition given by 
the ECJ unsuitable for the field of environmental liability 83 84. Although this classic 
definition is usually criticised by the civil doctrine the internal disparities in the 
concept of force majeure demand a certain harmonisation. However, there are doubts 
as to whether another solution of a general definition complemented by concrete 
examples of force majeure would not be preferable M.
80 See article 252/1 of the Convention;
81 See point 61 of the Explanatory Report;
82 See article 82/a) of the Convention;
83 See Chapter 5 on Community law, point 6 b);
84 See Thieffrey;
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6.2.8 2. Fault o r  In terest o f  the in ju red  Party
Similar to the EEC proposed Directive, the Convention also provides for the 
reduction or disallowance of the defendant's liability, if the victim of the damage, or 
any person under his responsibility, has contributed to the damage 85. However, 
unlike the doubts raised by the text of the Directive 86, it is here necessary that the 
injured person, or the person under his responsibility, has by his own fault contributed 
to the damage. In other words, either the defendant proves that the faulty conduct of 
such persons has contributed to the damage or the court must, at its own discretion, 
demonstrate that fault
Another innovative exemption is given to the operator if he proves that the 
damage was caused "by a dangerous activity taken lawfully in the interests" of the 
victim and where it is considered reasonable to expose this victim to the risks of said 
dangerous activity 87. In this situation, it is not the fault but the interest of the injured 
person that exonerates the operator but thisconcept of interest must also raise some 
doubts regarding its possible interpretations; these doubts may be limited by the 
remaining conditions of exemption.
Admitting that this particular exemption is mainly concerned with those 
emergency cases or situations where the person who suffered the damage gave his 
consent to the dangerous activity, the courts must previously conclude for the 
fulfilment of certain prerequisites. First of all, the dangerous activity must have been 
lawful and the consent of the victim must have been real and unequivocal. Finally,
85 See article 9s of the Convention and point 62 of the Explanatory Report;
86 See chapter 3, paragraph D, 6/a);
87 See article We) of the Convention;
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the polluting action must be reasonable in relation to the risk incurred in the
Oftdangerous activity .
6 2.8.3. Contributory A cts o f  Third P arties
Another exemption similar to that proposed by the EEC draft Directive, is the one 
establishing that the operator shall not be liable if he proves that the damage was 
caused by an intentional act of a third party, despite the adequate safety measures 
taken by the operator 8 9. In other words, if a third party's intentional conduct is 
considered to have caused the damage the operator will not be held liable as long as 
that conduct is outside his control.
6 2.8.4. A uthorisation b v  Public A uthorities
Although the Convention only provides for exemptions to the operator's liability 
under very specific and limited conditions, it is clear that it is more "generous" in the 
defences it make available than the proposed EEC Directive. For example, by 
excluding the operator from liability if the damage "resulted necessarily from 
compliance with a specific order or compulsory measure of a public nature" 90, the 
Convention seems to exclude the complying operator from liability. According to this 
concept, why should an operator be held liable if he has strictly complied with the 
orders imposed by a public authority?
Nevertheless, the Convention did not go so far as the Green Paper which 
suggested that the public authorities that have granted a certain pollution permit 
should be held liable for the damage caused by the authorised operator,where the 
latter has fully complied with the limits set. The Convention does not state as to
88 See point 61 of the Explanatory Report;
89 See article 82/b) of the Convention;
90 See article 82/c) of the Convention;
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whether the public authority who issued the public order in question should be held 
liable instead of the operator who only followed its orders.
6.2.8,5,___Acceptable Level o f  Pollution
The Convention provides that damage caused by a tolerable level of pollution, 
determined in the light of local relevant circumstances, shall not be compensated for. 
In other words, considering that its regime of strict liability should not be extended to 
cover all acceptable inconveniences, the Convention established that an acceptable 
level of pollution may be a ground for exemption under certain circumstances 91 923.
However, since the Convention does not apply exclusively it allows for this 
damage to be compensated for under other existing legal regimes, for example on 
the basis of the law relating to nuisance 9Z.
&2,9.____ Limitation periods
6.2.9.1. Expiration P eriods
The need for a harmonised expiration period among the Member States had 
already been recognised by the EEC, which proposed in its draft Directive an 
harmonised time limit within which a legal action may be brought, thereby avoiding 
situations of forum-shopping which could occur due to the differences between the 
internal laws of the States .
91 See article f^ d) of the Convention and point 60 of the Explanatory Report; in 
relation to Italian law see Salvatore Patti, in Dizionari del Diritto Privato, Vol.1. "Diritto 
Civile - Ambiente, Tutela Civilistica" refering to article 8442 of the Civil Code which 
has been interpreted so that the land owner should tolerate the emissions of gases, 
heat and noises which do not go beyond normal standards, taking into account the 
local circumstances;92 See point 38 of the Explanatory Report;
93 See point 76 of the Explanatory Report;
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Likewise 94, the Convention also adopted an expiration period of three years from 
the moment the claimant knew or should have known of the damage and of the 
identity of the operator 95. According to the discussants of the Convention, the legal 
proceedings for the recovery of damages shall be barred upon such an expiration 
period "for the better administration of justice and the avoidance of abuses" 96. 
However, this expiration period can be suspended or interrupted according to the 
internal law of the Contracting Parties.
Furthermore, a general expiration period was also established, according to which 
the right to bring a legal action shall be extinguished after thirty years "from the date 
of the incident which caused the damage"97 98.The main concern in establishing such a 
time-limit is to give the operators and the insurers the required legal certainty about 
the date after which no actions can be brought
Despite the similarities with the proposed Directive concerning the formulation of 
this general expiration period, the Convention does not leave the term "incident" to 
the arbitrary interpretation of the courts or of the national legislator. On the contrary, 
the Convention specifically establishes the commencement date of this expiry period 
according to the different possible interpretations the term incident. For example, if 
the incident refers to a continuous polluting occurrence or series of occurrences 
withthe same origin, the expiry period shall run from the end of such occurrence or of 
the last of the series of occurrences. Furthermore, with regard to the sites for 
permanent deposit of wastes, the same period runs at the latest from the date when 
the site was legally closed
94 See article 9^/1 of the Original Proposal;
95 See article 17^ 1 of the Convention and point 77 of the Explanatory Report;
96 See point 77 of the Explanatory Report;
97 See article 17^/2 of the Convention;
98 See point 79 of the Explanatory Report;
99 See article 172/2 of the Convention and point 78 of the Explanatory Report;
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S im ila r to  th e  EEC C o m m iss io n  v ie w  on th e  s u b je c t, th e  C onven tio n  is  o n ly  
a p p lica b le  to  th e  p o llu tin g  in c id e n ts  w h ich  o ccu r a fte r its  co m in g  in to  fo rc e . In  b road  
te rm s , th is  m eans th a t lia b ility  u n d e r th e  C o n ve n tio n  is  n o t re tro a c tive  and a p p lie s  
o n ly  to  in c id e n ts  occurring  a fte r th e  e n try  in to  fo rce  o f its  p ro v is io n s  in  a  c e rta in  p a rty
T he  C o n ve n tio n  goes e ve n  fu rth e r and  s ta te s  th a t in  s itu a tio n s  o f co n tinuo us 
p o llu tin g  o ccu rre n ce s  o r o f se rie s  o f o ccu rre n ce s h a v in g  th e  sam e o rig in , its  c iv il 
lia b ility  sys te m  applies o n ly  to  d a m a g e s  caused  by o ccu rre n ce s  w hich to o k  p la ce  
a fte r its  p ro v is io n s  w ere  in  fo rc e  10° . T h is  m eans th a t an a c tiv ity  pe rfo rm ed  b e fo re  th e  
e n try  in to  fo rc e  o f a ce rta in  lia b ility  in s tru m e n t sh o u ld  n o t b e  undu ly  pun ished  u n d e r 
c iv il lia b ility  la w , s ince  the  c o lle c tiv e ty  had  n o t p re v io u s ly  fo rb id d e n  it.
T h e re fo re , in  re la tion  to  p e rm a n e n t w aste  d e p o s it s ite s  lia b ility  is a lso  n o t fu lly  
re tro a c tive  s in c e  th e  C onven tio n  o n ly  a p p lie s  to  th e  d a m a g e  w h ich  becom es know n 
a fte r its  e n try  in to  fo rce . B y  c o n s id e rin g  irre le v a n t th e  m o m e n t w hen th e  in c id e n t 
ca u s in g  th e  dam age  occu rre d , th e  C o n ve n tio n  p la ce s  th e  opera to rs in  a  d iffic u lt 
s itu a tio n  b e ca u se  e ith e r th e y  m u st n o w  re ve a l a n y  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  th e y  a re  
aw are  o f a n d  w ill thus no t b e  sued  u n d e r th e  C o n ve n tio n  o r th e y  do  n o t re ve a l th is  
in fo rm a tio n , m ean ing  th e y  m a y b e  h e ld  lia b le  in  th e  fu tu re . If  they do  re ve a l suh  
in fo rm a tio n  no w , how ever, th e re  is  a lw a ys th e  ris k  th a t th e y  m ay face  a  c la im  fo r 
co m p e n sa tio n  a cco rd ing  to  in te rn a l la w .
F u rth e rm o re , lia b ility  is  a lso  fu lly  e xc lu d e d  in tw o  s p e c ific  s itu a tio n s , nam ely w h e n  
th e  s ite  w as c lo se d  in acco rdance  w ith  in te rn a l law  b e fo re  th e  e n try  in to fo rc e  o f th e  
C o n ve n tio n  a n d  w hen th e  o p e ra to r o f an  on-go ing  s ite  p ro ve s  th a t th e  dam age  is  th e  10





un ique  re su lt o f w aste  d e p o s ite d  th e re  b e fo re  its  e n try  in to  fo rce  101. T h e  c lo su re  o f 
the  s ite  m ust be in a cco rd a n ce  w ith  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f in te rn a l law  in o rd e r to  a v o id  the  
o p e ra to rs  abandonm ent o f th e  s ite s  under th e ir c o n tro l w ith o u t ta k in g  th e  necessary 
m easures to  p revent fu tu re  d a m a g e .
6.2.10. Insurance
T he  C onven tion  re q u ire s  th a t th e  o p e ra to r m ust o b ta in  som e fo rm  o f insurance  o r 
o th e r ty p e  o f fin a n c ia l g u a ra n te e  up  to  a c e rta in  l im it 102 103 w h ich  o b lig a tio n  has ra ised  
s e ve ra l c ritic ism s  and co n ce rn s  in  industry 's  re p re s e n ta tiv e  bodies. T h is  o b lig a tio n  is 
m ade in d ire c tly , by re q u irin g  th e  C on tracting  P a rtie s  to  ensure  under th e ir n a tio n a l 
law s th a t th e  o p e ra to rs  "p a rtic ip a te  in  a  fin a n c ia l s e c u rity  schem e" to  c o v e r th e  lia b ility  
th a t m a y a rise  under th e  C o n ve n tio n . In d e te rm in in g  th e  scope , co n d itio n s  and  fo rm  
o f such  a  schem e th e  C o n tra c tin g  P arties sh o u ld  ta k e  in to  account th e  risks o f the  
a c tiv ity  th a t w ill be s u b je c t to  it.
F in a lly , to  re turn  to  w ha t w a s  sa id  regard ing  e n v iro n m e n ta l insurance in th e  EEC
103
, th e  G reen  P aper p o in te d  o u t o n e  o f the  m a jo r p ro b le m s o f insuring e n v ironm en ta l 
dam age , w h ich  is if in su ra n ce  is  to  be m ade co m p u lso ry  it shou ld  be a va ila b le  in the  
m a rke t a t a  reasonab le  p rice  a n d /o r co n d itio n s . L ike w ise , th e  E xp lana to ry  R eport o f 
th e  C o n ve n tio n  a lso show s a  c e rta in  concern  o v e r th e  la ck  o f e xp e rtise  th e  European 
in su ra n ce  se c to r seem s to  h a ve , m o st s p e c ific a lly  in th e  e va lu a tio n  o f th e  risks to  the  
e n v iro n m e n t
F u rthe rm ore , am ong th e  p o s s ib le  types o f schem es s h o u ld  be  cons ide re d  n o t o n ly  
th e  m ore  d ra s tic  so lu tio n  o f co m p u lso ry  insurance  b u t a ls o  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f insu rance
101 S ee a rtic le  52/2 o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  and p o in t 49  o f th e  E xp lana to ry R eport;
102 S ee  a rtic le  12s o f th e  C o n ve n tio n ;
103 S ee C hap te r 2 , pa rag rap h  8 ;
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c o n tra c ts , se lf-in su ra n ce  and m u tu a l fu n d s 104. In  fa c t, w ith  th e  d e ve lo p m e n t o f the  
e n v iro n m e n ta l insurance m a rke t it  is  probab le  th a t th e  m ore  tra d itio n a l fin a n c ia l 
se cu rity  schem es w ill be  s u b s titu te d  b y  insurance c o n tra c ts
5,2.11. Compensation Fund
S ince  th e  "p o llu te r pays" p rin c ip le  leads to  th e  co n se q u e n t in te rn a lis a tio n  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l costs  it is  re q u ire d  th a t th e  o p e ra to r sh o u ld  b e  he ld  responsib le  fo r  th e  
dam ages caused  by th e  a c tiv ity  u n d e r h is co n tro l. N e ve rth e le ss , o th e r fo rm s  o f 
sharing  su ch  risks  am ong th e  c o lle c tiv e ly  seem  a d v isa b le , nam e ly  th ro u g h  in su ra n ce  
a n d /o r co m p e n sa tio n  funds.
T hese  com pensa tion  fu n d s  a llo w  fo r a m ore ra p id  and  e ffic ie n t co m p e n sa tio n  o f 
th e  d a m age  su ffe re d  and  lig h te n  th e  in d iv id u a l b u rd e n  o f th e  inhe ren t lia b ility  co s ts , in 
co m p a riso n  w ith  th e  c la ss ic  c iv il lia b ility  system  w h ich  re q u ire s  p re v io u s , so m e tim e s 
s low  and c o s tly  lega l p ro ce e d in g s . N e ve rth e le ss, it is  s till in  d o u b t w h e th e r 
co m p e n sa tio n  funds sh o u ld  o r s h o u ld  n o t be lim ite d  to  th o s e  s itu a tio n s  w ere  c iv il 
lia b ility  ca n  n o t be used to  co m p e n sa te  e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e , fo r e xa m p le , w hen  
th e  p o llu te r h a s se ized its  a c tiv itie s  o r is  unknow n 105.
U n like  th e  EEC C om m ission  p o s itio n  on th e  su b je c t, th e  C onven tio n  d o e s  n o t 
s p e c ific a lly  re g u la te  o r re fe r to  p o te n tia l com pensa tion  fu n d s . H ow ever, b y  re q u irin g  
th e  C o n tra c tin g  P arties to  e n su re  th a t o p e ra to rs  have  fin a n c ia l se cu rity  to  co v e r th e ir 
lia b ility , th e  C onven tio n  a llo w s fo r  th e se  P arties to  e s ta b lish  w h a te ve r fo rm s  o f
104 S ee a rtic le  12fi o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  a n d  p o in t 67 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  R eport;
105 S ee V o lk m a r J. H a rtje , "Oil Pollution by tanker accidents: liability versus 
regulation, w h o  agrees th a t co m p e n sa tio n  funds fo r  o il p o llu tio n  m ay im p ro ve  th e  
le v e l o f co m p e n sa tio n  b u t n o t the  in c e n tiv e  to  im p ro ve  ta n k e r risks s ince  th e y  d o  n o t 
d is c rim in a te  bew een  d iffe re n t risks  o f in d iv id u a l ta n ke rs ;
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fin a n c ia l schem es th e y  fin d  su ita b le  . O ne o f th e  va rio u s  p o ss ib ilitie s  sp e c ific a lly  
re fe rre d  to  is  a  schem e a cco rd in g  to  w hich th e  o p e ra to rs  co n tro llin g  a  sp e c ific  b ranch  
o f da n g e ro u s a c tiv itie s  fin a n c ia lly  co-opera te  w ith  each  o th e r in o rd e r to  guaran te e  
a d e q u a te  com pensa tion  fo r th e  dam age caused by th e  a c tiv ity  pe rfo rm e d  by a n y  one 
o f th e m  106 07. Th is is  a  ty p e  o f com pensation  fund  w h ich  w ould be  m a in ta ine d  by 
co n trib u tio n s  from  th e  o p e ra to rs  con tro llin g  th e  d ange ro us a c tiv ity  and its  m utua l 
ba s is  sh o u ld  encou rag e  a  b e tte r environm en ta l p ro te c tio n  108.
106 S ee  a rtic le  12*  o f th e  C o n ve n tio n ;
107 S ee  p o in t 67 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  R eport;
108 F o r exam p les in  w h a t re la te s  to  m arine o il p o llu tio n  see  Jan C . B ongae rts  and 
A lin e  F .M  De B iè vre , "Insurance for Civil Liability and Compensation for Marine Oil 
Pollutiorf, w ho d e fin e s  th e  P ro te c tio n  and In d e m n ity  C lu b s  (P & l), e s ta b lish e d  u n d e r 
th e  in te rn a tio n a l C onven tio n  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  fo r O il P o llu tio n  D am age (C LC ), a s  non­
p ro fit assoc ia tio ns co lle c tin g  fe e s  fro m  th e ir m em bers in  o rd e r to  re im b u rse  c la im s  




7.1. Future Instrument on Civil Liability for Environmental 
Damage
T he  p e rspective s on  th e  a d o p tio n  o f an EC  in s tru m e n t a b o u t c iv il lia b ility  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age h a ve  a lre a d y  been re fe rre d  to  \  b u t th e  question  re m a in s  as 
to  w h e th e r it is  adv isab le  fo r th e  E C  M em ber S ta te s  to  s ig n  th e  C o u n c il o f E u ro p e  
C o n ve n tio n . T he  d iffe re n t o p in io n s  range  fro m  co n s id e ra tio n s  th a t th e  C o n ve n tio n  
w as d raw n up by chosen lega l e xp e rts  w ith o u t a d e q u a te  d iscuss ion  am ong  a ll th e  
in te re s te d  p a rtie s  1 2 to  th e  idea  th a t th is  C o n ve n tio n  expresses the  C o m m u n ity  
p o s itio n  o n  th e  sub ject s in ce  th e  C om m ission  and  th e  EC  M em ber S ta te s  w e re  
in vo lve d  in  its  nego tia tions and th e re fo re  its  ad o p tio n  w o u ld  c re a te  a  u n ifo rm  s tric t 
lia b ility  re g im e  to  be a p p lie d  th ro u g h o u t E urope. P erhaps th e  C om m ission  sh o u ld  
c a rry  o u t a  co s t-b e n e fit a n a lys is  to  de c id e  w h e th e r it s h o u ld  ra tify  th e  C o u n c il o f 
E urope  C on ve n tio n  o r a d o p t its  o w n  lega l in s tru m e n t on th e  s u b je c t3.
1 S e e  C h a p te r 5 , paragraph
2 S ee G iandom e n ico  M a jone , "Deregulation and re-regulation: policy making in the 
EC since the Single Act' in EUI W o rk in g  Paper in  S P S  n^ 9 3 /2 , pa ragraph  4 , w ho 
co n firm s  th a t th e  rea l costs  o f m ost re g u la to ry  p ro g ra m m e s a re  borne d ire c tly  b y  th e  
in d iv id u a ls  and  firm s w ho  have to  co m p ly  w ith  th e m  a n d  th e re fo re  th e ir o p in io n  
sh o u ld  be  ta ke n  in to  a cco u n t in  any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t on c iv il lia b ility  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age;
3 S ee R énaud D ehousse, C h ris tia n  Joerges, G ia n d o m e n ico  M ajone and  F ra n c is  
S n yd e r in  *Europe after 1992 -  N ew  Regulatory Strategies? re fe rrin g  th a t th e  
C o m m iss io n  shou ld  ta ke  a  c o s t/b e n e fit a n a lys is  o f its  ow n proposa ls; a lso  
G ia n d o m e n ico  M ajone, "Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies: Lessons from the 




H ow ever, if th e re  is a  co n c lu s io n  to  be  draw n fro m  th e  com parison  m ade in the  
p re v io u s  C hapters it is  th a t th e re  is no p e rfe c t c iv il lia b ility  system  to  d e a l w ith  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, a lth o u g h  som e o f th e  c ritic is m s  m ade o f b o th  th e  ab o ve - 
m e n tio n e d  in s tru m e n ts  m ay se rv e  to  s tim u la te  va rio u s  q u e stio n s  th a t sh o u ld  be  ra ised  
by a n y  fu tu re  legal in s tru m e n t o n  th e  s u b je c t
7.1.1. Scope_of a potential Legal Instrument on Civil Liability for 
Environmental Damage
W ith  regard to  th e  m a in  d e fin itio n s  th a t such  a  fu tu re  instrum ent shou ld  con ta in  
here th e  conclus io ns th a t h a ve  been reached d u rin g  th e  preced ing  ch ap te rs  w ill be 
b rie fly  re ite ra te d .
7.1.1.1. Definition of Environment
F irs t, a  harm onised c o n ce p t o f e n v iro n m e n t sh o u ld  be sp e c ifica lly  estab lished, 
th e re b y  avo id ing  a n y  p o ss ib le  d ive rg e n ce 's  th a t m a y  arise  fro m  the  va rio u s  
in te rp re ta tio n s  m ade by th e  im p lem enting  n a tio n a l le g is la tio n 's . T h is shou ld , 
co n s id e rin g  th a t th e  co m p e n sa tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  bases its e lf on  the 
d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n t4, b e  com prehen sive  enough to  include a ll th o se  e lem ents 
co n s id e re d  lega lly  re le va n t. In  o th e r w ords, it w ould  se e m  th a t any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t 
on c iv il lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age sh o u ld  a d o p t a b road d e fin itio n  o f
th e  re g u la tio n  to  be  adop ted  w ith  its  fu ll a d m in is tra tiv e  and e conom ic  co s ts , the 
re q u ire m e n t fo r such  c o s t-b e n é fit ana lys is  d isc ip lin e s  th e  in s titu tio n s  d e c is io n s ;
4 F o llo w in g  th e  th o u g h ts  e xp ressed  in  the  G reen  P aper th a t the  e n v iro n m e n t needs 
to  be d e fin e d  in  o rd e r to  d e fin e  dam age  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t;
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e n v iro n m e n t, thereby in c lu d in g  n o t o n ly  th e  n a tu ra l e le m e n ts  b u t a lso  the  s o c ia l, 
cu ltu ra l a n d  econom ica l a sp e cts  th a t su rround  a hum an b e in g  5. r
Z 1.1.2. Definition of Environmental Damage
L ike w ise  it a lso  seem s o f v ita l im portance  to  d e fin e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  in 
o rd e r to  d e te rm in e  w h ich  in ju rie s  ca n  be  com pensated v ia  c iv il lia b ility  la w  6, w h ich  
q u e stio n  is  d ire c tly  connected  w ith  th e  no tion  o f re p a ra b le  d a m a g e . In th e  fo rm u la tio n  
o f th is  d e fin itio n , th e  unusua l ch a ra c te ris tic s  o f th is  typ e  o f dam age  shou ld  be ta ke n  
in to  a cco u n t. T here fo re , a  g e n e ra l d e fin itio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  sh o u ld  
co m p rise  tw o  d iffe re n t co n ce p ts , n am e ly  a s tric te r o n e  o f "im p a irm e n t" to  th e  
e n v iro n m e n t and a  b roader one th a t sh a ll a lso  in c lu d e  dam ages to  person and 
p ro p e rty .
F irs t, im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t m eans a n y  d e te rio ra tio n  o f th e  d iffe re n t 
co m p o n e n ts  o f the  env ironm en t, n a m e ly  o f its  n a tu ra l, s o c ia l, c u ltu ra l and e co n o m ica l 
e lem en ts. S e co n d , e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  should  a lso  in c lu d e  th e  dea th  an d  p h ys ica l 
in ju ry  su s ta in e d  by a  p riv a te  in d iv id u a l and th e  dam age  to  p riva te  p ro p e rty . T h e  
co n ce p t o f p ro p e rty  dam age  sh o u ld  b e  extended to  in c lu d e  no t on ly  th e  p h ys ica l 
dam age  to , d e s tru c tio n  o r loss  o f ta n g ib le  p rope rty  b u t a lso  th e  loss o f e co n o m ic  use  
o f ta n g ib le  p ro p e rty  no t p h ys ica lly  d a m a g e d  7.
7.L1.3,____ T yp e  of activities to be covered ' 0
5 S e e  C h a p te r 2 , paragraph 2 .1
6 S ee  C h a p te r 2 , pa ragraph 2 .2 .;
7 S e e  P a tric k  R eyners, * Compensation for nuclear damage in the OECD Member 
Countriesf in  C om pensa tion  fo r P o llu tio n  D am age, C h a p te r 4 , w ho  a lso  th in k s  th a t th e  
da m a g e  to  p ro p e rty  shou ld  c o v e r th e  loss  th e re o f (damnum emergens) b u t a lso  th e  
te m p o ra ry  d e p riv a tio n , loss  o f use  a n d /o r lo ss  o f p ro fit (lucrum cessans);
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It is  a lso  necessary to  le g a lly  de te rm ine  th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  a n d /o r substances 
to  w h ich  any lia b ility  reg im e  fo r e n v ironm en ta l d a m a g e  sh a ll a p p ly ,b y  ta k in g  in to  
a cco u n t th e  types o f haza rds posed by th e  d iffe re n t econom ic a c tiv itie s  a n d /o r 
substance s, the  p ro b a b ility  and  e x te n t o f d a m age  th e y  m ay cause an d  th e  fe a s ib ility  
o f com pensa ting  fo r su ch  d a m a g e s .
O f th e  tw o  ins trum en ts  a n a ly s e d , the  so lu tio n  p re se n te d  by the  C o u n cil o f E urope 
C o n ve n tio n  seem s p re fe ra b le , s in ce  th e  p a rtia l h a rm o n isa tio n  m ade b y th e  EC  has 
re ce n tly  been  cons ide re d  in co n ve n ie n t, n a m e ly  b y  th e  G re e n  Paper.
7 .1.1.4. Exclusions from the scope
In  o rd e r to  avo id  an  u n n e ce ssa ry  o ve rla p p in g  o f d iffe re n t lia b ility  ru le s, so m e  o f 
the  e x is tin g  e nv ironm en ta l le g a l instrum en ts  sh o u ld  b e  e xc luded  fro m  th e  scope  o f a 
fu tu re  ins trum en t. In  fa c t, co n s id e rin g th a t s e ve ra l in te rn a tio n a l ag reem en ts a lre a d y  
e s ta b lish  an harm onised  lia b ility  regim e fo r s p e c ific  types o f a c tiv itie s  a n d /o r 
p ro d u cts , any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t shou ld  no t a p p ly  to  th o se  dam ages d u ly  co ve re d  by 
in te rn a tio n a l law .
T h e re fo re  it m ay s u ffic e to  p ro v id e  fo r an  e xc lu s io n  s im ila r to  th e  p ro v is io n s  
e s ta b lish e d  by both th e  D ra ft D ire c tive  and b y  the  C o n ve n tio n , accord ing  to  w h ich  
th e y  s h a ll n o t apply to  dam age  caused  by n u c le a r w a ste  and o il p o llu tio n  co ve re d  by 
e n fo rce a b le  in te rn a tio n a l law , nam ely the  P aris C o n ve n tio n  and the  B russe ls 
C o n ve n tio n  0.
7.1.1.5. __Geographical scope
A t firs t s igh t, it  seem s e v id e n t th a t th e  g e o g ra p h ica l scope o f any fu tu re  
in s tru m e n t should  n o t b e  lim ite d  to  th e  EC M em ber S ta te s  b u t a  b ro a d e r e x te n t m ay 8
8  S ee C h a p te r 5, su b -pa rag ra ph  5 .4 .1 .3 . and C h a p te r 6 , su b -pa rag ra ph  6 .2 .2 .2 .;
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fa c e  d e e p e r e n fo rce m e n t a nd  im p le m e n ta tio n  p ro b le m s . T here fo re  it m ay p rove  
e a s ie r to  p roceed w ith  a  m o re  lim ite d  h a rm o n isa tio n  th a t m ay n e ve rth e le ss  be 
e x te n d e d  to  o the r E u ropea n  c o u n trie s  ou ts ide  th e  EC.
7AA.G.___The Brussels Convention
W ith  re g a rd  to  c o u rt ju ris d ic tio n , th e  s o lu tio n  g iv e n  b y  th e  B russe ls C o n ve n tio n  
s h o u ld  b e  a d o p te d .A cco rd in g  to  th is  th e  v ic tim  c a n  fre e ly  choose  the  c o u rt in  w h ich  he 
w ill su e  th e  person re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  9. In o th e r w o rd s , the  
v ic tim  m a y  b rin g  a  le g a l a c tio n  e ith e r in  th e  ju ris d ic tio n  w here  th e  dam age  o ccu rre d  - 
locus damni -  o r in th e  co u rts  w ho& e ju ris d ic tio n  c o v e r th e  o rig in  o f th e  sa id  d a m a g e  -  
locus actus10.
H o w e ve r, the  B ru sse ls  C o n v e n tio n  does n o t a d d re ss  th e  question  o f c h o ic e  law  
w h ich  h a s long been s u b je c t to  in te n se  d iscu ss io n  w ith in  th e  H ague C o n fe re n ce  on 
P riv a te  in te rn a tio n a l Law . A lth o u g h  th e  la tte r has g iv e n  serious th o u g h t to  the  
p o s s ib ility  o f adopting  a  c o n v e n tio n  re g u la tin g  th e  ch o ice  law in  transboun dary  
e n v iro n m e n ta l su its , a n  in te re s tin g  a lte rn a tiv e  fo r  a  fu tu re  instrum ent on  c iv il lia b ility  
fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  w o u ld  b e  to  a llo w  th e  p la in tiff to  choose th e  ju ris d ic tio n  
w h e re  w e  w ill sue 11 to g e th e r w ith  an increased  h a rm o n isa tio n  o f n a tio n a l law  on a  
b a s is  o f s tr ic t lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age.
9  S ee  1968 B russels C o n ve n tio n  (E E X ) "O n  J u ris d ic tio n  and E n fo rce m e n t o f 
Ju d g e m e n ts  in C iv il a n d  C o m m e rc ia l M a tte rs"; se e  fo r  a n  exam ple , E C J C ase 21 /76 , 
Handefwekerij 6 . J. Bier v. Mines de Potasse de Alsace SA, R JE, 1 9 7 7 ,3 2 3 ;
10 F o r a  m ore  d e ta ile d  a n a lys is  s e e  Jessurun  d 'O liv e ira ,"Class Actions in Relation to 
Cross-Border Pollution^, w ho q u e s tio n s  th e  p o s s ib ility  g iv e n  b y a rtic le  242 o f th e  EEX 
o f g ra n tin g  in te rim  re lie f, s in c e  n a tio n a l ju d g e s  m u st th e n  have th e  pow er to  b ind 
p a rtie s  to  a c t in an o th e r M e m b e r S ta te ;
"  S ee  A la n  E. B oyle , "International Law and Transboundary Access to Environmental 
Justice" in  the  C on fe rence  A c ce ss  to  E n v iro n m e n ta l J u s tic e  in  E urope w ho exa m in in g  
th e  d iffe re n t issues o f p riv a te  in te rn a tio n a l law  w ith  regard to  transboun dary  
e n v iro n m e n ta l ju s tice , ju s tifie s  th is  so lu tio n  o f fo ru m  sh o p p in g  by the  p o s s ib ility  o f the 
p la in tiff dec id in g  w h ich  sys te m  o ffe rs  th e  m ost a d va n ta g e o u s p rocedures, p rocedura l 
ru le s , su b s ta n tive  ru le s  and re m e d ie s , th e re b y m a x im is in g  h is chances o f re co ve ry ;
146




7.1.2.1. Strict liability or fault liability system
In th e  re cen t d iscu ss io n  launche d  by th e  EC G re e n  P aper ce rta in  business 
F e d e ra tio n s , rep resen tin g  p o te n tia l p o llu tin g  in d u s trie s , have vo ice d  th e ir 
d isa g re e m e n t w ith  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f a  sys te m  o f s tr ic t lia b ility  for e n v iro n m e n ta l 
d a m a g e . A ccord ing  to  th e m , s u c h  a  system  w o u ld  p e n a lise  those  o p e ra to rs  w ho have 
co m p lie d  w ith  every e n v iro n m e n ta l law  b u t a re  s till he ld  lia b le  even if  th e y  acted  w ith  
a ll due  d ilig e n c e  12. H o w e ve r, re ce n t deve lop m ents se e m  to  in d ica te  th a t su ch  a  
system  o f s tric t lia b ility  is  m o re  like ly  to  encou rag e  p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  to  b e tte r 
m anage  th e  e n v ironm en ta l ris k s  o f th e ir a c tiv itie s  a n d /o r increase th e  p re ve n tive  
m easures to  be taken  13 14.
U n der a pure syste m  o f s tr ic t lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, th e  in ju re d  
person  w ill never have to  p ro ve  th a t th e  d e fe n d a n t acted  w ith  fa u lt, bu t he w ill h a ve  to  
e s ta b lish  th e  causal lin k  be tw een  th e  in ju ry  su ffe re d  an d  th e  po llu tin g  in c id e n t caused  
b y  th e  a c tiv itie s  under the  d e fe n d a n t's  co n tro l. W ith o u t repea ting  a ll th e  d iscussion  
reg a rd in g  th e  pros and cons o f b o th  fa u lt and s tric t lia b ility  system s it seem s th a t th e  
la tte r is  m ore  like ly  to  enab le  c iv il lia b ility  to  act as an  e ffic ie n t m echan ism  o f 
e n v iro n m e n ta l p ro te c tio n  u, s in ce  the  p la in tiff does n o t have to  e s ta b lish  w h a t
12 F o llow ing  the  sam e b e lie f, W . J. O uw erkerk, "Environmental Liability from the 
perspective of an operator: Council of Europe Draft Convention on Civil Liability in 
T ra n sn a tio n a l L ia b ility  and In su ra n ce , P a rt C , C h ap te r 3 , w h o  considers th a t a  sys te m  
o f s tric t lia b ility  can b e  co u n te r-p ro d u c tive , if  the  g o o d  opera tors a p p ly in g  h igh  
s ta n d a rd s  w ithd raw  fro m  th e  m a rk e t to  con ta in  th e ir p o te n tia l exposure  to  lia b ility  n o t 
ju s tifie d  b y  th e  d ilig e n ce  w ith  w h ic h  th e ir ope ra tio ns a re  co n d u cte d ;
13  F o r a n o th e r p e rsp e ctive  se e  a lso  E rnest J . W e in rib b , "Liberty, community and 
corrective justicen in L ia b ility  and R esponsib ility : essays in  la w  and m o ra ls , a cco rd ing  
to  w h ich  s tric t lia b ility  m a x im ise s  th e  p ro te ctio n  o f th e  v ic tim  o f o th e r's  a c tio n s  an d  
th e re fo re  m axim ises th e  ro le  o f s ta te  o ffic ia ls  in  th e  p ro v is io n  o f th is  p ro te c tio n ;
14 S ee a ls o  C hapter 5 ;
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co n s titu te s  due d ilig e n c e  o r to  p ro ve  a  fa ilu re  o f th e  d e fend an t to  m e e t an 
e n v iro n m e n ta l s ta n d a rd  15.
N e ve rth e le ss , in  th e  p re c e d in g  C hap te rs it  a lso  b e ca m e  c le a r th a t fo r an  e ffic ie n t 
fu n c tio n in g  o f such  a  s tr ic t lia b ility  system  it  is  necessa ry  to  c le a rly  d e te rm in e  the  
a c tiv itie s  un d e r its  sco p e  16, th e  p a rtie s  to  w hom  lia b ility  shou ld  be  ch a n n e lle d  and 
any o th e r lim ita tio n s .
7 .1.2.2. Responsible Party
A s h a s  been  p re v io u s ly  s a id , it  is  a b so lu te ly  nece ssa ry  to  d e te rm in e  th e  p a rtie s  to  
w hom  lia b ility  shou ld  b e  c h a n n e lle d  b u t such a  ta s k  is  d ire c tly  dep e n d e n t o n  the 
scope o f th e  lia b ility  in s tru m e n t to  b e  adop ted . O n  th e  o n e  hand, th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  
c h a n n e lle d  th e  p rim a ry  lia b ility  to  th e  p ro d u ce r o f w a s te  beca u se  it co n s id e re d  th a t the  
la tte r is  th e  e co n o m ic  o p e ra to r w ith  th e  b e s t know ledg e  o f th e  n a tu re  and 
c h a ra c te ris tic s  o f h is w a s te . O n  th e  o th e r hand , a cco rd in g  to  th e  C o u n c il o f E urope 
C o n ve n tio n , p rim ary  lia b ility  lie s  w ith  th e  e xp lo re r o f th e  dangerous a c tiv ity  o r to  the 
o p e ra to r o f a  w aste  d isp o sa l s ite .
A lth o u g h  th e  re sp o n s ib le  p a rty  se e m s to  d iffe r  in  th e  instrum ents re fe rre d  to , both 
o f th e m  a tta ch  lia b ility  to  th e  p e rso n  th e y  co n s id e r to  be  in  th e  be tte r p o s itio n  to  avo id  
any e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  a n d /o r lim it its  e x te n t. F o llo w in g  th is  sam e te n d e n cy, the 
G reen  P a p e r suggeste d  th a t lia b ility  shou ld  be c h a n n e lle d  to  th e  pa rty  hav ing  th e  best
15 S e e  A la n  B oy le,"Making the polluter pay ? Alternatives to State responsibility in the 
allocation of transboundary environmental costs? in In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r 
E n v iro n m e n ta l H arm , P a rt 5 , C h a p te r 15, w ho co n s id e rs  th a t one o f th e  u tilitie s  o f a 
s tric t lia b ility  reg im e is  th a t it d e p e n d s  o n ly  o n  th e  fa c t o f harm  a nd  th e  p ro o f o f 
so u rce ;
16 S ee  a g a in  p o in t 2 .1 . o f th e  G re e n  P aper, a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  to  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r 
a  c e rta in  a c tiv ity  sh o u ld  b e  s u b je c t to  a  s tric t lia b ility  re g im e  th e  fo llo w in g  e le m e n ts  
sh o u ld  b e  ta ke n  in to  a cco u n t: ty p e s  o f hazard  posed  b y  th e  a c tiv ity ; p ro b a b ility  and 
e x te n t o f dam age; in c e n tiv e  fo r  b e tte r risk m a n a g e m e n t and p re ve n tio n  o f dam age ; 
fe a s ib ility  and co st o f re s to rin g  th e  dam age; p o te n tia l fin a n c ia l bu rden  on  the 
e co n o m ic  se c to r; need fo r  a v a ila b ility  o f in su ra n ce ;
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te ch n ica l know ledge, th e  la rg e r resources and the  e ffe c tiv e  con tro l o f th e  a c tiv ity . 
H ow ever, th is  re fe re n ce  to  th e  p a rty  having th e  la rg e r resources has ra ised  som e 
d o u b ts  a s  to  w he ther it  w o u ld  s tim u la te  the  "d e e p  p ocke t s y n d ro m e "17 18.
F in a lly , ta k in g  in to  a cco u n t th e  "p o llu te r pays" p rin c ip le  it  seem s p re fe ra b le  to  
choose  th e  suggestion  m ade b y  th e  C ouncil o f E urope C o n ve n tio n  to  lin k  op e ra tio n a l 
lia b ility  to  le g a l lia b ility  b u t such  lin ka g e  should extend  its e lf to  those s itu a tio n s  w here  
th e  pe rson  co n tro llin g  th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  is  no t id e n tifia b le . In o th e r w ords, in 
d e fin in g  th e  responsib le  p a rty  th e  b e s t w ay is to  co n n e ct it  th rough  le g a l, econom ica l 
a n d /o r fin a n c ia l pow er to  d e te rm in e  how  the  a c tiv ity  is  c a rrie d  o u t to  th e  p a rty  ha v in g  
e ffe c tiv e  co n tro l o f th e  a c tiv ity , th a t is  to  the  person  w ho  is  e ffe c tiv e ly  and  g lo b a lly  in  
ch a rg e  o f th e  a c tiv ity .
7 .1.2.3. Lender Liability
A s h a s a lready been  s ta te d , banks m ay have a  v e ry  im p o rta n t ro le  in  th e  
p re ve n tio n  o f e nv ironm en ta l d a m a g e , and th e re fo re  m aking  them  lia b le  fo r p ast 
dam age  o r dam age caused  b y th e ir  borrow ers' a c tiv itie s  sh o u ld  be  a vo id e d . In fa c t, 
th e  q u e s tio n  about to  w h a t e x te n t banks and o th e r fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  ca n  be he ld  
lia b le  fo r  th e  p o llu te r a c tiv itie s  to  w hom  they h a ve  le n t m o n e y  o r leased e qu ipm e n t is 
o n e  a b o u t w h ich  m ost le g is la to rs  a re  hesitan t. T he  v a rio u s  po in ts  o f v ie w  a lla cce p t 
th a t any p rovis ions a b o u t th e  responsib le  person sh o u ld  c la rify  w h e th e r th is  
e s ta b lish e s  a  lender lia b ility  e xe m p tio n  as does th e  S u p e rfu n d  10.
17 S ee C h a p te r 4;
18 A lth o u g h  the  A m erican  S u p e rfu n d  im poses s tric t lia b ility  on a  pu rch a se r o f 
c o n ta m in a te d  p roperty, even if  he  has not co n trib u te d  to  su ch  co n ta m in a tio n , it  a lso  
p ro v id e s  a de fence a g a in s t lia b ility  fo r a  pu rchase r w h o  conducts a ll ap p ro p ria te  
in q u iry  in to  the  p re v io u s o w n e rsh ip  and uses o f th e  p ro p e rty  co n s is te n t w ith  go o d  
c o m m e rc ia l o r custom ary p ra c tic e ; th e  use o f th is  in n o ce n t pu rchase r d e fe n ce  ca n  be  
e x te n d e d  to  exem pt th e  banks o r o th e r fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  fro m  le n d e r lia b ility ;
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L e n d e r lia b ility  m e a n s th a t a  b a n k  can  be  h e ld  lia b le  w hen it exe rc ises e ffe c tiv e  
c o n tro l o v e r o r, in  th e  e x e rc is e  o f h is  c re d ito r rig h ts , becom es th e  o w ner o f the  
co m p a n y  o r p ro p e rty  w h ic h  c a u s e d  th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  19. H ow ever, a s  the  
C o u n c il o f E u ro p e  C o n ve n tio n  im p lic itly  s ta ted , th e  le n d e r m u st have h ad  an e ffe c tiv e  
c o n tro l o v e r th e  d a n g e ro u s  a c tiv ity  a t th e  tim e  th e  p o llu tin g  in c id e n t occu rre d , in  o rd e r 
to  be  c o n s id e re d  as an  o p e ra to r a n d  co n se q u e n tly  be  h e ld  liab le .
N o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e  v a lid ity  o f  co n n e ctin g  th e  re sp o n s ib le  pa rty  w ith  th e  pe rson  
h a v in g  th is  e ffe c tiv e  c o n tro l o v e r th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  th is  su re ly  ra ises som e 
p ro b le m s  w ith  rega rd  to  le n d e r lia b ility . In fa c t, th e  p rin c ip a l d isadvan tages o f a llo w in g  
le n d e r lia b ility  is  th a t it w o u ld  c a u s e  d iffic u ltie s o v e r th e  granting  o f m ortgages o r 
o th e r fin a n c ia l g u a ra n te e s , th e re b y  reducing  th e  p o s s ib ility  o f s m a lle r co m p a n ie s 
o b ta in in g  c re d it and a ls o  m a k in g  e n v iro n m e n ta lly  dangerous in ve s tm e n ts  less 
fe a s ib le  20. In  fa c t, th e  la ck  o f a  le n d e r lia b ility  e xe m p tio n  cou ld  m ean th a t to  
m in im ise  lia b ility  risks b a n ks m a y  b e  fo rced  to  co n d u c t expensive  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
a u d its , p a rtic u la rly  in th e  ca se s  w h e re  th e  b o rro w e r's  la n d  is  o ffe red  a s a  s e c u rity .
In  th e  end , the  b e s t s o lu tio n  se e m s to  b e  th a t g iv e n  by the C ouncil o f E urope 
C o n ve n tio n , w h ich  im p lic itly  s ta te s  th a t w hen th e  banks o r o th e r fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  
have  le n t m oney to  th e  o p e ra to r o f a  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  o r com pany th e y  w ill n o t be 
he ld  lia b le  a s  long as th e y  do  n o t a c tiv e ly  in te rfe re  in th e  m anagem ent o f th e  fin a n ce d
19 W ith  re g a rd  to  A m e rica n  C E R C L A ’s lia b ility  se e  D avid  Jacoby and A bb ie  E rem ich , 
"Environmental Liability in USA" in  E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility , C hapter V , P a rt C , w ho 
in te rp re te d  C E R C LA 's a rtic le  101 (20)(A ) re fe re n ce  to  "o w n e r o r o pe ra to r" as in c lu d in g  
th e  p e rso n  w ho o b ta in e d  the  fa c ility , title  o r co n tro l o f w ha th  was co n ve ye d  d u e  to  
b a n kru p tcy , fo re c lo su re , ta x  d e lin q u e n c y  o r a b a n d o n m e n t. In o th e r w ords, acco rd in g  
to  th e m  th e  person, w h o , w ith o u t p a rtic ip a tin g  in  th e  m anagem ent o f a  fa c ility , ho lds 
an  in d ic ia  o f ow nersh ip  p rim a rily  to  p ro te c t h is  se cu rity  in te re s t in it, sh a ll n o t be  held 
lia b le .
20 In  re la tio n  to  th e  A m e rica n  e xp e rie n ce  see G a ry  H e c to r, "A  new reason yo u  ca n 't 
g e t a  lo a n " in  Fortune, 1992 c o n firm in g  th a t in  a  ty p e  o f "green lin in g " b a n ks  are 
c u ttin g  o ff  sm a ll- and m e d iu m -s ize d  businesses in  in d u s trie s  th a t h a n d le  d ange ro us 
ch e m ica ls  o r produce co n ta m in a te d  w aste
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a c tiv itie s  21. F urtherm ore , th is  se cu re d  c re d ito r e xe m p tio n  co u ld  be  co m p le m e n te d  b y  
th e  re q u ire m e n t o f le n d e rs  to  p e rfo rm  accord ing  to  a  p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lish e d  due 
d ilig e n ce  standard , a cco rd ing  to  w h ich  banks and o th e r fin a n c ia l in s titu tio n s  w ou ld  
o n ly  be e n title d  to  such e xe m p tio n  if they had  co m p lie d  w ith  ce rta in  d u e  d ilig e n ce  
o b lig a tio n s  22.
7 .2 .  S ta n d in g
It sh o u ld  be noted th a t in  b o th  th e  C o m m un ity  la w 's  p resen t p o s itio n  and th e  
p ro v is io n s  estab lished in  th e  C o u n c il o f E urope C o n v e n tio n , th e  stand ing  issue  is 
o n ly  p a rtia lly  regu la ted  23. If, o n  th e  o ne  hand, th e  D ra ft D ire c tive  a nd  th e  C ouncil 
C o n ve n tio n  sp e c ifica lly  g ive  s ta n d in g  to  com m on in te re s t g roups and a ssoc ia tio ns, 
w h ich  h a ve  as th e ir o b je c t th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t, on  th e  o th e r hand b o th  
a vo id  a n y  re ference to  th e  s ta n d in g  o f pub lic  a u th o ritie s  a n d  o f p riva te  in d iv id u a ls  in  
gene ra l.
7.2.O.1.___ Environmental Organisations
In fa c t, th e se  lega l in s tru m e n ts  n o t on ly le a ve  it to  th e  n a tio n a l law  to  e s ta b lish  th e  
c o n d itio n s  under w hich th e  g ro u p s  o r associa tions re fe rre d  to  m ay b rin g  an  a c tio n  b u t
21 In re la tio n  to  C anadian law , se e  G eoffrey T hom pson , "Environmental liability in 
Canada: the risks for lenders, receivers and trustees'* in  E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility , 
C h a p te r IV , P art A  w ho p ro v id e s  fo r such an e xe m p tio n  b y  conside rin g  th a t a le n d e r 
w ill n o t b e  held liab le  fo r c le a n -u p  co s ts  as long as he d o e s  n o t s tray fro m  the  p u re ly  
fin a n c ia l a sp e cts  o f its  re la tio n s h ip  w ith  its  bo rrow er;
22 S ee T hom as M cM ahon, "The evolution of US due diligence!' in  In te rn a tio n a l 
C o rp o ra te  Law , O cto b e r 1994, rP 39 , pp . 10, re fe rrin g  to  th e  S u p e rfu n d s  
R e a u th o risa tio n  B ill and  to  th e  A m e rica n  S o c ie ty  fo r T e s tin g  and M a te ria ls  (A S T M ) 
P ro v is io n a l P ractice  fo r E s ta b lish in g  Secured C re d ito r E xe m p tio n  under C E R C LA ;
23 For a  b rie f co m para tive  o b se rva tio n  about th e  issue  o f s tand ing  in  som e EEC  
M em ber S ta tes  see G e rrit B e tle m , "Standing for Ecosystems -  Going Dutctf in  
A ccess to  E nv ironm en ta l J u s tic e  in  Europe, Conference of 18/4/94 a t th e  E uropean 
U n iv e rs ity  In s titu te ;
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th e  s ta n d in g  o f p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  a n d  o f in d iv id u a l p riv a te  parties is  a lso  le ft fo r the  
in te rn a l le g is la to r. I f  a  s p e c ific  M e m b e r S ta te  in te rn a l law  s till bases its e lf on 
tra d itio n a l to rt law  to  c o m p e n s a te  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age, th e n  th e  E uropean 
c itiz e n  h a s  to  fa ce  a ll th e  tra d itio n a l p ro ce d u ra l d iffic u ltie s  th a t a  m ore  co m p le te  
h a rm o n isa tio n  co u ld  h a v e  h e lp e d  h im  to  s u rm o u n t24.
T h e re fo re , any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t on  c iv il lia b ility  fo r environm en ta l dam age 
sh o u ld  s p e c ific a lly  e s ta b lis h  th a t a n y  g ro u p  o r  o rg a n is a tio n  should be  a b le  to  b rin g  a 
le g a l a c tio n  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e , as lo n g  as th e ir so c ia l o b je c tive s  in c lu d e  the 
p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t o r any o th e r in te re s ts  fo r w h ich  th e y  su e  25. 
N e ve rth e le ss , it w ou ld  b e  p re fe ra b le  if  th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l associa tions’ rig h t to  sue 
w ere  to  b e  based o n  re a so n s  o f e ffic ie n t le g a l p ro te c tio n  o f its  ow n in te re s ts  ra th e r 
th a n  o n  th e  p ro te ctio n  o f jo in e d  in d iv id u a l in te re s ts  26.
7.2.0.2. Private Individuals
B e s id e s  th e  re fe re n ce  to  e n v iro n m e n ta l o rg a n isa tio n s , such an in s tru m e n t shou ld  
a lso  re g u la te  the  p o s s ib ility  o f c la im s  by p riv a te  in d iv id u a ls  27, use fu l in  those
24 F o r e xa m p le , in re la tio n  to  th e  s itu a tio n  in  th e  U K  se e  A ndrew  G eddes, "Locus 
Standi and EEC environmental measuresf in Jo u rn a l o f E nvironm en ta l Law , v o l. 4 , n2 
1 ,1 9 9 2 , pp . 3 5  s ta tin g  th a t tra d itio n a lly  an U K  c itiz e n  h a s standing as long a s  he has 
"s u ffic ie n t in te rest" in  th e  m a tte r to  w h ich  th e  a p p lic a tio n  re la tes. G eddes also 
c o n s id e rs  th a t e n v iro n m e n ta l s ta tu te s  are  a d o p te d  fo r th e  bene fit o f a ll c itiz e n s  and 
each  o n e  o f them  has a n  in te re s t in  see ing  th e s e  s ta tu te s  enforced.
25 F o r a n  exem plary d e v e lo p m e n t o f n a tio n a l ca se  la w  see  H ans Jessurun  d ’O liv e ira , 
"The Sandoz Blaze: the damage and the public and private liabilities", in  In te rn a tio n a l 
R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r E n v iro n m e n ta l H a rm , C h a p te r 18, w ho  re la tes D utch  ca se  law , 
a c co rd in g  to  w hich "e n v iro n m e n ta l o rg a n isa tio n s  h a ve  s tand ing  and m ay d e fe n d  the 
in te re s ts  fo r w h ich  th e y  have  b e e n  e s ta b lish e d  a s th e ir ow n  in te rests";
26 C o rrtra rily  see G e rrit B e tle m , "Standing for Ecosystems -  Going Dutctf in  the 
C o n fe re n ce  "A ccess to  E n v iro n m e n ta l Ju s tice  in  E u rope  held on th e  18 /4 /94  a t the  
E u ropea n  U n ive rs ity  In s titu te , w h o  c ite s  th e  K uunde rs  C ase  w here th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
o rg a n isa tio n s  rig h t to  su e  is  ju s tifie d  so le ly  on  th e  g ro u n d  o f jo in in g /co m b in in g  o f the 
d iffu s e  eco log ica l in te re s ts  o f c itiz e n s ;
27 In  re la tio n  to  in te rn a tio n a l la w  se e  C h ris tia n  T o m u sch a t, *International Liability for 
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law: the work 
of the International Law Commission in  In te rn a tio n a l R e sp o n s ib ility  fo r  E n v ironm en ta l
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c o u n trie s  w here  the  c o lle c tiv e  m o ve m e n t is w e a ke r * 28 29 F urthe rm ore , it shou ld  a lso  
re g u la te  m ass c la im s by ha rm o n is in g  the  e x is tin g  m echan ism s fo r ce n tra lis in g  
ju ris d ic tio n  o v e r th e  c la im s . A m o n g  th e se  m echan ism s, th e  co n so lid a tio n  o f c la im s in 
c la ss  a c tio n s  o r the  c o n s o lid a tio n  o f cases to  fa c ilita te  th e  p re -tria l p rocess and 
se ttle m e n ts  a re  som e o f th e  p ro ce d u ra l m eans, in c re a s in g ly  used th ro u g h o u t E urope,
OQ
th a t co u ld  e xp lo ite d  by th e  lia b ility  instrum en ts  re fe rre d  to
In fa c t, c lass a c tio n s  a llow  m em bers  o f a ce rta in  g ro u p  o f in ju red  persons to  b rin g  
an  a c tio n  on  b e ha lf o f th e  w h o le  c la ss  fo r the  c o m p e n sa tio n  o f the  w id e ly  d is trib u te d  
dam age 30. A nother p o s s ib ility  fo r  p rovid ing  in c e n tiv e  fo r  in ju red  persons to  b rin g  
co m p e n sa tio n  actions in to  c o u rt co u ld  be s h iftin g  th e  le g a l fe e s  in su ch  cases o f 
p u b lic  in te re s t litiga tio n
7.2.1. Remedies
W ith  re g a rd  to  th e  re m e d ie s  th a t should  b e  m ade  a v a ila b le  to  e v e ry  p o te n tia l 
p la in tiff, th o se  suggested  b y th e  EC  and b y th e  C o u n c il o f Europe seem  to  be
H arm , C h a p te r 3 , w ho co n c lu d e s  th a t m any m in o r tra n sb o u n d a ry  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
dam ages co u ld  be d e a lt w ith  le g a l actions b ro u g h t by p riv a te  in d iv id u a ls , w ith o u t any 
in vo lve m e n t o f the  g o ve rn m e n ts  co n ce rn e d ;
28 S ee J a m e s  C am eron, ” Environmental Public Interest LHigatiorf in EC E n v iro n m e n t 
a nd  P lann in g  Law , C hap te r 18 w h o  considers th a t litig a tio n  in itia te d  by in d iv id u a ls  o r 
g ro u p s  o f ind iv idu a ls  th ro u g h  a n  e ffic ie n t use  o f ju d ic ia l resources, e ith e r by 
e s ta b lish in g  a  new co rp o ra te  e n tity  o r v ia  c la ss  a c tio n s , can be  a n  e ffe c tiv e  
m e ch a n ism  w ith  w hich to  re so lve  co m p le x  co m p la in ts  a n d  to  p ro te c t the  e n v iro n m e n t;
29 S ee fo r a  m ore d e ta ile d  e xp o su re  on  m ass c la im s , K e n n e th  S. A braham  and G len
O . R ob inson , Aggregative valuation of mass tort claims? in  Law  and C o n te m p o ra ry  
P rob lem s, 1990, volum e 53, issu e  4 , pp. 139;
30 For a  m ore  de ta ile d  s tudy se e  Jessurun d 'O liv e ira , " Class Actions in relation to 
Cross-Border Pollution” in  EU I W o rk in g  Paper, c itin g  R u le  2 3  o f th e  A m e rica n  F edera l 
R u les o f C iv il P rocedure th a t d e fin e s  c lass a c tio n s  as th e  agg rega tion  o f a  nu m b e r o f 
p e rso n s  in to  a  group w h ich  is  a llo w e d  to  litig a te  fo r th e  p ro te c tio n  o f d iffu s e  rig h ts  a n d  
in te re s t, su ch  as environm en ta l rig h ts ;
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s u ffic ie n t. In  genera l te rm s , th e  p o te n tia l p la in tiff sh o u ld  b e  ab le  to  ta k e  le g a l ac tion  
e ith e r to  o b ta in  an in ju n c tio n , th a t is  th e  cessa tion  o f th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity , a n d /o r the  
re im b u rse m e n t o f e xp e n d itu re  ta k e n  to  p re ve n t, co m p e n sa te  a n d /o r re s to re  the  
e n v iro n m e n t 3\  N e ve rth e le ss, it  rem a ins q u e s tio n a b le  w he ther a n y fu tu re  lega l 
in s tru m e n t on  the  su b je c t sh o u ld  g iv e  its  C on tracting  P a rtie s  the  rig h t to  re s tric t the  
re m e d ie s  m ade a va ila b le  o r to  d e te rm in e  w h ich  p la in tiffs  m ay bring a  lega l a c tio n  to 
ob ta in  su ch  rem ed ies, a s  th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  and th e  C o n ve n tio n  do.
7.2.1.1. Compensation for Damage S tr ic to  S e n s u
T h is  la s t question  shou ld  b e  answ ered re m e n b e rin g  th a t any fu tu re  legal 
in s tru m e n t w h ich  is p roduced  b y  th e  p resent h a rm o n isa tio n  e ffo rt, shou ld  n o t b e  so 
vague  a s  to  be  co n s id e re d  vo id  o f a n y  rea l u tility  in  th e  p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t 
In  fa c t, it sh o u ld  no t be  le ft to  th e  S ta tes ' in te rn a l la w  to  decide w he the r p riv a te  
in d iv id u a ls  can  sue to  p u t an e n d  to  th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  th a t is  causing  da m a g e  to  
th e ir h e a lth  a n d /o r to  th e ir  p ro p e rty  and /o r if th e y  ca n  se e k  th e  re im b u rse m e n t o f 
e xp e n se s  in cu rre d  to  p re ve n t s u c h  dam age.
P riva te  in d iv id u a ls  sh o u ld  b e  a b le  to  dem and a n  in ju n c tio n  to  p ro h ib it th e  p o llu tin g  
a c tiv ity  a n d  to  seek the  re im b u rse m e n t o f expenses m ade  to  com pensa te  fo r p ro p e rty  
dam age  31 2. A lthough  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f p riva te  in d iv id u a l a c tio n  33 is n o t to  be  d e in e d , 
if  the  p re s e n t s ta te  o f c iv il lia b ility  law  th ro u g h o u t E u ro p e  is  considered , it seem s 
q u e s tio n a b le  w he ther p riv a te  p a rtie s  should  a lso  have th e  rig h t to  su e  fo r pe rso n a l
31 S ee a rtic le  4£ o f th e  O rig in a l P roposa l fo r a  D ire c tiv e  o n  C iv il L ia b ility  caused  by 
W aste ;
32 F or th e  fo llo w in g  re fe re n ce s  to  th e  A m erican  O il P o llu tio n  A c t, see R obert F orce , 
"Insurance and Liability Pollution in the US in  T ra n sn a tio n a l E nvironm en ta l L ia b ility  
and  In su ra n ce , In te rna tio na l B ar A sso c ia tio n  S e rie s , 1993;
33 S ee C h a p te r 4 ;
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d a m a g e s . P riva te  p a rtie s  s h o u ld  a lso  be a llow ed  to  re q u e s t th a t the  responsib le  p a rty  
ta k e  th e  necessary p re ve n tive  o r re insta ting  m easures.
7.2.1.2. Compensation for Impairment to the Environment
It is  a lso  c le a r th a t bo th  th e  com peten t p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  and th e  recogn ised  
e n v iro n m e n ta l associa tio ns sh o u ld  be  ab le  to  o b ta in  an in junction  p ro h ib itin g  the  
a c tiv ity  w h ich  is causing  th e  im p a irm e n t to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t. L ikew ise, b u t co n tra ry  to  
th e  C o u n c il o f E urope C o n ve n tio n  34, these p a rtie s  sh o u ld  a lso be a b le  to  seek the  
re im b u rse m e n t o f e xp e n d itu re s  m ade to  p re ve n t such  im p a irm e n t an d /o r to  
co m p e n sa te  o r resto re  the  e n v iro n m e n t. F urthe rm ore , b o th  these p a rtie s  shou ld  a lso  
be a llo w e d  to  request a  co u rt o rd e r under w h ich  th e  p o te n tia l p o llu te r is  o b lig e d  to  
u n d e rta ke  th e  m easures necessa ry  to  re s to re  a n d /o r re in sta te  th e  e n v iro n m e n t 
th e m se lve s  35 36.
A lth o u g h  it m ay seem  to o  ra d ica l to  a llow  a  p riv a te  p a rty  to  b ring  a  lega l a c tio n  
based on  im p a irm e n t to  th e  env ironm en t w h ich  ca u se d  no persona l dam age  to  
h im se lf, it shou ld  be taken  in to  accoun t th a t th e  e n v iro n m e n t be longs to  a ll o f us and 
th a t a n y  "ow ner* o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t should a lw ays b e  a b le  to  c la im  re in s ta te m e n t 
a n d /o r co m pensa tion  fo r the  im p a ire d  env ironm en t .
34 S ee a rtic le  182 o f th e  C o u n c il o f Europe C o n ve n tio n  e x p lic itly  e xc lu d in g  a ll c la im s  
fo r re im bursem en t o f co s ts  fro m  th e  actions a va ila b le  to  p u b lic  in te re s t g roups;
35 S ee th e  A m erican  O il P o llu tio n  A c t (O PA 1990) u n d e r w h ich  a g o ve rn m e n t e n tity  
m ay re c o v e r dam ages fo r in ju ry  to , de stru ctio n  o f, lo ss  o f, o r loss o f use o f n a tu ra l 
re so u rce s, includ ing th e  re a sonab le  costs o f a sse ss in g  th e  dam age;
36 L ike w ise , the  A m erican  O P A  estab lishes th a t a n y  person w ho uses n a tu ra l 
re so u rce s  w h ich  have been in ju re d , destroyed o r lo s t m a y recover dam ages fo r loss 
o f su b s is te n ce  use o f n a tu ra l resources, w ith o u t re g a rd  to  th e  o w ner s h ip  o r 
m a n a g e m e n t o f th e  resources; a g a in s t see a lso  E m m anue l d u  P on tav ice  and P a tric ia  
C o rd ie r, ”Compensation for indirect or remote pollution damage in individual countries 
and at international lever, in  C om pensation  fo r P o llu tio n  D am age, O E C D , 1981, 
C h a p te r 1, w ho ag ree  w ith  D espax in  considering  th a t th e  harm  d o n e  to  p riv a te  
in d iv id u a ls  is  usua lly  th e  com m on  fa te  o f th e  w h o le  com m un ity , a  fa c t th a t is 
so m e tim e s  regarded as e v id e n ce  o f th e  absence o f a n y  d ire c t and p e rso n a l d a m age  
w h ich  s h o u ld  w a rra n t e ffe c tive  le g a l p roceed ings;
155
C H A P T E R  7
C O N C L U S I O N S
1 5 6
7.2.1.3. Limitations of Liability
S tra n g e ly  enough ¡t s e e m s  th a t o n ly  th e  EEC  C o m m iss io n  recognised th e  need  to  
lim it lia b ility  n o t o n ly  th ro u g h  th e  c o s t b e n e fit a n a lys is  p roposed  in  the  D ra ft D ire c tiv e  
b u t a lso  b y  advoca tin g  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f c e rta in  fin a n c ia l ce ilin g s  in  the  G re e n  
P a p e r37. O n  th e  one h a n d , it m a y  b e  d e fe n s ib le  to  c o n s tra in  the  p la in tiff to  a cce p t 
ch e a p e r re in s ta tin g  m easures, e v e n  if  suggested by th e  d e fe n d a n t, w hen th e  c o s t o f 
h is  ow n a c tio n s  exceeds th e  co n se q u e n t b e n e fits  to  th e  en v iro n m e n t and  as lo n g  as 
th o se  c h e a p e r m easures a d e q u a te ly  re insta te  th e  e n v iro n m e n t o r re im b u rse  th e  
e x p e n d itu re  incu rred  to  th is  e n d . O n  th e  o th e r hand , th e  d isp ropo rtion  be tw een  th e  
re in s ta tin g  costs  and th e  co n se q u e n t b e n e fit to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t shou ld  n o t be  a  
reason fo r  d ism iss ing  th o s e  re s to ra tio n  m easures b u t in s te a d  se rve  as a n  im p e tu s  to  
a v o id  fu tu re  p o llu tio n .
A lth o u g h  fin a n c ia l c e ilin g s  w o u ld  fa c ilita te  e n v iro n m e n ta l insurance, it is d o u b tfu l 
w h e th e r a  lim ite d  lia b ility  sys te m  w o u ld  s till be  use fu l in  the  p reven tio n  o f fu tu re  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age. In  fa c t, n o t o n ly  w ou ld  the  p o te n tia l p o llu te rs  ta ke  fe w e r 
p re v e n tiv e  m easures b u t a ls o  th e  d a m a g e s above  a  ce rta in  estab lished lim it w o u ld  be 
su p p o rte d  b y  th e  p u b lic  in  g e n e ra l and  not by  th e  p o llu te r, thereby d is to rtin g  the  
p o llu te r p a y s  p rincip le .
N e ve rth e le ss , the  su g g e s tio n  in  th e  G reen P aper th a t w hen the  p o llu te r is  n o t a t 
fa u lt, b u t an  un fo ressea b le  d a m a g e  s till occurs, d am ages shou ld  on ly be  aw arded  up 
to  a  c e rta in  p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lish e d  lim it should  b e  co n s id e re d . H ow ever, th e  G reen  
P aper s e e m s  to  fu rth e r su g g e s t th a t if  th e  p o llu te r is  in su re d  and /o r co u ld  have  ta ke n  
s p e c ific  p re ve n tive  m easures, th o se  fin a n c ia l lim its  shou ld  no t app ly , w h ich  
s u g g e s tio n  w o u ld  no t fa c ilita te  e n v iro n m e n ta l in su ra n ce .
37 F or a  m o re  de ta iled  d e s c rip tio n  o f th e  d iffe re n t p o s s ib ilitie s  see C h a p te r 5;
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7.2.1.4. Compensation for Economic or other Non-material Damage 
T h is  is  ano the r a sp e ct w hose  lega l tre a tm e n t d iffe rs  fro m  one co un try  to  an o th e r, 
nam ely th e  prob lem  o f w h e th e r th e  loss o f p ro fit o r o th e r non-m ateria l dam age sh o u ld  
be  re co ve ra b le  v ia  a  c iv il lia b ility  a c tio n  38 3940. S uch  a  p ro b le m  is c lose ly re la ted  to  the  
q u e stio n  o f w he ther dam age  w h ich  is no t a  d ire c t consequence o f th e  p o llu tin g  
in c id e n t m ay be su b je c t to  com pensa tion . A cco rd in g  to  recen t d eve lop m en ts , the  
fin a n c ia l loss  due to  an  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  w h ich  is  n o t an im m ed ia te  ph ys ica l 
co n se q u e n ce  o f th e  p o llu tin g  in c id e n t b u t from  th e  le g a l s ta n d p o in t is  co ns ide re d  to  be 
a  d ire c t, a lthoug h  rem ote , cause , is  sub ject to  com p e n sa tio n  v ia  a c iv il lia b ility  ac tion
39
In fa c t, fo llow ing  th e  m ore  re ce n t court ru lin g s  o n  th e  sub ject it seem s th a t the  
tre n d  is  tow ards accep ting  c la im s  fo r loss o f p ro fit th a t m ay a rise  fro m  s itu a tio n s  o f 
dam age  stricto sensu 40. H ow ever, it is  ra the r p e cu lia r th a t courts  and le g is la to rs  a re  
re lu c ta n t to  recogn ise  th e  rig h t to  c la im  com pensa tion  fo r loss o f p ro fit o r o th e r non­
m a te ria l dam age a ris in g  from  th e  im pa irm ent to  the  e n v iro n m e n t. In fa c t, the  dam age
38 F o r a n o th e r d is tin c tio n  se e  R obert E. G od in , HTheories of compensation^*, in 
L ia b ility  and  re sp o n s ib ility : e ssa ys  in law  and m ora ls, w h o  de fines pecun ia ry h a rm s as 
th e  da m a g e s to  one 's p ro p e rty  o r earning ca p a c ity  o r th e  crea tion  o f le g a l lia b ilitie s  
and n o n -pecu n ia ry  harm s as in c lu d in g  bod ily  harm , e m o tio n a l d is tress, h u m ilia tio n , 
fe a r and  anxie ty, loss o f com pan io nsh ip , loss o f fre e d o m , d is tress caused by 
m is tre a tm e n t o f a th ird  person  o r a  corpse;
39 S ee E m m anuel du  P on tav ice  and P a tric ia  C ord ie r, supra note  , w ho a lso  co n s id e r 
th a t o n ly  in d ire c t dam age, in  th e  sense o f its  be ing tra ce a b le  to  the  o rig in a l e v e n t 
th ro u g h  an unforeseen sequence  o f e xcep tion a l c ircu m sta n ce s, should n o t s u b je c t to  
co m p e n sa tio n ;
40 A lso  u n d e r the  A m erican  O P A  econom ic fosses re su ltin g  from  the  d e s tru c tio n  o f 
rea l o r p e rso n a l p ro p e rty  sh a ll b e  recove rab le  by  a c la im a n t w ho ow ns o r leases th a t 
p ro p e rty ; see  a lso C o lin  d e  la  Rue, "Environmental Damage Assessment* in 
T ra n sn a tio n a l L ia b ility  and Insu rance , Part C , C hap te r 1, w ho concludes th a t pure 
e co n o m ic  loss, w ith o u t any accom panying dam age to  property is  in g e n e ra l 
irre co ve ra b le  in  E ng lish  Law ;
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to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t in its e lf is  a s  lik e ly  to  cause da m a g e  fo r loss o f p ro fit o r o th e r 
e co n o m ic  lo s s  as th e  dam age  to  p e rs o n a l p roperty  41.
7.2.1.5. Punitive Damages
U n d e r ce rta in  reg im es, th e  p la in tiff can  be  a ttrib u te d  p u n itive  dam ages w h ich  
e xce e d  th e  to ta l am ount o f e c o n o m ic  loss in cu rre d  b u t n o rm a lly  o n ly  w hen th e  
d e fe n d a n t's  conduct has be e n  fa u lty  o r n e g lig e n t. In  o th e r w ords, if th e  p o te n tia l 
p o llu te r a c te d  w ithou t th e  re q u ire d  d ilig e n c e  he sh o u ld  b e  pen a lise d  fo r such  la c k  o f 
ca re .
C o n tra rily , it is  b e lie ve d  th a t e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  shou ld  be  m ore o f a 
p re v e n tiv e  th a n  o f a re p re ss ive  n a tu re  and th e re fo re  p u n itiv e  dam ages shou ld  n o t be 
in c lu d e d  am ong the  re m e d ie s  a v a ila b le  to  th e  p la in tiff under any fu tu re  le g a l 
in s tru m e n t. N everthe less, it m a y p ro v e  in te re s tin g  to  s tu d y  th e  p o ss ib ility  o f th e  
d e fe n d a n t be ing  ordered to  p a y  dam ages to  a  c itiz e n s  g roup  o rie n te d  to  th e  
in v e s tig a tio n  and p ro se cu tio n  o f in d u s try  v io la to rs  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l law  42.
7,2,2,___ Burden of Proof
L2AL__ Causal Link
In  th e o ry , it  is  th e  in ju re d  p a rty  w ho  m ust adduce  th e  evidence  o f th e  ca u sa l 
re la tio n s h ip  betw een th e  d a m a g in g  a c tiv ity  and th e  re s u ltin g  dam age, b u t in  re a lity  it
41 In  fa c t, un d e r th e  A m e rica n  O P A  a n y  person m ay re c o v e r dam ages equa l to  th e  
lo ss  o f p ro fits  o r im p a irm e n t o f e a rn in g  capac ity  d u e  to  in ju ry , de stru ctio n  o r lo ss  o f 
re a l p ro p e rty , personal p ro p e rty  a n d /o r na tu ra l resources.
42 S ee  D a v id  Jacoby and A b b ie  E re m ich , w ho co n s id e r th a t th e se  dam ages ca n  be 
co n s id e re d  p u n itive  if it is  n o t b u t a  su b sta n tia l p o rtio n  o f th e  norm al dam age  aw a rd ; 
se e  a lso  H ans Jessurun d ’O liv e ira , w ho  concludes th a t b y  g iv in g  to ta l freedom  in  th e  
a llo c a tio n  o f th e  dam age a w a rd s , a  c iv il lia b ility  re g im e  m a y le a d  to  com pensa tion  b u t 
n o t n e c e ssa rily  to  the  re s to ra tio n  o f th e  e nv ironm en t;
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m ay p ro ve  d iffic u lt to  e s ta b lish  such a lin k  w ith  to ta l ce rta in ty , fo r exam ple in  those 
s itu a tio n s  w here o n ly  th e  accum u la tio n  o f p o llu tin g  em issions fro m  severa l sources 
le a d s to  harm fu l e ffe c ts  43. In  fa c t, the  re q u ire m e n t o f th is  causal link be tw een  the  
p o llu tin g  in c id e n t and th e  d am ages su ffe re d  is  s till o n e  o f the  m a jo r obstacles to  an 
e ffic ie n t co m p e n sa tio n  fo r env iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  th ro u g h  any c iv il lia b ility  sys te m  44.
N e ve rth e le ss, th e  re ce n t tre n d  has be e n  th e  e vo lu tio n  from  sc ie n tific  p ro o f o f 
ca u sa tio n  to  a re ve rsa l o f th e  onus o f p ro o f o f ca u sa tio n , by adopting a m uch b roader 
c o n ce p t o f gene ra l c a p a b ility  to  cause e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age 45. T here fore , on  the 
o ne  hand , any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t on c iv il lia b ility  fo r  e n v ironm en ta l dam age should  
acknow led ge  th e  in cre a s in g  use o f e p id e m io lo g ica l s tu d ie s , genera l s ta tis tic s  and 
p ro b a b ilis tic  p ro o f46 to  a s ce rta in  th e  re fe rre d  ca u sa l lin k . O n the  o th e r hand, it  w ou ld  
pe rh a p s be  c o n ve n ie n t to  e xa m in e  th e  fe a s ib ility  o f estab lish ing  th e  reve rsa l o f the  
b u rden  o f p ro o f. In  fa c t, u n d e r ce rta in  co n d itio n s  it  sh o u ld  be th e  po ten tia l p o llu te r 
w ho has to  prove  th a t th e  s p e c ific  dam ages have  n o t been caused by any p o llu tin g  
in c id e n t o rig in a te d  b y  th e  a c tiv itie s  under h is  co n tro l 47, w h ich  are  genera lly capab le  
o f ca u s in g  en v iro n m e n ta l dam age .
43 F u rthe rm ore , se e  G len  O ’ R obinson a cco rd ing  to  w hom  the  com plexity o f assign ing  
ca u sa l re sp o n s ib ility  is  p ro p o rtio n a l to  the  e lapsed tim e  betw een the  exposure to  an 
en v iro n m e n ta l risk  and  its  ca u sa l d e te rm ina tion ;
44 S e e  H ans-D ie te r S e llsh o p p , "Multiple tortfeasors/ combined polluter theory, 
causality and assumption of proof/ statistical proof, technical insurance aspects/ in 
T ra n sn a tio n a l e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  and insurance  b y  R alph K roner, 1993 re ca llin g  
th a t th e  p rob lem  o f the  n e g lig e n ce  c rite ria  in fa u lt lia b ility  was substitu ted  b y  the  
ca u sa tio n  standard  in s tric t lia b ility ;
45 S e e  Hans-Dieter Sellschopp;
46 S ee G len  O 'R ob inson , "Risk, causation and harrrf, in  L ia b ility  and re sp o n s ib ility : 
essays in  m oral and law , a cco rd in g  to  w hich p ro b a b ilis tic  eva lua tions w ill be b a se d  on 
a gg rega te  s ta tis tics  th a t w ill n o t d iffe re n tia te  betw een m an ifested  harm s th a t p ro b a b ly  
w ere  th e  p roduct o f a  p a rtic u la r risk  exposure  and a n tic ip a te d  harm s tha t w ill p ro b a b ly  
ensue  fro m  it;
47 F o r exam ple , see  th e  G erm an E nvironm en ta l L ia b ility  Law  o f 1990, w h ich  
e s ta b lish e s  a  p resum ption  o f causa tion  acco rd ing  to  w h ich  if  a  ce rta in  in s ta lla tio n  is 
ca p a b le  o f causing  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age it is  p resum ed th a t it d id  so ;
159
C H A PTER 7
CON CLUSIO N S
160
72.2.2.___Joint and Several Liability
A s h a s  been p re v io u s ly  a n a lyse d , th e  p ro b le m s  o f p roving  ca u sa tio n  are  
so m e tim e s  overcom e b y  th e  a cce p ta n ce  o f a  jo in t and s e ve ra l lia b ility  ru le , acco rd in g  
to  w h ich  o n e  o f th e  in d iv id u a l p e rso n s  re sp o n sib le  fo r p a rt o f th e  dam age can be  he ld  
lia b le  fo r  th e  w ho le  a m o u n t o f it  48. In  fa c t, su ch  a  ru le  w ou ld  fa c ilita te  the  p la in tiff's  
burden o f p ro v in g  th e  ca u sa l lin k  betw een a ll the  p o llu tin g  inc iden ts  a nd  th e ir 
co n se q u e n t dam age.
H ow ever, one o f in co n ve n ie n ce s  p o in ted  o u t w ith  re g a rd  to  the  accep tan ce  o f th is  
ru le  o f jo in t and  severa l lia b ility , is  th a t the  su b se q u e n t co n trib u tio n  a c tio n s  b ro u g h t by 
th e  d e fe n d a n t, p re v io u s ly  he ld  re sp o n s ib le  fo r th e  w h o le  dam age, a g a in s t th e  o th e r 
lia b le  p a rtie s  w ould  co n g e s t th e  c o u rts  and fu rth e r ra ise  the  tra n sa ctio n  co s ts . T h is  
m ay be so lv e d  by p re v io u s ly  e s ta b lish in g  th e  person  to  w hom  lia b ility  w o u ld  be 
ch a n n e lle d  49 and by p ro h ib itin g  th e  de fe n d a n t to  se e k redress. N e ve rth e le ss, th is  
op tion  se e m s to o  d ra s tic  in  re la tio n  to  th e  s ig n ifica n ce  o f th e  prob lem  50.
H ow ever, m aybe a  m ix tu re  b e tw e e n  th e  sys te m  proposed  b y  the  C o n ve n tio n  and 
th a t p roposed  b y th e  d ra ft D ire c tiv e  w ou ld  e ffic ie n tly  d e a l w ith  such p ro b le m . In  o th e r 
w ords, if  a  ru le  o f jo in t a nd  s e v e ra l lia b ility  is a cce p te d  it m ay be  co n ve n ie n t to  bo th  
ch a n n e l lia b ility  in to  a  p re v io u s ly  esta b lish e d  o rd e r and  to  enable th e  d e fe n d a n t to  
p rove  th a t o n ly  p a rt o f th e  d a m a g e  w as caused b y h is  in d iv id u a l a c tiv ity . In th e  end . 
lia b ility  w o u ld  be  m ore e ffic ie n tly  ch a n n e lle d  b u t th e  d e fe n d a n t held p rim a rily  lia b le  
w o u ld  b e  a b le  to  p rove  th a t the  d a m a g e  being d iv is ib le , th e  po llu ting  a c tiv ity  u n d e r his 
co n tro l h a s  on ly  p a rtia lly  ca used  th e  en v iro n m e n ta l dam age  in question .
48 S ee C h a p te r 5 , pa rag rap h  5 .5  and  C hap te r 6 , p a rag rap h  6 .2 .7 .1 ;
49 A cco rd in g  to  po in t 2 .1 .4
50 See p o in t 2 .1 .4 . o f th e  G reen  P aper a cco rd ing  to  w h ich  im posing lia b ility  on  a 
s p e c ific  p a rty  m ay be  an e ffic ie n t and e q u ita b le  w ay o f co s t in te rn a lis in g . 
F u rth e rm o re , it w ill a lso  p ro m o te  p re ve n tio n  if th is  sp e c ific  pa rty  has th e  o p e ra tio n a l 
co n tro l to  c a rry  o u t th e  m ost e ffe c tiv e  risk m anagem e n t e ith e r because it has the  
b ig g e s t re so u rce s  a n d /o r e xp e rtise ;
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A cco rd in g  to  th e  d e fe n d a n ts  o f th e  s tro n g e r ve rs io n  o f c iv il lia b ility  fo r 
e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e , a n y  in s tru m e n t o n  th e  su b je c t shou ld  be in c lin e d  to  lim it the 
p o ss ib le  g rounds fo r  e xe m p tio n  fro m  lia b ility , in  o rd e r to  assure a  m ore e ffe c tiv e  
p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t th ro u g h  adeq u a te  com pensa tion  fo r p o llu tio n  v ic tim s . 
H o w e ve r, such an  u n lim ite d  lia b ility  syste m , w ith  n o  exem ptions and no fin a n c ia l 
c e ilin g s , w o u ld  o n ly  be  a cce p te d  w ith  g re a t d iffic u lty .
7.2.3.1. Force Maleure
T h is  w as one o f th e  a sp e cts  on  w hich th e  in te rn a tio n a l and co m m u n ity  le g is la to r 
w ere  n o t ab le  to  a g ree , as has been seen in  th e  p re ce d in g  C hap te rs 51. D esp ite  the  
c ritic is m s  m ade o f the  c la s s ic  d e fin itio n  o f In te rn a tio n a l Law , nam ely th a t it 
e x h a u s tiv e ly  lis ts  th e  s p e c ific  s itu a tio n s  o f force majeure, th is  d e fin itio n  s till seem s 
p re fe ra b le . H ow ever, th is  d e fin itio n  o f force majeure th a t excludes any person from  
lia b ility  if he p roves th a t th e  dam age w as ca used  b y  an  a c t o f w a r, h o s tilitie s , c iv il 
w ar, in su rre c tio n  o r a  n a tu ra l phenom enon o f a n  e xce p tio n a l, in e v ita b le  and 
irre s is tib le  c h a ra c te r s till a llo w s  fo r a  ce rta in  m a rg in  o f d is c re tio n  in  its  in te rp re ta tio n .
T h e  d e fin itio n s  a d vo ca te d  b y th e  EEC  in s titu tio n s  n o t on ly  seem  to o  va g u e  b u t 
a re  a ls o  dependen t o n  th e  in te rp re ta tio n  m ade  o f s e v e ra l abstract co n ce p ts  th e y  re fe r 
to , su ch  as th e  te rm  "a c ts  o f G o d "52 and th e  co n ce p t o f "unusua l a n d  un fo reseeab le
51 S e e  C h a p te r6 , p a rag rap h  6.2 .8 .1  and C h a p te rs , p a ra g ra p h  6 .7 .1 ;
52 S e e  p o in t 13 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta tem en t, a cco rd in g  to  w hich th e  p o llu te r can 
o n ly  b e  exem pted fro m  lia b ility  if he p roves n o t o n ly  th a t th e  dam age w as ca u se d  by 
acts o f G od but a lso  th a t h is  a c tio n s  w ere n o t n e g lig e n t in  re la tion  to  su ch  a  ris k ;
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c ircu m s ta n ce s " N e ve rth e le ss , it  seem s th a t th e  tre n d  is  tow ards co n s id e rin g  the  
in c re a s in g  te c h n ic a l m e a n s to  c o n tro l these  na tu ra l e ve n ts  and th e re fo re  to  a b o lish  
th e  d e fe n ce  b a sed  on a  "A c t o f G o d ".
7.2.3.2. Fault or interest of the Injured Party
T h is  is  o n e  o f the  le ss  c o n tro v e rs ia l g rounds o f e xe m p tio n , accord ing  to  w h ich  
w hen th e  v ic tim s  co n d u c t o r o m is s io n  has co n trib u te d  to  th e  dam age, th e  lia b ility  o f 
the  re sp o n s ib le  person sh o u ld  be  reduced  a cco rd ing ly  o r d isa llow e d . In o th e r w o rd s , if 
th e  d e fe n d a n t is  ab le  to  p ro ve  th a t th e  b e h a v io u r o f th e  in ju re d  person, o r any o th e r 
person u n d e r his re sp o n s ib ility , h a s p a rtia lly  o r w h o lly  co n trib u te d  to  th e  dam age  o r 
in ju ry  to  th e  e n v iro n m e n t, h is  lia b ility  sh o u ld  be a cco rd in g ly  w aived.
It is  s till u n c le a r w h e th e r th e  d e fe n d a n t has a lso  to  p ro ve  th a t the  c o n trib u to ry  acts 
o f the  in ju re d  pa rty , o r a n y o th e r pe rson  under h is  re sp o n s ib ility , w ere  fa u lty  o r 
n e g lig e n t. A s  a lready m e n tio n e d , if th e re  is  no  such  need  to  p rove  th e  fa u lty  o r 
n e g lig e n t b e h a v io u r o f th e  v ic tim , th e  la tte r w ou ld  be  s u b je c t to  a  kind o f s tric t lia b ility  
system  acco rd in g  to  w h ich  th e  d e fe n d a n t w ou ld  o n ly  h a ve  to  prove th e  ca u sa l lin k  
be tw een  th e  co n trib u to ry  a c ts  o f th e  re fe rre d  v ic tim  and  th e  dam age in  q u e stio n .
N o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e  "s tric tn e s s " o f th is  system  it  se e m s p re fe ra b le  to  a vo id  lin k in g  
th is  e xe m p tio n  w ith  th e  re q u ire m e n t o f p ro v in g  th e  fa u lt o r neg ligence o f th e  v ic tim , 
w h ich  e le m e n ts  can be to  d iffic u lt to  fu lfil bu t w ith o u t w h ich  th e  exem ption  can s till be 
c la im e d . Instead , the  e x is te n ce  o r n o n -e x is te n ce  o f fa u lt can  be tra n s la te d  in to  the  
degree  to  w h ich  th e  lia b ility  o f th e  d e fe n d a n t is  re d uced  o r d isa llow ed.
7.2.3.3. Contributory Acts of Third Parties 53
53 S ee th e  d e fin itio n  o f force majeure g ive n  b y th e  EC J o n  th e  C ase 145/85, Denkavit 





C oncern ing  th e  in te rv e n tio n  o f th ird  p a rtie s  it se e m s peacefu l th a t th e  lia b ility  o f 
th e  d e fe n d a n t sh a ll be  w a ive d  if  he p roves th a t th e  dam age  in q u e stio n  w as caused 
by th e  in ten tio na l co n d u ct o f a  th ird  party . H ow ever, u n like  the above exe m p tio n , the 
d e fe n d a n t w ill h a ve  to  p ro ve  th a t n o t on ly w a s  it th e  fa u lty  conduct o f a  th ird  p a rty  th a t 
ca u se d  th e  dam age  b u t a ls o  th a t he h im s e lf w as n o t a t fa u lt, h a v in g  ta ke n  a ll the  
a d e q u a te  m easures to  p re v e n t and  avoid  s u c h  dam age.
7.2.3A. Authorisation bv Public Authorities
C oncern ing  th e  p o s s ib ility  o f avo id ing  lia b ility  b y  com ply ing  w ith  th e  co n d itio n s  se t 
in  th e  p e rm it issued  b y th e  com p e te n t p u b lic  a u th o ritie s , th e  le g a l instrum ents 
ana lysed  have d iffe re d  in  th e  rig h ts  g ive n  to  th e  d e fe n d a n t. O n th e  one hand, the  
E E C  d ra ft D ire c tive  e s ta b lish e s  th a t th e  e x is te n ce  o f su ch  a  p e rm it does n o t lim it o r 
e xc lu d e  c iv il lia b ility  fo r d a m a g e  and in ju ry  to  th e  environm en t. O n  th e  o th e r hand, 
th e  C onven tion  e xc ludes th e  d e fend an t fro m  lia b ility  if he p ro ve s  th a t h e  was 
co m p ly in g  w ith  a  "s p e c ific  o rd e r o r a com p u lso ry  m easure  o f a p u b lic  n a tu re " legal 
ru le s.
A s  has a lready been  m e n tio n e d , one o f th e  p u rposes o f any en v iro n m e n ta l p e rm it 
is  to  a llo w  na tiona l g o ve rn m e n ts  to  con tro l th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  be low  an accep tab le  
le v e l th a t can be  d iffic u lt to  e s ta b lish . H ow ever, s in ce  th e se  leve ls a re  a lso su b je c t to  
co n s ta n t change, even  w h e n  th e  p o llu tin g  a c tiv ity  has been p re v io u s ly  au tho rise d  
d a m age  to  the  e n v iro n m e n t m ay s till o ccu r 54. T h e re fo re , the  m ere ho ld ing  o f o ffic ia l 
a u th o risa tio n s  sh o u ld  no t d isch a rg e  the  person  responsib le  fo r th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
d am age  fro m  h is e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility . N e ve rth e le ss , it is up to  the  p la in tiff to
54 T h is  paragraph w ill re p e a t som e  o f th e  th o u g h ts  expressed  in C h a p te r 5 , because  
o f th e ir im portance  in  co n c lu d in g  fo r the  b e s t so lu tio n  to  th e  question ;
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d e m o n s tra te  th a t h is co n d u ct lie s  w ith in  the  a m b it o f th e  a u tho risa tion  w h ich  cove rs  
h is a c tiv ity  unde r lega l o r a d m in is tra tive  re g u la tio n s .
T a k in g  in to  a ccoun t th a t c e rta in  p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  a re  g ive n  the  co m p e te n ce  -  and 
a lso  th e  d u ty  -  to  e s ta b lish  th e  accep tab le  q u a n tity  and q u a lity  o f th e  p o llu tin g  
a c tiv itie s , th e y  should  b e  co n s id e re d  as re g u la to ry  b o d ie s  responsib le  fo r a  s p e c ific  
e n v iro n m e n t. T h e re fo re , it has b e e n  in cre a s in g ly  m a in ta in e d  th a t th e  p u b lic  a u th o rity  
w h ich  h a s  issued a  "p o llu tio n  p e rm it" shou ld  b e  he ld  lia b le  fo r the  dam age  ca u se d  by 
th e  a u th o rise d  a c tiv ity , w h ere  th e  la tte r has fu lly  c o m p lie d  w ith  the  s ta n d a rd s  s e t in 
th e  p e rm it. H ow ever, th is  p u b lic  a u th o rity  is n o t to  be  h e ld  lia b le  fo r th e  p o llu tio n  its e lf 
b u t fo r  th e  inadequate  fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  a p p lica b le  le g is la tio n  o r p e rm its  o r fo r  the  
d e fic ie n t co n tro l o f the  in s ta lla tio n s  ca u s in g  p o llu tio n .
F in a lly , as has a lre a d y  b e e n  suggested  th e  lia b ility  o f these p u b lic  a u th o ritie s  
shou ld  b e  p ropo rtion a l to  th e ir e ffe c tiv e  re sp o n s ib ility  in  th e  e n v ironm en ta l d a m a g e  in 
que stio n  and th e re fo re  it sh o u ld  be  jo in t and se v e ra l w ith  th e  "rea l" p o llu te rs  55. T h is  
ru le  o f jo in t and se ve ra l lia b ility  is  based on  th e  id e a  th a t even if  th e  d e fe n d a n t's  
p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s  have been d u ly  au tho rise d , th e  la tte r a re  expected to  e xe rc ise  th e ir 
a c tiv itie s  in  good  fa ith  w ith o u t a b u s in g  th e ir p o llu tio n  p e rm its  56.
7.2.3.5. Contractual Derogation
U n like  th e  EC D ra ft D ire c tiv e , th e  C o u n c il o f E urope  C onven tion  d o e s  no t 
e x p lic itly  re fe r to  the  q u e stio n  o f w h e th e r it is  p o ss ib le  to  negotia te  th e  lia b ility  th a t 
a rises u n d e r its  p ro v is io n s . N e ve rth e le ss , it appea rs  lo g ic a l th a t any "e n v iro n m e n ta l"
55 S ee C h a p te r 5;
56 W ith in  th e  fie ld  o f in te rn a tio n a l la w  se e  T hom as G e h rin g  and M arkus Ja ch te n fu ch s , 
"Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage? in  European Jo u rn a l o f 
In te rn a tio n a l Law , v o l. 4 , n2 1, 1993, pp. 105, w ho co n c lu d e  th a t d am age  fro m  
a c tiv ité s  n o t p roh ib ite d  b y  in te rn a tio n a l law  sh o u ld  be  su b je c t m a in ly  to  a  p rim a ry  
lia b ility  o f th e  p riva te  p a rtie s  a n d  o n ly  som etim es to  a  su b s id ia ry  lia b ility  o f lice n s in g  





lia b ility  system  shou ld  n o t a llo w  lia b ility  to  b e  n e g o tia b le , in  o rde r to  a vo id  d ange ro us 
a c tiv itie s  being passed  o n  to  sm a lle r com pan ie s w ith  an  in s u ffic ie n t fin a n c ia l c a p a c ity  
to  c o v e r any p o te n tia l e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age.
H ow ever, th e  v a lid ity  o f ce rta in  co n tra c tu a l a rrangem en ts  be tw e e n  th e  person 
th a t is  he ld  lia b le  and th e  person a c tu a lly  re sp o n s ib le  fo r s p e c ific  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
d a m age  should be  le ft to  in te rn a l law .
7.2.3.6. Acceptable Level of Pollution
A ccord ing  to  re ce n t d o c trin e  an a cce p ta b le  le v e l o f p o llu tio n  shou ld  n o t be 
in c lu d e d  am ong th e  p o ss ib le  grounds fo r e xe m p tio n , s in ce  its in te rp re ta tio n  w ould 
p ro b a b ly  lead to  se ve ra l d iscre p a n cie s.
7.2.4. Limitation Periods
7.2.4.1. Expiration Period
In  re la tio n  to  th e  tim e  lim its  w ith in  w h ich  a  p o llu tio n  v ic tim  m a y bring  a  legal 
a c tio n  fo r dam age o r im p a irm e n t to  the  e n v iro n m e n t, b o th  th e  d ra ft D ire c tive  and the  
C o u n c il o f E urope C o n ve n tio n  seem  to  ag re e  th a t harm onised e x p iry  p e rio d s  are 
nece ssa ry  to  a vo id  s itu a tio n s  o f fo rum -shopp ing , w h e re  th e  p o te n tia l p la in tiff w ou ld  
ch o o se  th e  ju risd ic tio n  w ith  th e  lo ngest e xp ira tio n  p e rio d .
A cco rd in g ly , th e  le g a l p roceed ings fo r th e  re c o v e ry  o f dam ages sh a ll b e  ba rre d  
a fte r an  exp iry  p e rio d  o f th re e  years fro m  th e  m o m e n t the  p la in tiff knew  o r shou ld  
have  know n o f th e  dam age and  o f the  id e n tity  o f th e  p o llu te r. T h is la s t re fe re n ce  to  
the  id e n tity  o f the  p o llu te r sh o u ld  a lso  be in c lu d e d  because  in m any p o llu tio n  ca se s  it 
m ay ta ke  seve ra l years fo r  th e  p la in tiff to  in ve s tig a te  and d e te rm in e  w ho  is  the  
in d iv id u a l de fend an t am ong th e  po ten tia l p o llu tin g  p a rtie s . It is  a d v isa b le  to  e s ta b lish
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such  a n  e xp iry  period to  a llo w  fo r  b e tte r a d m in is tra tio n  o f ju s tice  a nd  to  a v o id  any
abuses.
F u rth e rm o re , fo llo w in g  th e  o p tio n s  m ade in  m ost c iv il lia b ility  sys te m s a  g e n e ra l 
e xp iry  p e rio d  should a lso  be e stab lish ed , acco rd in g  to  w h ich  no a c tio n s  m a y  be 
b ro u g h t a fte r a period o f th irty  ye a rs  fro m  the  m o m e n t th e  p o llu tin g  in c id e n t o ccu rre d . 
H ow ever, any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t on  c iv il lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  sh o u ld  
s p e c ific a lly  de te rm ine  th g e  d a te  fro m  w hich  th is  g e n e ra l exp iry  p e rio d  is  to  be 
co u n te d , nam e ly  by c la rify in g  th e  in te rp re ta tio n  th a t can  b e  m ade o f th e  te rm  in c id e n t
57
LZÆZ.___ Retroactive Application
W ith in  E urope, a ll s id e s  o f th e  d iscuss ion  ta b le  seem  to  agree th a t any sy s te m  on 
c iv il lia b ility  fo r e n v ironm en ta l d a m a g e  shou ld  n o t b e  re tro a c tiv e , s in c e  it is  se ttle d  
th a t a s p e c ific  a c tiv ity  p e rfo rm e d  b e fo re  th e  e n try  in to  fo rce  o f a  c e rta in  lia b ility  
in s tru m e n t shou ld  not b e  undu ly  p e n a lise d  w ith  th e  re s to ra tio n  o f dam ages fro m  the  
past. In  o th e r w ords, any fu tu re  e n v iro n m e n ta l lia b ility  in s tru m e n t sh o u ld  c le a rly  
sp e c ify  fro m  w h a t da te  it sh a ll a p p ly  w ith o u t re la tin g  it to  p a s t dam age * 58. '
T he  s p e c ific  ch a ra c te ris tics  o f th e  p ro sp e ctive  a p p lic a tio n  o f any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t 
w ill de p e n d  o n  th e  a c tiv itie s  w ith in  its  scope . F o r e xa m p le , th e  C o u n c il o f E u rope  
C o n ve n tio n  estab lishes s p e c ific  re g im e s  w ith  rega rd  to  th e  s itua tion s o f co n tin u o u s  
p o llu tin g  occurrences a n d /o r s e rie s  o f o ccu rrences and a n o th e r d iffe re n t a p p lica tio n  
reg im e fo r th e  perm anen t w a ste  d e p o s it s ite s . T h e  firs t s itu a tio n s  a p p lie s  o n ly  to  th o se
7 S ee a rtic le  1 7 ^2  o f th e  C o n ve n tio n  and p o in t 7 8  o f th e  E xp lana to ry  R eport, 
a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  th is  g e n e ra l e x p iry  period  sh a ll be  co u n te d  from  th e  end  o f a  
co n tin u o u s  p o llu tin g  o ccu rrence  o r fro m  th e  la s t o f a  se rie s  o f occu rrences h a v in g  the  
sam e o rig in . In re la tio n  to  th e  p e rm a n e n t d e p o s it o f w a ste s  the  p e rio d  s h a ll be 
co u n te d  fro m  th e  date w h e n  the  s ite  w as le g a lly  c lo se d ;
58 S ee p o in t 7 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t o f th e  "R e p o rt on P re ve n tin g  and 
R em edying  E nv ironm en ta l D am age" (h e re a fte r E xp la n a to ry  S ta tem en t);
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d am ages caused b y occu rre n ce s  w hich to o k  p la c e  a fte r th e  C o n ve n tio n  p ro v is io n s  
w e re  in  fo rce , b u t th e  re g im e  in  re la tio n  to  th e  w a s te  d isposa l s ite s  a p p lie s  o n ly  to  
th o s e  dam ages w h ich  be co m e  know n a fte r th e  sa m e  e n try  in to  fo rc e . D e sp ite  th is  
d iffe re n c e , n e ith e r reg im e  co n s id e rs  re le v a n t th e  m o m e n t w hen th e  p o llu tin g  in c id e n t 
o ccu rre d . R egard less o f th e  concre te  o p tio n  ch o se n  b y any fu tu re  in s tru m e n t, it w ill 
th u sa lw a ys  be necessa ry  to  c la rify  and d e te rm in e  th e  te rm  "inc iden t".
7.2.5. Insurance
A s p re v io u s ly  co n c lu d e d , th e  m ain co n ce rn  is  th a t if insu rance  is  to  b e  m ade 
co m p u lso ry  it  sh o u ld  be  a v a ila b le  on th e  m a rke t a t a  reasonab le  p rice  an d  under 
e x a c tly  th e  sam e co n d itio n s  th a t it is  re q u ire d . A t th e  p re se n t m om en t, th e  s itu a tio n  is 
c ritic a l s ince  m o st insu re rs  o n ly  co v e r a cc id e n ta l e ven ts  w hen th e  a p p lica b le  
e n v iro n m e n ta l standa rds h a ve  been co m p lie d  w ith  59. In  fa c t, th e  in su ra n ce  m arke t 
e n co u n te rs  se ve ra l d iffic u ltie s  in p ro v id in g  in su ra n ce  cove rage  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l 
dam age , nam ely th e  d e fin itio n  the reo f, th e  p ro b a b ility  o f its happen ing  and  its 
p ro b a b le  e x te n t
N eve rthe le ss, it is  a lso  c le a r th a t the  a v a ila b ility  o f adequate insu rance  leads to  
lo w e r p ro ductio n  co s ts  and a llo w s  po llu ting  co m p a n ie s  to  d ire c t th e ir resources, based 
on an  accu ra te  assessm ent o f th e ir en v iro n m e n ta l co s ts  in the fo rm  o f p re m iu m s, to  
th e ir m o s t e ffic ie n t u se  ®°. *60
69 S e e  Jean B ig o t, "Compensation for pollution damage and insurance", in 
C om pensa tion  fo r P o llu tio n  D am age, C h a p te r 4 , w h o  s till includes am ong th e  m ain 
c rite ria  o f in su ra b ility  th e  fo rtu ito u s  ch a ra c te r o f th e  p o llu tin g  inc iden t, th e  co m p lia n ce  
by th e  insu red  w ith  a ll e n v iro n m e n ta l s tanda rds and th e  suddenness o f th e  ca u se  o f 
dam age;
60 S e e  G eorge C . F reem an J r. and K yle E . M cS Ia rrow , " The proposed EC Directive 
on Civil Liability for Waste -  a  comparison with the US Superfund liability regime?, in  
EC E nvironm en t a n d  P lann ing  Law , C hap te r 13;
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L2mSaL___Harmonisation of European Insurance Law
T h e re fo re , if  a n y fu tu re  in s tru m e n t o n  c iv il lia b ility  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age 
re q u ire s  m andato ry in su ra n ce , perhaps a  p re v io u s  ha rm on isa tion  o f E uropean 
in su ra n ce  law  w ou ld  be  u se fu l. In  fa c t, n o t o n ly  m ay th e  d iffe re n ce s in p re m iu m s and 
in su ra n ce  co n d itio n s  c re a te  m a rke t d is to rtio n s , b u t a lso  b y  leav ing  e v e ry th in g  to  be 
d e te rm in e d  by th e  in su re rs  th e m se lve s  it m a y tra n s fo rm  them  fro m  e n v iro n m e n ta l 
p o lice m a n  to  in d u s tria l lice n se rs , th e re b y  s tiflin g  th e  in d u s try  6Y.
F u rthe rm ore , h a rm o n isa tio n re ce n t te n d e n c ie s  in  th e  E uropean in su ra n ce  m arke t 
m u s t ta k e  in to  accoun t, fo r e xa m p le , th e  c o n s titu tio n  o f new  types o f n o n -e xc lu s ive  
p o o ls  a n d  the  e x te n s io n  o f co ve ra g e  to  g ra d u a l p o llu tio n  risks  61 2 63.
72.5.2. insurance Coverage
In  g e n e ra l te rm s , e n v iro n m e n ta l in su ra n ce  co ve ra g e  should b e  e x te n d e d , fo r 
e xa m p le  it shou ld  a lso  c o v e r th e  sa lva g e  expenses an d  som e types o f no n -a cc id e n ta l 
d a m a g e , such as g ra d u a l and syn e rg e tic  p o llu tio n  . N everthe le ss, any re g u la tio n  on
61 S e e  th e  G reen P aper, a cco rd in g  to  w h ich  co m p u lso ry  insurance m ay le a d  to  a 
s itu a tio n  w here  insure rs de c id e  w h e th e r to  p ro v id e  o r w ith h o ld  insurance  c o ve ra g e  to  
a  s p e c ific  com pany if th e  la tte r h a s  a  good o r b a d  e n v iro n m e n ta l risk;
62 S e e  R a lph  P. KriSner, "Environmental Liability Insurance: Tour d'horizon in Europef 
in T ra n sn a tio n a l E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility  a nd  In su ra n ce , P a rt A , C h a p te r 1, w h ich  
ju s tifie s  th e se  new fo rm s  o f p o o lin g  to  u n d e rw rite  new , re la tive ly  unknow n p o llu tio n  
risks  u n d e r a  w e ll-co n tro lle d  re g im e  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l le g is la tio n  and e x e m p lifie s  th is  
co ve ra g e  extens ion  w ith  tw o  S w ed ish  in su ra n ce  co m p a n ie s  w ho have  d e le te d  the  
tra d itio n a l exclus ion  c la u se  fo r  g ra d u a l p o llu tio n  fro m  th e ir new g e n e ra l lia b ility  
in su ra n ce  p o lic ie s  fo r m idd le  a n d  sm a ll-s ize d  in d u s trie s ;
63 S e e  Jean B ig o t, "Compensation for pollution damage and insurance? in 
C o m p e n sa tio n  fo r P o llu tio n  D am age , C hap te r 4 , w ho in  re la tio n  to sa lva g e  expenses 
co n s id e rs  th a t by m in im is in g  th e  consequ ences o f an a c c id e n t, th e  in su re d  p a rty  is 
ta k in g  c a re  o f the  in te re s ts  o f th e  in su re r a n d , in  accordance  w ith  th e  g e nera l 





e n v iro n m e n ta l insurance  sh o u ld  a lw ays p ro v id e  fo r c e rta in  lim ita tio n s , fo r exam ple  by 
e xc lu d in g  from  its co ve ra g e  th e  c o s t o f lia b ility  fo r d a m a g e  caused in te n tio n a lly  64.
F u rth e rm o re , in su ra n ce  ca n  o n ly  becom e an e ffic ie n t m eans o f addressin g  the  
risk  o f p o llu tio n  lia b ility  if sa id  risk  is  assessed a c cu ra te ly , nam ely th ro u g h  adequate  
e n v iro n m e n ta l a u d its , and if  s u ffic ie n t c la im s  re se rve s  a re  co rrespond ing ly  s e t 65 6. 
A c co rd in g ly , th e  co n d itio n s , e xc lu s io n s  and lim its  o f a n y  insurance p o lic y  w ill h a ve  to  
be  s p e c ific a lly  es tab lish ed , ta k in g  in to  a cco u n t th e  p a rtic u la r ch a ra c te ris tics  o f the  
e n v iro n m e n ta l risks to  b e  co ve re d .
7.2.5.3. Geographical Coverage
It m a y p rove  co n ve n ie n t to  re s tric t co ve rage  to  a  s ite  th a t has p re v io u s ly  been 
sp e c ifie d  in the  insurance p o lic y , thereby a llow ing  th e  insu re r to  e la b o ra te  sound  
ra tin g s  based  on the  re a l n a tu re  o f the  e n v iro n m e n t in  w h ich  the  insu red  ca rrie s  o u t 
h is  a c tiv itie s  .
7.2.S.4. Temporal Coverage
In o rd e r to  guaran te e  adequ a te  co m p e n sa tio n  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age , 
in su ra n ce  cove rage  shou ld  p a y  a ll c la im s fo r d am ages ca used  by p o llu tin g  in c id e n ts  
o ccu rrin g  during  the  p o licy  p e rio d , even if th e  p o licy  h a s  te rm in a te d  67. In fa c t, if
64 See W e rn e r P fe n n ig sto rf, "The continental view, in  T ra n sn a tio n a l E n v iro n m e n ta l 
L ia b ility  a nd  Insurance, P art D , C hap te r 2, w ho  a lso  co n s id e rs  th a t in su ra n ce  sh o u ld  
be  lim ite d  th rough  re in su ra n ce , aggrega te  lim it pe r p o lic y  period , lim its  pe r e v e n t 
a n d /o r b y  p rov id ing  fo r se ria l c la im s  clauses;
65 S ee C h a rle s  S. D onovan a nd  E lisabeth M . M ille r, "77 ie  American View, in 
T ra n sn a tio n a l L ia b ility  and  In su rance , P art D , C h a p te r 1, w ho  a lso re fe rs  to  o th e r 
lim ita tiv e  causes to  th e  in s u ra b ility  o f the  ris k  o f e n v iro n m e n ta l p o llu tio n  lia b ility , 
nam ely th e  lack  o f c la im s h is to ry , th e  u n ce rta in ty  o f co v e ra g e  under e x is tin g  p o lic ie s  , 
th e  like lih o o d  o f re su ltin g  litig a tio n  and  the  sh e e r m a g n itu d e  o f the  p o te n tia l lia b ility ;
66 S ee R a lph  P. K riin e r;
67 In fa c t, th e  tra d itio n a l g e n e ra l lia b ility  p o lic ie s  exposed  th e  insured to  a  ru n -o ff risk  
b y  co ve rin g  th e  lia b ility  o f the  insu red  p rov ided  it is  b a se d  upon an a c t o r o m iss io n  
co m m itte d  during  the  p e rio d  o f th e  insurance;
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c o v e ra g e  w as o n ly  g ive n  to  c la im s  m ade d u rin g  th e  p o licy  period o r w ith in  a  ce rta in  
d e a d lin e , these p o llu tio n  d e la y e d  e ffe c ts  o r p o llu tio n  caused  by person w ho  has since 
b e co m e  inso lven t, w o u ld  p ro b a b ly  be  le ft u n p a id
7.2.5.5.__ Future Perspectives
H ow ever, in th o se  s itu a tio n s  o f dam age w h e re  it  is  no t possib le  to  id e n tify  the 
in d iv id u a l p o llu te r b u t o n ly  th e  branch o f in d u s try  w h ich  has p ro b a b ly  caused  the  
p o llu tin g  inc iden t, it  m ay b e  p re fe ra b le  to  co m p e n sa te  fo r such dam age  th rough  a 
p re v io u s ly  estab lish ed  fu n d , d u e  to  the  in su ra n ce  h ig h  costs. H ow ever, s in ce  the  
a d h e s io n  to  such fu n d s  sh o u ld  be vo lu n ta ry  68 9, th e  com panies w h ich  are not 
m e m b e rs  o f any fu n d  sh o u ld  be  ob lig e d  to  a cq u ire  insurance fo r th e ir po ten tia l 
p o llu tin g  a c tiv itie s .
B esides these sys te m s o f com pu lso ry  in su ra n ce  and com pensa tion  funds it 
w o u ld  perhaps be in te re s tin g  to  s tu d y  o th e r p o s s ib ilitie s  such as in su ra n ce  con tracts , 
s e lf-in su ra n ce , m u tua l fu n d s  a n d  insurance  p o o ls  70.
ZJ2J.6.__ Insurance Pools
Insurance  P ools is  o n e  o f th e  p o ss ib ilitie s  re fe rre d  to  above , w h ich  shou ld  be 
s p e c ific a lly  ana lysed s in ce  it is  ga in in g  in c re a s in g  support am ong th e  E uropean 
S ta te s . In  fa c t, th e  m a in  in su ra n ce  poo ls, th e  D u tch  M as, the  F rench A ssu rp o l, the
68 S e e  R alph P. K rô n e r, w h o  n o te s  th e  te n d e n cy  to w a rd s  the  adop tio n  o f a  "c la im s 
m a d e " system , w hose  p o lic ie s  a p p ly  a  schem e based  upon a lim it p e r c la im  and per 
in su ra n ce  year;
69 T o  a vo id  s itu a tio n s  w h e re  th e  adm iss ion  to  a  sp e c ific  fu n d  re su lts  in the 
in tro d u c tio n  o f a  c lo se d  s h o p  o r re s tric ts  the  acce ss  to  a  pro fession  o r m arke t;
70 S e e  A n thony J. E . F itzs im m o n s , *Non-marine environmental liability: the use of 
insurance pools and the European dimensiorf, in  T ransna tion a l E nv ironm en ta l 
L ia b ility  and Insurance , P a rt D , C h a p te r 3 , w ho  d e fin e s  insurance p o o ls  as con tractua l 
a rra n g e m e n ts  under w h ich  in su re rs  band to g e th e r to  share  com m on a d m in is tra tive  
fa c ilitie s , th e  risks u n d e rw ritte n  being s p lit be tw e e n  th e  pool m em bers  in fixed  
p ro p o rtio n s , o ve rhead s u su a lly  b e in g  s p lit in  th e  sa m e  p ropo rtion s;
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S w edish  and the  re ce n t D an ish  Pool have he lped to  o b v ia te  seve ra l p ro b le m s th a t 
co m p e n sa tio n  fo r e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age w as encoun te ring  in  those  co u n trie s .
T h e  m ain  ch a ra c te ris tics  o f these  E uropean poo ls  is  th a t un like  n o rm a l in su ra n ce  
p o lic ie s , th e y  usua lly  co ve r g ra d u a l p o llu tio n  and fin a n c ia l tosses, th e  la tte r u n d e r 
c e rta in  co n d itio n s . H ow ever, th e y  do  no t ge n e ra lly  c o v e r eco log ica l d a m a g e , d a m a g e  
n o tifie d  a fte r exp iry  o f th e  insu rance , illega l p o llu tio n  a nd  po llu ting  a c ts  o r o m iss io n s  
p rio r to  th e  s ta rt o f th e  p o licy  a n d  a lso  a fte r its  e xp iry . T h e  use o f q u e stio n n a ire s , lo c a l 
in sp e c tio n s  and fu rth e r te ch n ica l investiga tions a re  am ong the  w ork ing  p ro ce d u re s  
re q u ire d  fo r acceptance to  th e  pools, b u t a t th is  phase som e p o o ls  c o v e r th e  
e xpense s incurred to  p re ve n t spreading o f p o llu tio n  and expenses fo r v e rify in g  
w h e th e r p o llu tio n  has o ccu rre d  71.
S om e o f these c h a ra c te ris tics  o f the  European p o o ls  should  be ta ke n  in to  a c c o u n t 
in  the  fo rm u la tio n  o f a n y  fu tu re  jo in t com pensation schem e.
7.2.6. Joint Compensation Schemes
In fa c t, the re  a re  se ve ra l s itua tion s w here  it is  n o t feasib le  to  co m p e n sa te  
e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age v ia  c iv il lia b ility  law , p a rtic u la rly  w hen it is  n o t p o ss ib le  to  
id e n tify  th e  responsib le  p a rty  o r w hen the  p o llu te r has s ince  becom e in s o lv e n t. In 
such  s itu a tio n s  com pensa tion  sh o u ld  be paid b y  such fu n d s , especia lly w hen th e re  is 
n o  o th e r course  o f redress, e ith e r because th e  e n v iro n m e n ta l dam age  ca n n o t be
71 F or a  v e ry  in te resting  and co m p le te  com parison  o f th e  d iffe re n t E uropean p o o ls , I 
had  th e  o p p o rtu n ity  o f hea ring  Jens 0 .  N ie lsen , R isk  M anagem ent E ng ine e r a t 
T O P D E N M A R K  and C o n su lta n t to  th e  D anish P ool o f E nvironm en ta l Im p a irm e n t 
L ia b ility
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a ttrib u te d  to  a  p a rtic u la r p o llu te r o r its  co m p e n sa tio n  cannot b e  o b ta in e d  from  
in s u ra n c e  72.
F u rth e rm o re , in  th e  s itu a tio n s  o f ch ro n ic  p o llu tio n , o f d ischarges lice n se d  by the  
c o m p e te n t p u b lic  a u th o ritie s , o r  o f "h is to ric a l" d a m a g e  it is  a lso necessa ry to  use 
o th e r c o lle c tiv e  fo rm s  o f co m p e n sa tin g  th e  da m a g e  caused . H ow ever, c e rta in  EEC 
in s ta n c e s  fe e l th a t th e s e  c a s e s  o f ch ro n ic , c u m u la tiv e  and past p o llu tio n  a re  b e tte r 
d e a lt w ith  a t n a tio n a l a nd  re g io n a l le v e l, s in c e  th e ir in s titu tio n a l re p re se n ta tive s  are 
m o re  a w a re  o f th e ir in itia l e v o lu tio n  73.
T h e  m a in  a d va n ta g e s  o f a n y  co m p e n sa tio n  sch e m e  are th a t th e  com pensa tion  
co s ts  w o u ld  be  jo in tly  and m o re  e a s ily  sha red  and u su a lly  th e  dam age  is  in d e m n ifie d  
m o re  q u ic k ly  74. O n  th e  o th e r h a n d , tw o  fa c to rs  m u s t be c le a rly  e s ta b lish e d : w hich 
e c o n o m ic  secto rs s h o u ld  c o n trib u te  to  a  s p e c ific  fu n d  and the  c o n d itio n s  o f these 
c o n trib u tio n s  , w h ich  sh o u ld  b e  assessed  a cco rd in g  to  th e  risk o f d a m age  75. T h is  la s t 
a s p e c t is  o f g re a t im p o rta n c e  in th e  m a in te n a n ce  o f th e  d e te rre n t e ffe c t th a t 
e n co u ra g e s  the  p o llu te r c o m p a n ie s  to  m anage  th e ir e n v ironm en ta l risks : one
72 S e e  V o tke r T h ie m , "Environmental Damage Funds* in C om pensation fo r  P o llu tio n  
D a m a g e , C hap te r 5 , w ho co m p a re s  th e  d iffe re n t n a tio n a l com pensa tion  fu n d s and 
fo rm u la te s  th e  ba s ic  tra ce s  o f an  e xe m p la ry  fu n d  m o d e l; in re la tio n  to  th e  American 
experience th e  re c e n t sp e e ch  o f Jess M anue l A lo n so , C PC U  o f N o e l/G reave s 
In co rp o ra te d  at th e  Conference on Insurance for Environmental Damage he ld  in 
L is b o n  a t 25 /11 /94  e xp la in in g  th e  new  ty p e s  o f co ve ra g e 's  th a t h ave  be e n  recen tly  
in tro d u c e d , nam ely E n v iro n m e n ta l R e m e d ia tio n  Insurance , In tegra te d  E n v iro n m e n ta l 
P ro te c tio n  Insurance  and  co m b in e d  P ro fe ss io n a l/C o n tra c tin g  E n v iro n m e n ta l L ia b ility  
In su ra n ce ;
73 S e e  p o in t 8  o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta te m e n t;
74 S e e  paragraph 5 .4 .9  o f C h a p te r 5 ; see  a ls o  p o in t 3  o f th e  G reen P aper s ta tin g  th a t 
u n d e r jo in t com p e n sa tio n  sys te m s  th e  c o s t o f d a m a g e , w hich is  th e  re s u lt o f the 
a g g re g a te  im pact o f a  s e c to r's  a c tiv itie s , is  in te rn a lise d  by b e com ing  appo rtio n e d  
a m o n g  th e  in d iv id u a l co m p a n ie s .
75 S e e  Ida K oppen , re m e m b e rin g  th a t u n d e r In te rn a tio n a l L ia b ility  Law  severa l 
p riv a te  com pensa tion  sch e m e s  have be e n  e s ta b lish e d , su ch  as T O V A LO P , 
C R IS T A L , O P O L, w hose  c o n trib u tio n  fo rm u la  o b e ys  to  th e  p rin c ip le  o f a llo ca tin g  
c o s ts  and risks  am ong a  p lu ra lity  o f acto rs w h o  a re  n o t p o llu te rs  strictchsensif.
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p o s s ib ility  cou ld  be th a t o f g ra d in g  th e  co n trib u tio n s  acco rd ing  to  th e  p o te n tia l risks  
in vo lve d  in  the  va rio u is  co m p a n ie s ' a c tiv itie s  7 6.
T h e  sp e c ific  ch a ra c te ris tics  o f a  European C om pensa tion  Fund w ill depend o n  th e  
scope  o f th e  lia b ility  in s tru m e n t to  w hich it re la te s , n a m e ly  on the  ty p e  o f a c tiv itie s  
co ve re d  a n d  on the  lim ita tio n s  im posed  on th is  lia b ility .
7 .2.6.1. Green Taxes
A cco rd in g  to  th e  E C 's p o lic y  o f fisca l h a rm on isa tion  it cou ld  be d e te rm in e d  th a t 
ce rta in  fa xe s  o r le v ie s  on p o llu tin g  p roducts, on  p o llu itn g  in s ta la tio n s  anchor on  
p o llu tio n  in  genera l w o u ld  b e  p redestin ed  to  a  E uropean C om pensation  Fund w h ich  
w o u ld  c o n trib u te  to  th e  re s to ra tio n  o f the  e n v iro n m e n t w hen th e  c iv il lia b ility  sys te m  
fa ils  to  d o  so 77. in  fa c t, such  an  environm en ta l p o lic y  fo llow s th e  re ce n t tre n d  o f 
e u ropea n  and in te rn a tio n a l s o lid a ry  in  the fie ld  o f p ro te c tio n  o f th e  e n v iro n m e n t 78. 
F o r e xa m p le , in the  fig h t a g a in s t C 0 2 , th e  E uropean C om m ission  has p roposed  
le vy in g , a t European le ve l, an environm en ta l ta x  as an in ce n tive  to  co m b a t cartoon 
d io x id e  e m iss io n s a t a ll leve ls
7S In  re la tio n  to  c o lle c tive  lia b ility  reg im es see G u n tn e r T e u b n e r, "The invisible cupola: 
from causal to collective attribution in ecological liability in  E co log ica l R e sp o n s ib ility :
S e lf-o rg a n isa tio n  in E n v iro n m e n ta l Law, w ho  p re fe rs  th e  co m b in a tio n  o f th e  
d is trib u tio n a l advan tages o f c o lle c tiv e  lia b ility  w ith  th e  in ce n tive s  o f an in d iv id u a lis in g
trend  a ffirm e d  in  th e  5 th  E n v iro n m e n ta l P rogram , acco rd ing  to  w h ich  
th e  fis c a l m easures sh o u ld  "p ro g re ss ive ly  se rve  to  d isco u ra g e  p o llu tio n  a t th e  so u rce  
o r  en co u ra g e  th e  use o f a p p ro p ria te  p roductio n  p ro ce sse s"; see a lso  E dgar G o ld , 
"Marine Pollution Liability after Exxon Valdez: the US all-or-nothing lotteryP, in  Jo u rn a l 
o f M a ritim e  Law  and C o m m e rce , v o l. 22, rf*  3 , J u ly -O c to b e r 1991, p p . 4 2 3 , w ho  
d e scrib e s  th e  in te rn a tio n a l lia b ility  and com pensa tion  re g im e  fo r o il p o llu tio n  d am age  
an d  s ta te s  th a t the  In te rn a tio n a l O il C om pensation  F und  is  financed  b y  a  C o n tra c tin g  
S ta te  le vy  o il im ports by o il co m p a n ie s ;
78 S ee th e  speech by M rs S c rive n e r, "International Solidarity: The contribution from 
Environmental Taxes and Taxation on Savings? on  T a x  L e tte r Europe o f N o ve m b e r 7 , 
1994, p p . 7 ;
a p p o rtio n m e n t; 
77 F o llo w in g  the
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T h e  A m e rica n  "S u p e rfu n d " e xp e rie n ce  In d ica te s  th a t such a  schem e Is e ffic ie n t 
fo r e m e rg e n cy  cases b u t th e  re tro s p e c tiv e  p ro v is io n  o f C ER C LA has ra ised  se ve ra l 
d o u b ts  a s  to  gene ra l fa irn e s s  a n d  e ffic ie n c y  o f th is  sys te m . T he  best ch o ice  se e m s to  
be to  le a v e  it  to  th e  S ta te s  in te rn a l law s to  re g u la te  th e  s itu a tio n s  o f dam age  in h e rite d  
fro m  th e  p a s t, w h ich  s itu a tio n s  w e re  su b je c t to  n a tio n a l law  a t the  tim e  th e  dam age 
w as ca u se d .
7.2.7. Conclusion
T h e  d u a lis tic  s o lu tio n  su g g e s te d  by th e  G reen  P aper seem s to  b e  a  ve ry  
a ttra c tiv e  one : w hen a  c e rta in  e n v iro n m e n ta l d a m a g e  can be a ttrib u te d  to  an 
in d iv id u a l p o llu te r w ho  is  s o lv e n t, th e  in ju re d  pe rson  sh o u ld  seek co m p e n sa tio n  v ia  a 
c iv il lia b ility  action  b ro u g h t in  th e  co m p e te n t co u rt. A lth o u g h  su ch  a  s o lu tio n  is 
p e a ce fu l am ong th e  d iffe re n t s id e s  o f th e  le g a l and  th e o re tic a l d e b a te , th e  s p e c ific  
ch a ra c te ris tic s  o f th e  a p p lic a b le  c iv il lia b ility  sys te m  s till lead  to  ce rta in  e le m e n ts  o f 
d isco rd . W ith in  the  E C , th e  la te s t po s itio n  has been to  estab lish  a  system  o f s tric t 
lia b ility  w ith  se ve ra l e x c lu s io n  c la u se s . H o w e ve r,re ce n t suggestions have been to 
in tro d u ce  a  m uch s tric te r sys te m  o f abso lu te  lia b ility  and  a lso  a re ve rsa l o f th e  burden 
o f p ro o f w ith  re sp e ct to  ca u s a tio n  79.
O n  th e  o th e r h and , w hen da m a g e  can n o t be  p a id  fo r v ia  c iv il lia b ility , fo r the 
rea so n s  m entioned  a b o ve , it sh o u ld  be co m p e n sa te d  th rough a  com pensa tion  
sch e m e . A m ong  p o ss ib le  co m p e n sa tio n  schem es an  in te re s tin g  d e ve lo p m e n t is  the 
e s ta b lish m e n t o f v o lu n ta ry  a n n u a l ag reem en ts be tw een  econom ic g roups and the
79 S e e  p o in t 10 o f th e  E xp la n a to ry  S ta tem en t;
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S ta te , w h ich  agreem en ts sh o u ld  sp e c ify  th e  a m oun t o f each co n trib u tio n  and th e  
m easures th a t should  b e  taken  to  rem edy any dam age 80.
Qft
F u rth e rm o re , as in Japan , o th e r typ e s  o f non le g a lly  e n fo rceab le  ins trum en ts  co u ld  
be used, such as p o llu tio n  co n tro l agreem ents, w h ich  a re  p riva te  co n tra c ts  s ig n e d  
betw een a  p riv a te  e n te rp rise  a n d  th e  loca l a u th o rity  o r th e  loca l c itiz e n  g ro u p s  
sp e c ify in g  th e  "p o llu tion  righ ts" and  p re ve n tive  d u tie s  o f th e  priva te  com pany. S ee  
K a zu  K ato , "The new frontiers of environmental policy in Japarf, C hapter V , P art B  o f 
E n v iro n m e n ta l L iab ility ;
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